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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by 
Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major 
issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st 
century global politics. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, 
projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research 
agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing 
agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in 
Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, and e-books. Most of these are 
also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinions expressed by the author(s).  
 
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers (ENTraNCE Judges)  
This series of working papers is published in the context of ENTraNCE Judges, training for national 
judges in competition law. The training is organised by the RSCAS, with the financial support of DG 
Competition of the European Commission. In the context of the training programme, selected judges 
from different EU Member States attend both online and residential training activities in Florence. 
Each year the training focusses on a different aspect of competition law enforcement that is relevant to 
the national judiciary.  
Information concerning the ENTraNCE Judges training program can be found at: 
http://www.eui.eu/Projects/ENTRANCE/Home.aspx 
Each working paper includes the case notes written by the national judges participating in one edition 
of ENTraNCE Judges. In the context of the training activities, in fact, each participating judge is 
requested to summarise and to comment on a national judgement that is related to the field of 
competition law. The working paper thus aims to increase understanding of the challenges faced by 
the national judiciary in enforcing national and EU competition in the context of the decentralised 




This working paper includes a collection of case notes written by the national judges who attended the 
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers (ENTraNCE Judges 2013). 
The training programme was organised by the RSCAS between February and November 2013, with 
the financial contribution of the DG Competition of the European Commission. The case notes 
included in the working paper summarise judgments from the different EU Member States that relate 
to different aspects of competition law enforcement. The working paper thus aims to increase the 
understanding of the challenges faced by the national judiciary in enforcing national and EU 
competition in the context of the decentralised regime of competition law enforcement introduced by 
Reg. 1/2003. 
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1. Introduction to the Collective Working Paper 
 
Giorgio Monti and Pier Luigi Parcu 
Introduction 
This working paper includes a collection of case notes written by the national judges who attended the 
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers (ENTraNCE Judges 2013). 
The training programme was organised by the RSCAS between February and November 2013, with 
the financial contribution of the DG Competition of the European Commission. The case notes 
included in the working paper summarise judgments from the different EU Member States that relate 
to different aspects of competition law enforcement. In this introduction we briefly recall the cases and 
elaborate on some shared themes that arise from the decentralized enforcement of antitrust rules across 
the European Union. 
The Scope of Application of the Competition Rules 
Judge McGovern’s discussion of Medicall Ambulance Limited v. Health Service Executive illustrates 
how the Irish courts are committed to applying principles from the ECJ to the interpretation of national 
competition law, even when this risks sitting uneasily with the national statutory provisions. In the 
case at hand the issue was whether the defendant as an ‘undertaking’ even if it was not operating to 
make profit. This caused some difficulty because the national legislation defined undertakings as 
entities that operate ‘for gain.’ Notwithstanding this explicit statutory language the national court 
managed to find that the defendant did operate as an undertaking because while it did not make profits 
it was gaining from its policy of discriminating against its rivals. This is also one of several cases in 
this collection that involves private enforcement, indicating an increased activism in this field. Still on 
the question of the scope of application of the competition rules, Judge Calgano’s analysis of Atlantica 
v Coutnav rejects the application of the competition rules in cases where the defendant is a public law 
entity in Tunisia and under principles of international law it enjoys immunity. The case is also 
noteworthy for the possibly questionable suggestion that blocking access of a ship on the route from 
Genova to Tunis would not affect trade between Member States, which might require further 
discussion, not least in light of the judgment in Case C-306/96 Javico v YSLP which suggests a more 
careful assessment of the facts. A similarly restrictive interpretation of the effect on trade is found in 
Portuguese Competition Authority v. Baxter – Médico Famaracêutica, Lda and Glintt – Business 
Solutions, Lda, discussed by Judge Nogueira. On the facts two firms colluded to exploit their position 
in the market for the sale of a billing system and it is not a remote possibility that non-Portuguese 
suppliers might be considering entry into the Portuguese market, so the pattern of trade could be 
affected even if the likely immediate scope of the agreement is domestic. 
Procedural Issues 
Convergence between national and European norms is of course much more complex when it comes 
to matters of procedure. Judge Simplis takes us through the various stages of the litigation in the cartel 
for milk production in Greece and notes the careful manner in which fundamental rights 
considerations inform the analysis of issue such as the role of presumptions, access to the file, and the 
impartiality of the decision maker. Likewise, Judge Ungureanu discusses a procedural issue which was 
addressed for the first time in Romania in S.C. Alpiq Romindustries s.r.l. v. Romanian Competition 
Authority. Here the court had to determine how far legal and professional privilege applied. It will be 
recalled that on this point the ECJ has indicated that national rules diverge on the scope of this 
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principle so that there can remain differences. On the facts the issue was resolved by noting that the 
document under question had been prepared before the antitrust authorities had begun procedures and 
so could not constitute a document worthy of protection. In Portugal, Judge Assunção finds that in 
Association of Navigation of Portugal (AGEPOR) v. Portuguese Competition Authority the court 
explored the right of access to documents by the defendant and examined closely the privilege against 
self-incrimination, serving as a reminder of the importance to safeguard the accused’s fundamental 
rights. More controversial in Portugal is the power that courts have in revising the fine set by the NCA 
upwards, which Judge Roque reports in Madeira’s driving schools SMTZ and others v. Portuguese 
Competition Authority. This is in line with the powers of the ECJ under EU Law, but there is some 
disquiet among some jurists as to whether this power is appropriate: in criminal cases normally appeal 
courts may only revise a penalty downwards and to some a similar approach should be followed in 
competition cases given the quasi-criminal nature of the procedures. An element to consider on 
evaluating the issue is if the deterrence aim pursued by the fining policy is to be left only to the NCA’s 
assessment or if it should be re-examined by the court in all possible directions. 
Of much practical significance is Judge Paneda Usunariz’s discussion of BCN Aduanas y 
Trasportes v. Spanish Competition Authority. Here the Spanish court held (in a manner similar to the 
German courts) that the 10% turnover ceiling for a fine should be interpreted as the maximum fine that 
the authority may impose, and not as a ceiling. It held that this was based on the protection of the rule 
of law, whereby the defendant had to know what the maximum fine could be. This can have 
significant effects on the way the fine is appraised. In the approach of the Commission, suppose the 
basic amount is EUR 10 million, then the Commission will consider aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances to determine if the fine should go up or down. Suppose that the aggravating 
circumstances lead to a fine of EUR 15 million but that this is above 10% of the defendant’s turnover: 
then the fine will be reduced. However, under the approach suggested by the Spanish Court here, the 
NCA would first have to determine what the maximum fine could be and so identify what percentage 
of the turnover would reflect the gravity of the offence under consideration. So for instance it may be 
that the ring leader of a cartel would merit a fine amounting to 9% of turnover, the fine would then be 
calculated on this finding. The two approaches could lead to divergent results in a good number of 
cases, and it may well be that the ECJ will one day be called to determine whether this approach 
espoused by the Spanish and German judges is in line with EU law by asking if it allows for effective 
enforcement of the competition rules. It is perhaps surprising that while the Spanish courts make a 
good number of references to the ECJ to clarify issues pertaining to distribution contracts between oil 
companies and petrol stations, when the law appears fairly well settled, an extremely controversial 
procedural matter as that identified in these cases has yet to receive a reference for a preliminary 
ruling. 
Damages Actions 
The struggle to introduce the principle of full compensation for antitrust violations indicated by the 
ECJ to the Member States in their judicial practices is still undergoing. Three judges comment on 
follow on actions and the legal force of decisions of the national competition authority. Judge Puccini 
covers the important judgment of Pasquale Savarese v. Lloyd Adriatico S.p.A. where the court held 
that a finding of a cartel leads to a presumption that prices have been increased, which may be rebutted 
by the defendant but then the defendant must show with precision that the price increase has other 
causes than the cartel. On the facts the defendant had suggested that high insurance prices in Italy have 
to do with issues like the high number of fraudulent claims, but this general observation was not 
sufficient to show that the defendant’s prices were not further raised as a result of the cartel. In 
contrast, Judge Todorova reports that the Bulgarian courts have placed the onus of proof on the 
plaintiff to show a causal link between the infringement and the harm, although this (X v Z Ltd) was a 
case of unfair competition that would fall outside the scope of the EU antitrust prohibitions. 
Nevertheless, this contrast illustrates the relevance of the Damages Directive to codify aspects of 
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private enforcement. Judge Goda’s discussion of Šiaulių tara v. Stumbras gives a scenario where the 
defendant appeals both the decision of the Lithuanian competition authority on the merits (i.e. it 
challenges whether the findings of a restrictive practice were made out) and contests the damages 
award. This is somewhat unusual in that normally the defendant will appeal the decision directly. On 
the damages award the Court of Appeal applied general principles of civil law and recalled the 
deference that should be afforded to court appointed experts who are called upon to estimate the losses 
suffered by the plaintiff. 
Judge Todorova returns to the difficult issue of causation in her commentary about I.B. AD v. 
Bulgarian Telecommunications Company EAD. Here the claimant sought damages because the 
defendant provided discriminatory access so as to raise the claimant’s cost on the retail market for 
dial-up internet. However, because of the growth of cable access to internet it was not possible to 
prove that the defendant’s abusive conduct was the reason for the claimant’s fall in profits.  
Some of the difficult issues raised in these cases, especially those related to the value of the NCA’s 
decision for the courts and of the issue of causation, at least for restrictive agreements, have found 




Judge Zenkova allows us to follow up on the ECJ’s judgment in the Slovenská Sporiteľňa v. Slovakian 
Competition Authority case. It will be recalled that here three national banks had agreed to boycott a 
new financial services provider and the question arose whether the alleged illegal operation of this 
new entrant was relevant in assessing the application of Article 101. The ECJ’s negative answer was 
followed to the letter by the national court, and in particular the national court noted that, on the facts, 
the cartel members only mentioned their concerns about the illegal conduct of the new entrant after the 
NCA had begun investigating the cartel, perhaps indicating that the defence was a pretext. 
Judge Calcagno discusses the role of leniency applications in Butangas Spa and Liquidas Spa v. 
Italian Competition Authority where the administrative court explained the evidentiary power of 
leniency applications, reminding us that whilst the information contained in a leniency document is 
important, one should also ensure that it is corroborated by other items of evidence. 
Judge Maciejevski highlights a bidding cartel where the cooperation between the two competitors 
was very intense and where the court took its time to explain the role of competition law enforcement 
in these kinds of cases, identifying the reasons for the prohibition and the purpose of fining policies. It 
is likely that this case, Eksortus and Specialus Montažas – NTP v. Lithuania Competition Authority, 
will serve as an important precedent, not so much for the points of law it makes, but for explaining the 
competition culture which antitrust laws are designed to bring about. Similarly Judge Szabó’s 
discussion of a similar cartel in Hungary (Adeptus Zrt. and others vs Hungarian Competition 
Authority) reveals how bid rigging remains a major concern and a widespread antitrust violation across 
the EU. 
Judge Usunariz reports on one of a good number of disputes that surfaced in Spain with respect to 
the arrangements between petrol supplies and petrol stations, TOBAR v. CEPSA, Estaciones de 
Servicio S.A. This helps us trace the implementation of a reference for a preliminary ruling back into 
the national court, where we note how closely the reasoning of the ECJ is followed. What appears 
from this case is how a range of issues that require resolution remain to be determined. For instance, in 
this case the issue of the voidness of the contract came up, however, a more detailed consideration of 
                                                     
1
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing 
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of 
the European Union, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, p. 1–19. 
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the impact of the voidness of a specific clause with the validity of the contract as a whole still appears 
as an open issue that could benefit from a full discussion by the ECJ. 
Regulated Sectors 
One of the more tricky fields for the application of competition law is that of industries that are 
regulated for public interest reasons. For instance, judge Raycheva highlights the tension between the 
regulation of the medical profession and the antitrust rules in Bulgarian Medical Association v. 
Bulgarian Competition Authority. Here the NCA challenged a decision of the association to stipulate 
minimum fees for certain medical services, while the association had seen that this fee structure was 
necessary to guarantee the quality of service delivery. In this kind of discussion (competition v 
quality) the guidance from the ECJ is thin and, on the light of precedents, it may be difficult for the 
association to claim that price fixing is ever a proportionate way of ensuring quality of service 
provision; however the matter requires further discussion by competition authorities. The regulation of 
the medical profession also came under antitrust scrutiny in Portugal, in Association of Doctors of 
Portugal v. Portuguese Competition Authority where again the issue of price fixing was at stake. Here 
the national courts considered and confirmed the competence of the NCA to apply the law to 
associations of undertakings; as Judge Assunção notes, it is very significant that the Constitutional 
Court heard this case, not least as the NCA had pursued a number of professional associations, thus its 
stance was legitimized. Further legitimation came from the ECJ, as judge Roque reports on Ordem dos 
Técnicos Oficiais de Contas v. Portuguese Competition Authority where the ECJ explained the role of 
competition law in sectors with professional associations, affording some protection from the 
application of competition law only when restrictive practices are strictly necessary for the proper 
performance of the service in question. 
Another important principle was settled very elegantly in Orthopaedic companies and National 
Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) v. Lithuania Competition Authority, discussed by Judge Gida. Here the 
parties claimed that their collusion was required by the national regulatory framework, but the court 
noted that the scope for this line of argument is very limited indeed and on the facts found that the 
regulator had not eliminated all scope of competition among the defendants. A similar issue arose in 
Judge Pieńkowska’s case note, Stalexport Company v. Polish Competition Authority. The NCA had 
fined the owner of a stretch of motorway for charging users a toll charge even during a time when the 
road was under repair and traffic was limited severely. Again here the fact that the regulatory system 
authorized the charging of fees to road users was not sufficient to constitute a defence under the 
domestic law on abuse of dominance because the regulatory framework did not require a fee be levied, 
and it was thought unreasonable to continue to require toll charges when the road was being repaired 
so extensively. 
An alternative way of seeing the state’s involvement is to consider whether the state, in regulating a 
particular market, itself acts as an undertaking. An interesting case taking this approach is reported by 
judge Mac Eochaidh, Island Fisheries Teoranta v. The Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources. Here it was found that it was plausible that the fees set by a minister for use of an 
essential facility could constitute an abuse of dominance and damages could be claimed by those 
harmed by the excessively high harbor charges. 
These cases in this section are a reminder that it would be wise for regulatory frameworks to be 
revised systematically to ensure either compliance with EU competition law or, if necessary, to 
explore how to balance the demands of competitive markets with other public interests. The role of an 
NCA as a competition advocate – encouraging Ministers and regulators to consider the competitive 
effects of their practices might be a viable substitute to litigation.  
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Abuse of Dominance 
It is trite law that all abuse cases start with defining the relevant market. Judge Puccini brings to our 
attention a very close judicial review of this issue in CETEL S.N.C. and others v. ENEL S.p.A. The 
courts paid close attention to the Commission’s Notice on market definition but also noted that the 
approach to determining the market had to be commercially realistic from the start, so that identifying 
the defendant’s business model and its competitors would be a useful starting point for trying to work 
out demand and supply side substitutability – simple reference to the business of the accused is not 
enough to find dominance. 
Judge Szabó notes the very well-known difficulties in litigating cases where the abuse is 
exploitative, as in Private Radio Broadcaster v. State-owned Hungarian radio company. Here the 
private broadcaster was sued for failure to pay the radio company. This dispute arose because the 
defendant had originally signed up to a long term deal whereby the plaintiff agreed to broadcast a 
significant amount of hours. Later the defendant scaled down its ambitions and broadcast fewer 
programmes but still had to pay the sum under the original contract. While it was clear that the 
plaintiff’s insistence caused harm the court found that there were good reasons for it to insist on being 
paid in light of the investments it had made. 
However, even exclusionary abuse cases may prove tricky, Judge Raycheva’s discussion of Vitosha 
Ski AD and others v. Bulgarian Competition Authority illustrates how difficult it is to classify and 
identify exclusionary practices when the dominant firm seeks to protect or expand its dominant 
position. Here the NCA and two appellate courts all interpreted the essential facts in a divergent 
manner. Likewise, in Judge Ernitis’ discussion of Estonian Competition Authority v. Estonian Post we 
find courts differing on whether the dominant player had indeed foreclosed market access by 
discriminating against rivals. Part of the difficulty might be that the ECJ’s case law has set out fairly 
precise rules for identifying certain types of abuse, but classifying less frequent or recognizable 
conducts in these stylized types is often tricky. 
Judge Titsias’s annotation of Greek medicines distributor v. GlaxoSmithKline allows us to see how 
the ECJ’s case law on the parallel trade in pharmaceuticals is received in the domestic courts. On the 
facts it was held that a dominant firm abuses its dominance if it refuses normal orders from its 
distributors. As Judge Titsias astutely remarks, there seems to be a slight discrepancy between the 
advice of the ECJ and the approach of the Greek court: while the ECJ appeared to suggest that a 
refusal to honour an order would be abusive having regard to both the size of the order and the 
previous business relationship between the parties, the Greek court appears to consider only the 
former. As the learned judge notes the Greek court’s position is probably to be preferred because the 
point is to prevent the market partitioning effect of the dominant firm’s conduct. 
Judge Chavdar brings to our attention a case which seems to show the inadequacy of using 
competition law, Ethna Cargo v. Bulgarian Competition Authority. The claimant was the client of a 
telecommunications operator. He asked to terminate the contract and move to another telecoms 
operator (there are two others on the Bulgarian market) but the defendant promised better terms, so the 
claimant stayed. Then the defendant did not do as promised. At this stage, one would naturally 
consider that the claimant has a cause of action in damages for breach of contract and/or 
misrepresentation. However the claimant brought the matter to the NCA. It and the courts had to then 
struggle with the slippery question of whether there was an abuse of a collective dominant position in 
view of the onerous terms set by the defendant for rescinding the contract and transferring the numbers 
to another supplier. In the end the court failed to find collective dominance. However, this case would 
appear to be a matter for the national regulator, rather than the competition authority. The antitrust 
aspects of the case are very tricky indeed for the scope of the notion of collective dominance remains 
still quite unclear even in ECJ’s jurisprudence. 
Judge Neimanis identifies a set of three cases which concerns buyer power, Maxima Latvija and 
others v. Latvian Competition Authority. This discussion is valuable because the Latvian legislation 
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contains a specific article addressing abuse of buyer power and the cases illustrate the varying ways by 
which powerful buyers can take advantage of their position to impose onerous terms on their suppliers. 
However, here one wonders if the rules are not being applied to behavior that damages competition, or 
just to conduct that is unfair. The difficulty in drawing this borderline is even more pronounced in 
Judge Pieńkowska’s discussion of Getin Noble Bank v. Polish Competition Authority, where a bank’s 
imposition of excessive charges on clients was condemned, more for their unfairness than for their 
anticompetitiveness. In this instance the NCA has competence to apply both consumer and 
competition law, and at times the two provisions may appear the in tension with each other: if a 
customer finds high charges in one bank, surely she can find another bank to contract with? In other 
words, if a market is competitive does one need consumer law as a market protection instrument? 
Besides its normal role as a contractual protection instrument? A clear answer to this type of doubts it 
is still lacking and national case laws reflects the uncertainty. 
A Brief Conclusion 
As with earlier working papers materializing from this training programme, we observe judges and 
competition authorities drawing on the EU Law acquis to inform their approaches, indicating an 
increasing degree of substantial convergence among the Member States. Legal provisions are 
generally aligned and the choice between the use of EU law or national laws, always based on the 
effect on trade test, normally does not have any substantive consequence on the merit of the case. 
Only rarely, some specific national provisions, most of the time essentially pertaining to 
confining fields, like unfair competition, may still cause some minor discrepancy in the 
application of competition principles.  
At the same time, even if the substance is converging, we undoubtedly find that national procedural 
autonomy may sometimes lead to slightly different approaches across jurisdictions. In this regard, it is 
helpful to also be able to trace the story of cases that have gone to the ECJ on preliminary rulings and 
to be shown how these are concluded, often with very subtle and helpful readings of the guidance from 
the ECJ. Nonetheless, some remaining uncertainties may require for the future an increase in referral 
to the ECJ or maybe even a more frequent request of support to the Commission in dubious instances. 
As in the past, the cases discussed below show that “new” Member States are more likely to 
face “antique” anti-competitive behaviours, such as open air cartels and difficult cases of 
exploitative abuses. While this is an admittedly small sample, what might be remarked is how 
“domestic” most of the cases taken up by NCAs are, at times indeed the view is taken that there is no 
effect on trade so that only national competition law applies. This suggests that many markets remain 
local, but also that it is perhaps in local markets where a “competition culture” has yet to filter 
through.  
Diverging public interests and sometime uncertain boundaries between competition laws and other 
laws, especially in traditionally regulated sectors, show up frequently in the cases presented. In this 
regard, it is particularly encouraging to see that many NCAs do not avoid challenging established 
practices in traditionally regulated sectors when these impede entry by new competitors. 
All in all, when judging from the cases presented in the ENtraNCE Judges 2013, convergence 
in Member States’ enforcement of competition law is continuing to advance, both in the themes 
treated and in the solutions proposed. The area of discrepancy is reducing essentially to 
procedural matters and to few very specific national provisions, but fundamental 




2. The Scope of Application and Procedural Aspects of Competition Law Enforcement 
2.1. Brian Mc Govern (High Court, Ireland), Medicall Ambulance Limited v. Health Service 
Executive 
Introduction 
This was a judgment given by Mr. Justice Cooke on 8th March, 2011, in an application for judicial 
review. The case is of interest because it involved a preliminary ruling on the application of the 
definition of ‘undertaking’ in the circumstances which arose. In the course of his judgment, Justice 
Cooke obtained assistance from the approach of the Court of Justice in similar circumstances in Case 
C-475/99, Ambulanz Glockner v. Landkreis [2011] ECR 1-8089. That case was concerned with an 
allegation of the abuse of a dominant position by a number of voluntary non-profit organisations 
endowed with public functions under the German law for the provision of both public Emergency 
Ambulance Services and services licensed for general patient transport. 
Facts 
In the Medicall Ambulance case, the plaintiff company was the owner of a fleet of ambulances and 
carried on the business of providing the service of patient transfer by ambulance for members of the 
public and their insurers and to hospitals and other healthcare facilities, including hospitals and 
facilities operated by the defendant. 
The defendant is a statutory body established under Irish legislation to discharge a wide range of 
functions in relation to the provisions of healthcare and personal and social services in the State. In 
addition to its responsibilities for managing and operating hospitals and other facilities and providing 
medical care, the defendant has roles of a general, social and public character to promote the 
improvement and protection of health, safety and welfare, and functions of an advisory, educational 
and regulatory nature. Among its functions is the provision of ambulance services through its National 
Ambulance Service. In a total national fleet of approximately 460 ambulances, approximately 400 are 
operated by the National Ambulance Service and approximately 60 by private operators. Of the fleet 
of private ambulances, 22 were operated by the plaintiff. 
In order to operate the National Ambulance Service, the defendant maintained a network of eight 
regional ‘call centres’ or ‘ambulance control centres’. These processed requests are received from 
hospitals and other facilities for the provision of an ambulance to transport a patient to or from a 
hospital, or between hospitals, and it allocated the job to an operator. In the case of the transfer of a 
public patient, the job was allocated to a vehicle in the National Ambulance Service. If none was 
available, then recourse was had to a private operator. The services of the private operator for public 
patient transfers were provided under a ‘framework agreement’ that was concluded by the defendant 
with three operators provided following a public procurement procedure. In the period which was 
relevant to the proceedings (1st January, 2008. to 31st January, 2011), the plaintiff was one of the 
three operators in question. 
In the case of a transfer of a private patient, the job was allocated to a private operator, or one of a 
number of private operators nominated by the patient’s health insurer. If no such operator was 
available, the job would be allocated to a vehicle in the National Ambulance Service. In that case, the 
defendant would invoice its charges directly to the responsible health insurer on the basis of ‘cost 
only’. At the judicial review hearing, the plaintiff estimated that the annual value of the market for 
private patient transfers was approximately €8m to €10m. 
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In the judicial review proceedings, the plaintiff challenged the legality of an arrangement described 
as the ‘Booking Protocol’ which, it alleged, was unilaterally introduced and imposed by the defendant 
in November, 2008, and which was operated by it until December, 2010.  
The Ruling of the High Court 
In the course of his judgment, Justice Cooke set out the nature of the Booking Protocol and, in 
particular, the protocols for private patients who were covered by current private health insurance at 
the time.  
The plaintiff’s challenge to the decision to introduce the Booking Protocol was based on two main 
grounds; (i) that its introduction was ultra vires the statutory powers of the defendant, and (ii) that the 
action of the defendant in imposing the Protocol infringed s. 5 of the Competition Act 2002 (as 
amended) and was an abuse by the defendant of its dominant position in the market for the provision 
of ambulance services for the transfer of private patients in the State.  
In the Irish Competition Act 2002, the rule prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position is set out in 
s. 5(1) which states: 
‘Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position in trade for any goods or services 
in the State or in any part of the State is prohibited.’ 
The term ‘undertaking’ is defined in s. 3 of the Act as meaning ‘a person being an individual, a body 
corporate or an unincorporated body of persons engaged for gain in the production, supply or 
distribution of goods or the provision of a service’.  
For the plaintiff to succeed in its application, the court first had to be satisfied that the defendant 
was to be treated, in the circumstances outlined, as an ‘undertaking’, as defined in s. 3 of the Act.  
In his judgment, Justice Cooke carried out an extensive review of cases in the Irish courts and the 
ECJ on what constitutes an ‘undertaking’, as meant by s. 3 of the Competition Act 2002, and Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU in European Union law.  
In Deane & Ors. v. The Voluntary Health Insurance Board [1992] 2 I.R. 319. The Supreme Court 
had to consider the definition of an ‘undertaking’ in the context of services provided by the defendant 
(a health insurer) as a statutory body incorporated under the Voluntary Health Insurance Act 1957. 
The issue turned upon the use of the expression ‘for gain’ in the definition. In the High Court, the 
learned judge reached his decision on the basis that the words connoted ‘for profit’, but the Supreme 
Court disagreed, holding that the true construction of the section is that the words ‘for gain’ connote 
merely an activity carried on, or a service supplied in return for a charge or payment. 
Justice Cooke, in his judgment, pointed out that in the case law relating to Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, where there is no definition of ‘undertaking’ and therefore no element of being ‘engaged for 
gain’, an entity will be considered to act as an undertaking where it is engaged in an economic activity. 
He referred to SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v. Euro Control [1994] ECR 1-43, where the ECJ held that 
‘the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless 
of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed’. He also referred to Pavel Pavlov & 
Ors. v. SPMS [2000] ECR 1-6451, where the court held that ‘any activity consisting in offering goods 
and services on a given market is an economic activity . . .’ 
He concluded that, under European Union law, the obtaining of a charge or payment in return for 
the goods or services offered is not an essential ingredient. However, he also said that it was equally 
clear that the taking of payment, or the making of a charge for a service, does not of itself necessarily 
characterise the entity as an economic operator and therefore as an undertaking. 
In Carrigaline Company Ltd. v. Minister for Transport [1997] 1 ILRM 241, at 290, Justice Keane 
held that the Minister for Transport was not acting as an ‘undertaking’ within the meaning of the 
(High Court, Ireland), Medicall Ambulance Limited v. Health Service Executive 
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definition when issuing television retransmission licenses under the Wireless Telegraphy Acts, 
notwithstanding the fact that a substantial initial levy, together with an annual fee based on turnover, 
was the price of the license. Similarly, in the Euro Control case, the ECJ held that it was not an 
undertaking and that the collection of route charges by the organisation could not be separated from 
the organisation’s other activities. Those charges are merely the consideration, payable by users, for 
the obligatory and exclusive use of air navigation control facilities and services, and that in collecting 
them, Euro Control can be regarded as a public authority acting in the exercise of its powers relating to 
the control and supervision of air space, which are typically those of a public authority. They are not 
of an economic nature that justifies the application of the Treaty Rules of Competition.  
Justice Cooke went on to deal with some cases where a public authority (including a Government 
Minister) while principally engaged in activities of a public interest and non-economic character, may, 
in certain circumstances, be treated as an undertaking if and when economic activities are engaged in, 
and goods and services are offered by it, to the market. The determination of the issue as to whether an 
activity falls within the exercise of public powers, or as an economic activity, must be carried out 
separately for each activity exercised by a given entity. See C-49/07 MOTOE [2008] ECR 1-4816. 
Justice Cooke concluded that ‘neither the objectors for which a body or organisation has been 
established nor the basis of its financing, nor the fact that it carries on predominantly public interest 
and non-economic activities prevents the entity being classed as an undertaking for other activities, 
even when those activities may be merely incidental to its main area of operation’. 
He went on to hold that, in assessing whether the particular activities of a public body may be 
economic activities attracting the categorisation as an ‘undertaking’, it may be a relevant but not a 
determining consideration that the particular activities are typical of, and capable of being, provided 
by private operators, especially when the services are offered on a market where such private operators 
are already active. One has to ask ‘what is the entity in question actually doing when it engages in the 
conduct sought to be impugned?’  
Having considered the facts in the case before him, Justice Cooke concluded that ‘. . . the conduct 
of the defendant in introducing and effectively imposing upon private operators, including the 
plaintiff, such a regime for the allocation of ambulance service requests, has, in these circumstances, 
the necessary indices of an economic activity which bring the conduct within the scope of the 
definition of ‘undertaking’ in s. 3 of the Act of 2002.’ Justice Cooke’s reasons are set out in the 
judgment. Among the matters Justice Cooke took into account was the fact that the provision of 
ambulance services within the State includes a number of private operators who are in competition 
with one another and, to a degree, with the National Ambulance Service. The learned judge concluded 
that it was clear that the services in question were provided ‘for gain’. Although the HSE emphasised 
the fact that its charges were calculated exclusively by reference to the cost incurred by the HSE, and 
that no element of profit was included, Justice Cooke decided that profit was not a necessary 
ingredient for being ‘engaged for gain’.  
The Court adopted the approach of the Court of Justice in Case C-475/99, Ambulanz Glockner v. 
Landkreis [2001] ECR 1-8089. In that case, the Court was concerned with an allegation of the abuse 
of a dominant position by a number of voluntary, non-profit organisations endowed with public 
functions, under German law, for the provision of ambulance services, both Public Emergency 
Services and services licensed for general patient transport. Although the questions referred to the 
Luxembourg Court for a preliminary ruling were mainly concerned with the extent to which the abuse 
of a dominant position applied to a public undertaking endowed with special or exclusive rights in the 
context of what was then Article 90 EC (now Article 106 TEFU), the Court had to consider the 
concept of ‘undertaking’ when applied to the non-profit medical aid organisations concerned. The ECJ 
held that it is the essential nature of the service, and the circumstances in which it is offered or 
provided, which determine whether it is an economic activity. The fact that it is provided because the 
organisation in question has taken on a public duty to do so, does not prevent it being characterised as 
an economic activity.  
Brian Mc Govern 
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Comment 
In the Irish case, Justice Cooke determined that the activity of the defendant in providing ambulance 
services and prescribing the manner in which services by private ambulances will be performed, and 
the manner in which transfer jobs will be allocated, is that of an ‘undertaking’. He also held that where 
a public body has a variety of roles and functions, the different activities which these involve will fall 
to being analysed separately for the purpose of applying competition rules and the notion of 
‘undertaking’. In his judgment, Justice Cooke quoted from the opinion of the Advocate General in the 
Ambulanz Glockner case, when he said that ‘the basic test is whether the entity in question is engaged 
in an activity which consists in offering goods and services on a given market and which could at 
least, in principle, be carried out by a private actor in order to make profits’.  
The case comprises an interesting analysis of what is an ‘undertaking’ and what are the relevant 
considerations or indicators to be taken into account when assessing that question in Irish domestic 
law and having regard to the decisions of the ECJ. In particular, the case provides a useful discussion 
on whether or not a body can be an ‘undertaking’ if it acts on a ‘non-profit’ basis. This is useful in the 
Irish context, having regard to the definition of ‘undertaking’ contained in section 3 of the 
Competition Act 2002, which refers to an individual body corporate, or other body engaged ‘for gain’ 
in the production, supply or distribution of goods or the provision of a service.  
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2.2. Lorenza Calcagno (Court of Genova, Italy), Atlantica v. Cotunav 
Facts 
Atlantica has filed a suit asking for an injunction in respect of all the defendants and particularly: 
1. An order to the Tunisian Ministry of Transport and the country’s Merchant Navy and Ports 
Authority (OMMP) to permit the Atlantic ships (those called ro/ro ships) to enter the harbor of La 
Goulette; 
2. An order to Cotunav not to moor (or, in general, not to operate) in the Port of Genoa through a 
Rebora or Tirrenia agent and, in consequence, an order to Rebora and Stazioni Marittime not to 
work on the mooring of Cotunav’s ships. 
As a matter of fact, Atlantica told the Court that it had obtained, on November 6
th
 (2012), permission 
to work with ro/ro ships on the line between Italy and La Goulette, Tunis, but on the 23rd November, 
OMMP denied an Atlantica ship permission to enter the port of La Goulette because of the traffic. The 
plaintiff has asserted that the reason given for the denial was untrue because permission was given, at 
the same time, to other ships. The suit was filed by Atlantica on the 1st December. As a matter of law, 
the plaintiff stated that the behaviour was a violation of the internal reciprocity principle (as fixed in 
Article 16, Preleggi Italian Civil Code); 
1. a violation of the treaty between Tunisia and the EU (the Euro Mediterranean Agreement) that 
created an organised scope in order to apply the competition rules and access to the service’s 
market; 
2. a violation of internal unfair competition rules. 
In reference to the second point, Atlantica asserted that Cotunav, (which holds a monopoly in the 
Tunisian market for ro/ro shipping lines) and OMMP agreed in order to exclude the Plaintiff from the 
market, and this was a clear violation of the rules of the Treaty, particularly of Articles 56 and 102, 
etc. Atlantica argued the existence of an abuse of a dominant position that was created by the 
agreement between the private company, Cotunav, and the Authority of the Port of Tunis, OMMP. 
Judicial Proceedings 
In the First Instance, the judge declared the existence of an agreement between Cotunav and OMMP in 
order to discriminate against the Italian shipping line in respect of the relevant market in competition 
with the Tunisian shipping line, and that the refusal of entrance to the Port of La Goulette was not 
caused by a real traffic jam problem, but the judge stated it was impossible to pronounce the 
injunctions that had been requested because of the quality of OMMP, a public subject on which Italian 
Judges cannot deliver a judgment. 
Atlantica filed an appeal gainst the decision, asking that Cotunav and OMMP be ordered separately 
to repair competition on the Genoa-La Goulette line for ro/ro ships and, as a consequence, to let 
Atlantica’s ships enter the Port of Tunis and to order Cotunav to stop the line in order to avoid the 
strengthening of the dominant position of the defendant. For the comprehension of the Euro 
Mediteranneo Treaty, Atlantica asked the Court, as judge of the Last Instance, to question the Court of 
Justice on whether the rules of the UE treaty 101 and 102 can find direct application in the agreement 
with Tunisia. Atlantica observed that an Italian Judge, as a Community Judge, must pronounce on 
whether the market is not ruled as competition law required and, in the case filed, the order can be 
made by looking at the fact as a violation of rules 101 and 102 of the treaty. Atlantica recalled also the 




The Court decided as follows: 
1) the principle of reciprocity is not violated, because it is referred to in the sense of the general 
situation; 
2) the OMMP is a public subject and so it is not possible for a judge to pronounce an order; the 
international law, and the principle of sovereignty prevent it from falling under the power of the 
Court; 
3) the Treaty indicates that there is no direct application of the rules of European competition law 
and it is not possible to pronounce using the theory of effects because of the distortion of the 
market; the agreement occurred in Tunisia and not in Italy; the Genoa-Tunis line is not a ‘sea 
highway’, and it has no community relevance because Tunisia is outside the community market. 
Comment 
The case summarised here has several different interesting matters for discussion. In particular, the 
question is whether EU competition law can be relied upon to sanction an agreement between a 
foreign public entity and a private undertaking that is operating outside the EU. In the case, the Court 
decided that the most important points were the nature of OMMP and the limits arising from 
international law. Perhaps, the plaintiff could find a different defence by asking for an injunction 
relating to the unfair rules that are working in the internal market. 
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2.3. Iannis Symplis (Council of State, Greece), Milk producers v. Greek Competition 
Authority 
Facts 
The Greek quota for milk production under CAP
2
 was (and probably still is) barely sufficient to cover 
local demand for ‘High Temperature Short Time’ (HTST) milk. The rest of the dairy industry’s needs 
(for extended shelf life (ESL) and ultra-heat treatment (UHT) milk, condensed milk, sour milk, cream, 
yoghurt, and also for ice-cream and cheese) are covered from imports. Due to the short shelf life of 
HTST milk (5 days, including the day of processing), there is no supply substitutability for local 
production
3
. In theory, thus, even though practically all of the local production comes from very small 
holdings, this lack of supply substitutability should have provided some counterbalancing power to 
dairy farmers, against the considerable industry concentration at both the processing and the retail 
level (the combined market share of the 5 biggest processors is around 70%; at the retail level; 
supermarkets have a 70% share of the dairy market; and in the big cities, particularly Athens and 
Thessaloniki, the lion’s share of the supermarkets’ market was divided among five undertakings – one 
of whom filed for bankruptcy in 2011).  
Then, in June, 2005, a flurry of press releases from dairy farmers’ and consumers’ associations, and 
parliamentary questions from MPs representing rural areas with a strong concentration of dairy 
farming, triggered an investigation into the dairy industry by the Competition Commission (CC). The 
investigation led to two separate procedures coming before the CC. The first involved a series of 
horizontal agreements and concerted practices between milk processors, affecting both the upstream 
and the downstream markets, which had all the characteristics of a single continuous infringement, but 
were dealt with by CC (DEC. 373/V/2007) as three separate infringements. Of these, the 
infringements affecting the downstream market were punished with a gentle rap on the wrist; only one 
undertaking contested the CC’s findings, but on only one of those infringements, and that not very 
vigorously. As for the infringement affecting the upstream market, the CC concluded that milk 
processors had held a number of meetings under the auspices of their trade association, in the course 
of which they had agreed on a coordinated strategy to force milk farmers to accept lower prices, and to 
pass on to the industry part of the subsidy they received under the CAP. As a part of that strategy, they 
agreed that they would refuse to deal with any farmer attempting to switch from one processor to 
another, or with small cheese processors attempting to resell their surplus milk supply. The second 
procedure involved a string of resale price maintenance agreements between each processor and the 
supermarket chains (DEC. 369/V/2007).  
Judicial Proceedings 
The CC concluded that, since the agreements covered the whole of the national market, they 
potentially affected the trade between member-states, and, on that basis, concurrently applied both Art. 
81 TEC (101 TFEU) and its domestic identical twin, Art. 1 of Act 703/1977
4
, but none of the grounds 
                                                     
2
 See particularly Action Program 2000 and R. 3950/92, 1255/99 and 1788/2003 
3
 Except possibly in the North East, where there is the option of imports from Bulgaria and, at a pinch, the North West, 
where imports from Italy may be an option. The CC, having already concluded that any agreement affecting the whole of 
the national territory, by its definition potentially also affects the trade between member-states, did not consider it 
necessary to examine the question of supply substitutability.  
4
 Act 703/1977 has already been replaced by Act 3959/2011. Art. 1 and 2 of the new act, just as Art. 1 and 2. of Act 
703/1977, are identical to Art. 101 (para. 1 and 3) and 102 of the Treaty. Art. 3 of the Act is equivalent to Art. 101 para. 2 
of the Treaty.  
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that had been put forward turned on the issue of whether national or EU law should have been applied, 
nor was there any indication that this concours ideal d’infractions had affected the calculation of 
penalties. In one case
5
 (currently under advisement), the appellant did put forward the argument that 
the agreement fell under the de minimis rule, under both national and European law (Art. 81 and the 
block exemption regulation, R. 2790/99), but the argument was based on the undertaking’s share in the 
national market. Unlike the Expedia case (C-226/11), Art. 3 para. 2 of R. 1/2003 was not invoked, and 
therefore the courts did not have to examine the question of the relationship between national and EU 
law. In another case,
6
 the appellant did argue, inter alia, that the Athens Administrative Court of 
Appeals (AACA) had failed to give specific reasons for its finding that there was an infringement of 
Art. 81. The CoS dismissed this ground of appeal, on the basis that the appellant had not challenged 
the CC’s finding that the agreement affected trade between member states, which is the only condition 
for applying European law in addition to national law.  
The same appellant had also sought to challenge the jurisdiction of the CC, arguing that, under Art. 
2 para. 1 of R. (EC) 1184/2006
7
, the European Commission has exclusive jurisdiction on the matter. 
This argument had been rejected by the AACA, on the grounds that: 
1) the regulation applies only to procedures pending before the European Commission  
2) there was no national market organisation for milk in Greece, and  
3) the agreement was not necessary for the attainment of the objectives of Art. 33 (39) of the 
Treaty. 
The first part of the AACA’s reasoning was clearly inadequate in the way it was formulated (since it 
begged the question as to whether the regulation allowed for any other procedures, besides those 
before the European Commission), and the rest of it was not only inadequate in the absence of a 
detailed exposition of the workings of the CAP in the milk sector, but it also did not answer the 
appellant’s objection on the issue of jurisdiction. By contrast, the CoS opted – by all accounts, wisely 
so – to limit its ruling to that issue alone, and rejected the appellant’s arguments on the ground that the 
powers of national competition authorities to apply Art. 81(1) are not affected by Art. 2, para. 2 of R. 
                                                     
5
 Application 3907/2010, ADELFOI VEROPOULOI SA v CC 
6
 Judgment 2365/2013, is discussed further below. 
7
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1184/2006 of 24th July, 2006, (codifying Council Regulation No 26 of 4th April, 1962, 
applying certain rules of competition to the production of and trade in agricultural products):  
Article 1 
 Articles 81-86 of the Treaty and the provisions made for their implementation shall, subject to Article 2 of this 
Regulation, apply to all agreements, decisions and practices referred to in Articles 81(1) and 82 of the Treaty, which 
relate to the production of, or trade in, the products listed in Annex I to the Treaty. Article 2 
 1. Article 81(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to such of the agreements, decisions and practices referred to in Article 1 
of this Regulation as form an integral part of a national market organization, or are necessary for the attainment of the 
objectives set out in Article 33 of the Treaty. 
 In particular, it shall not apply to the agreements, decisions and practices of farmers, farmers' associations, or 
associations of such associations belonging to a single Member State which concern the production or sale of 
agricultural products or the use of joint facilities for the storage, treatment or processing of agricultural products, and 
under which there is no obligation to charge identical prices, unless the Commission finds that competition is thereby 
excluded or that the objectives of Article 33 of the Treaty are jeopardised. 
 2. After consulting the Member States and hearing the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned, and 
any other natural or legal person that it considers should be heard, the Commission shall have sole power, subject to 
review by the Court of Justice, to determine, by decision which shall be published, which agreements, decisions and 
practices fulfil the conditions specified in paragraph 1. 
 The Commission shall so determine, either on its own initiative or at the request of a competent authority of a 
Member State or of an interested undertaking or association of undertakings. 
 3. The publication shall state the names of the parties and the main content of the decision. It shall have regard to the 
legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.” 
(Council of State, Greece), Milk producers v. Greek Competition Authority 
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(EC) 1184/2006. It is only the power to exempt an agreement from Art 81(1) (101 para. 1) of the 
Treaty that is reserved for the Commission alone. Interestingly, the Court reached this conclusion 
without reference to Art. 5 of R. 1/2003, or to the Tele2 Polska (C 375/09) case. 
Otherwise, none of the cases raised particularly novel issues in terms of substantive law, since the 
appellants, by and large, limited themselves to challenging, directly or indirectly, the object/effect 
distinction. 
In Judgment 2780/2012, in the case of CARREFOUR – MARINOPOULOS SA v Competition 
Commission, concerning a resale price maintenance agreement between the appellant, a supermarket 
chain, and a milk processor (MEVGAL SA), the appellant thus argued, inter alia, firstly, that the 
legality of resale price maintenance agreements should be assessed under a ‘rule of reason’. Secondly, 
that an infringement can only be established if an agreement can be shown to have produced effects in 
the relevant market and only after balancing, through a rigorous and thorough economic analysis, its 
pro- and anti-competitive effects, in the light of the particular circumstances of that market; and, 
thirdly, that the Competition Commission and the AACA disregarded evidence showing that, in 
practice, the appellant had not applied the retail prices suggested by the supplier. 
This is all familiar ground, which provided the Court with an opportunity to reaffirm: 
Firstly, that, in the case of restrictions by object, there is no need to show effects, compliance, or 
that the agreement has been applied at all. Indeed, the Court, taking its cue from a remark of the CFI in 
Mannesmanröhren-Werk (T-44/00, points 132-3), went even further to hold that in the case of 
infringements by object there may not even be a need to define the relevant market except insofar as, 
in its judgment, that might be considered necessary, either in order to establish whether the agreement 
affects the trade between member states, or for the calculation of a penalty. In view of this, there is no 
question of balancing the pro- and anti-competitive effects, nor does the CC need to show that the 
agreement results in an ‘unreasonable’ restraint of trade, instead, it is the defendant undertaking that 
has the burden of proving why the agreement should be exempted under paragraph 3. Significantly, 
the Court did not make any explicit pronouncement on the question of whether, in that respect, a 
distinction should be made between restrictions by object and restrictions by effect. However, since it 
did rule that vertical restrictions by object are not only not covered by the block exemption regulation, 
but, in principle, cannot even claim the benefit of an individual exemption, there is arguably an 
implicit ruling that, even in the case of restrictions by effect, any balancing should take place in the 
context of paragraph 3. Still, formally, the question remains open, and, secondly (albeit somewhat 
implicitly and cautiously, through the structure of its argumentation), that the same rules apply to 
horizontal and vertical agreements. This is an issue where the ECJ had also chosen to tread carefully: 
In Activision Blizzard (C-260/09), the ECJ, while allowing that the same principles apply to both 
types of agreements, it pointed out that, in contrast to horizontal settings, in vertical relationships, 
communications between undertakings are normal; and when urged by the Commission to apply the 
public distantiation rule to vertical settings, that is, in essence, to reconsider the stringency, in terms of 
the evidentiary burden, of the tacit acquiescence test established in Bayer (C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P) and 
Volkswagen II (T-208/01 and C-74/04 P), the ECJ avoided deciding on the issue, on the grounds that 
neither the Commission nor the CFI had relied on that rule, but on documentary evidence. This road, 
however, was open only in part to the CoS, as the AACA, had already relied (albeit probably 
unnecessarily, on which more anon) on the public distantiation rule and therefore, although the Court 
did not need to make an explicit pronouncement on the issue of whether, in substantive law, the same 
rules apply to horizontal and vertical agreements, the question could not be entirely by-passed in the 
area of evidence and proof. The solution adopted by the Court, perhaps not an entirely satisfactory 
one, was a two-stage analysis of both the substantive and the evidentiary aspects of para. 1: A general 
overview of the principles applicable to restrictions by object (which does not distinguish between 
horizontal and vertical agreements) is followed by a ruling that RPM, as an agreement affecting prices, 
is also a restriction by object. The analysis of evidentiary rules (on which, again, more anon) follows 
the same structure: the analysis of the Court starts with a general outline of the types of evidence from 
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which the existence of an agreement may be adduced; having first established that, in both horizontal 
and vertical settings, an agreement may also be inferred, inter alia from the undertaking’s behaviour, 
or from statements addressed to it. The Court went on to rule that both the absence of a public 
distantiation (in a horizontal setting), and, the tacit acquiescence to an invitation, the expression of a 
wish, or the manifestation of the intention of a continuing business partner (in a vertical setting), are 
such types of behaviour. The two tests, the public distantiation test and the tacit acquiescence test, 
were thus implicitly presented as functional equivalents, differing only in the context of their 
application (vertical as opposed to horizontal) – a solution that comes far closer to the position of the 
Commission than the ECJ was prepared to go but, in the absence of an explicit pronouncement, it is 
still adaptable to the circumstances of future cases (particularly cases of parallel trade in 
pharmaceuticals), where an inference of tacit acquiescence would probably go against common sense. 
The actual complaint of the appellant, however, that passivity does not equal consent, was dismissed 
on the ground that, although the AACA, under the particular circumstances of the case, did not err in 
law, in relying also ‘for the sake of completeness’ on the tacit acquiescence test its judgment was in 
fact based primarily on the interpretation of documentary evidence in the light of the circumstances. 
This analysis was reaffirmed, again, in a more condensed form, in Judgments, 2007/2013 and 
2365/2013, in the cases of VIVARTIA SA (‘DELTA FOOD SA’) and FAGE – MILK PROCESSING 
INDUSTRY SA v Competition Commission, the appellants. In those cases, two of the cartel members 
had also argued, inter alia, that the main object of the agreement was to coordinate their approach on 
monitoring compliance by milk farmers with quality control regulations, thus giving the Court the 
opportunity to reaffirm that if an agreement has an anti-competitive object, it is irrelevant whether it 
also has a legitimate one.  
Given the weakness of the appellants’ case in law, it is not surprising that the thrust of their 
arguments was directed towards questions of procedure and the evaluation of evidence. Underlying 
those grounds of appeal was a general complaint that the CC and the AACA had failed to observe the 
appellants’ rights to a defence, and the presumption of innocence, that are guaranteed by Art. of the 
ECHR: In the CARREFOUR case, the appellant sought to argue that the public distantiation rule, as 
well as any recourse to the use of judicial presumptions is, in general, incompatible with the 
presumption of innocence, guaranteed by Art. 2, para. 2 of the Convention; and in the DELTA and 
FAGE cases, the appellant undertakings argued that the CC had violated their right to have their case 
tried by an impartial tribunal and their rights to defence, guaranteed under the ‘criminal head’ of Art. 
6, para. 1 of the Convention.  
The Nature of the Sanctions Imposed 
In view of the arguments of the appellants, the first issue that the CoS had to examine was the nature 
of the sanctions imposed by the CC. 
The response of the Court was markedly cautious. In the CARREFOUR case the Court held that 
‘quite independently of the question whether the sanctions for infringements of competition law 
should be considered as lato sensu criminal, in the sense of Art. 6 para. 2 of the ECHR, despite the fact 
that the decision is characterised expressis verbis as non criminal in Art. 23 para. 5 of R. 1/2003 and in 
Art. 15 para. 2 of R. 17’, there had been no violation of the Convention, either in abstracto (i.e., in 
terms of the applicable rules of evidence), or in concreto (in their application by the AACA). The 
ruling of the ECHR in the MENARINI case (27.9.2011, R.43509/08), although known to the Court, 
was politely ignored, the need to resolve a potential conflict between EU law and the Convention was 
bypassed, and the niceties of courtesy between independent jurisdictions have been preserved, in a 
manner not dissimilar in its essence to that adopted by the EU courts. Still, that formulation had left 
open the possibility to reconsider the issue, should the need arise. Indeed, in the DELTA and FAGE 
cases, in two preliminary rulings, referring the cases to an enlarged panel for a rehearing on the ground 
of their major importance, the Court seemed inclined to take the extra step: this time, citing 
(Council of State, Greece), Milk producers v. Greek Competition Authority 
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MENARINI, it asserted that ‘the case involves a charge of a ‘criminal nature’ in the sense of the 
Convention
8
. On the other hand, the quotation marks, which are used, as a matter of course, at least by 
the 2nd Section of the Court, whenever a sanction is ‘criminal’ only in the Engel sense, were 
preserved. The enlarged panel, however, while still citing MENARINI, reverted to hypothetical mode 
and, without this time making a reference to R. 1/2003 and R.17, held that even if it were to be 
assumed that the case was related to a charge of a ‘criminal nature’, there had been no breach of the 
Convention. 
The Evaluation of Evidence and the Presumption of Innocence 
In the CARREFOUR case, the CC had relied on three pieces of evidence for its finding that an anti-
competitive agreement had been concluded between the appellant and its supplier:  
1) an rpm clause in the text of the agreement on the terms of their business relationships, a copy of 
which had been forwarded to the appellant by his supplier, accompanied by a cover letter that was 
signed by the supplier's commercial director;  
2) a wholesale pricelist (retrieved from the supplier), and  
3) a representative sample of retail prices, which the undertaking had provided itself in response to 
the questionnaire of the CC, and which, when compared with the list of wholesale prices, 
confirmed that the agreement had been applied. In their submissions before the AACA, the 
appellant had argued that the infringement had not been proven to the ‘requisite legal standard’, 
because  
1) in the absence of a document signed by the appellant and accompanied by a list of agreed retail 
prices, there was no ‘positive proof’ that an agreement had been concluded, and  
2) in the absence of explicit consent, its silence should be interpreted as being a repudiation of the 
rpm clause.  
These arguments were certainly sheer sophistry, since the existence of a signed document is not a 
condition for the existence of a contract under the Civil Code. The AACA, however, prudently 
avoided entering into that issue, and dismissed the appellant’s arguments on the ground that:  
1) the absence of a signature was irrelevant, because the existence of a valid contract is not 
necessary, and 
2) the appellant, having admitted that the ‘commercial terms’ of the agreement had been agreed 
and applied, could no longer, in the absence of a public distantiation, consistently argue that the 
rpm clause did not also make part of the agreement.  
This reasoning did not leave too many options open to the appellant, except to raise the stakes: In its 
appeal before the CoS, it argued, firstly, that there is no set of finite circumstances that would allow, as 
a matter of course, the discarding of the possibility (éventualité) that the agreement achieved between 
the parties did not include the particular offending clause. Secondly, that in the field of administrative 
sanctions, a recourse to judicial presumptions in general, and to the distantiation rule in particular, or 
any drawing of adverse conclusions, that did not arise from directly proven positive behaviour but 
from the inaction or silence of the defendant, violates the presumption of innocence; and,  
3) that, in view of that presumption, the CC and the AACCA had misapplied the rules of evidence, 
firstly, by failing to attach proper weight to exonerating oral testimony, according to which the 
policy of the milk processors was only to suggest the maximum recommended prices; and, 
secondly, by failing to conduct a thorough economic analysis, in order to examine whether the 
retail prices observed might allow for the possibility of drawing an inference that no agreement 
had been concluded.  
                                                     
8
 Judgments 2447/2012, 3717/2012. 
Iannis Symplis 
18 
While the specific complaints of the appellant could be summarily dismissed as being inadmissible in 
cassation proceedings, the general argument, on the implications of the presumption of innocence for 
the evaluation of evidence, could not. In its response to the appellant’s complaints, the Court thus set 
itself two tasks: firstly, to provide an overview of the relevant principles; and, secondly, to provide a 
framework for the direct integration of the (essentially identical in their main lines) solutions adopted 
by the EU courts into domestic law. In terms of structure, the analysis of the Court was divided into 
three distinct parts, each one of them involving several small successive steps. 
The Relevance of the Evidence 
The starting point of the analysis was to examine what types of evidence can be considered in order to 
establish the existence of an agreement. In response to the appellant’s contention that only 
documentary evidence of a contract may be considered relevant, the Court held (providing several 
examples from EU case law) that, since any expression by distinct undertakings of a joint intention to 
conduct themselves on the market in a specific way constitutes an agreement, for the purposes of 
competition law, pointers to the existence of such an agreement can be adduced directly, or inferred 
indirectly, by any form of manifestation or documentation of that conduct, including business 
documents or other internal documents of an undertaking, mentions in internal documents or 
communications of other undertakings, communications from, to, or between undertakings, as well as 
actual market behaviour. Through this analysis, the elements on which the AACA had relied for its 
finding of an infringement were presented in a more general context as specific instances, or as 
examples of a general class. As a final note, it should be mentioned that there is one element that is 
conspicuously – and deliberately – missing from this shopping list of ‘smoking guns’: there is no 
mention of enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, in a vertical setting such mechanisms are equally 
compatible with the existence of an agreement, as well as with unilateral conduct; and in a horizontal 
setting, they may provide the evidence for the existence of a cartel, but not of membership in it, since 
retaliation measures can be taken equally well against renegade cartel members, or against non-joiners 
or competitors. 
The Evaluation of the Evidence 
The next question that the Court was called to examine was that of the evaluation of evidence. The 
starting point of the analysis was that, in the evaluation of evidence, the juge du fond must give full 
effect to the principle of the effectiveness of EU law. The principle of harmonisation, although not 
explicitly stated, was certainly implicit in the structure of the Court’s approach. Equally implicit in the 
Court’s analysis was the idea that, at least in the context of R. 1/2003, the principle of procedural 
autonomy may not distract from the uniform application of European competition law. 
The Court already had a rich body of case law on the evaluation of evidence, which had been 
developed mainly in the context of taxation and custom and excise. With the sole exception of the 
concept of faisceau d'indices, which is present in the case law of the EU courts, but not in the case law 
of the CoS, the approach of both jurisdictions is remarkably similar. The task that the Court set itself 
was to introduce and integrate the missing concept into its own case law. The bridgehead for what 
was, in essence, an exercise in translation was the principle, sanctioned in almost identical terms by 
both the CoS and the EU Courts
9
, that the items of evidence on which the CC and the AACA rely in a 
decision, in order to prove the existence of an infringement, must not be assessed separately, but as a 
whole. There is a wealth of cases, where the CoS, deciding on an appeal from the tax authorities or the 
customs office, held that the lower courts, by separately examining the probative value of its 
individual piece of evidence, in order to decide whether a tax offence had been committed, had erred 
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in law. What is more, in those cases, the court to which the case was remitted for reconsideration was 
not directed to examine whether a direct proof of the authority’s case could be adduced from the 
evidence as a whole, but whether the evidence, as a whole, was sufficient to establish a judicial 
presumption. It was then sufficient for the Court to link the familiar concept of judicial presumptions 
with that of faisceau d'indices: the task of the juge du fond is to examine whether the individual pieces 
of evidence, when assessed as a whole, provide such a faisceau d'indices; it is this conclusion that 
allows the drawing of a presumption. The Court went on to clarify that drawing conclusions through 
inferences and presumptions is a multi-step process. In the first place, each individual piece of 
evidence can be either a direct pointer to the existence of a certain fact, or a starting point for drawing 
inferences or presumptions about its existence. In a further step, those facts must be assessed as a 
whole in order to determine whether a particular element of the infringement has been proven. Finally, 
it is not necessary to prove every element or circumstance of the infringement, it is sufficient that the 
elements or circumstances that have been proven allow, in their turn, the drawing of a judicial 
presumption.  
This chain of presumptions, held the Court, is sufficient condition, as a matter of law, for a 
conviction ferme; and once the juge du fond is able to form, if necessary through judicial 
presumptions, such a conviction, it is incumbent upon the defendant to put forward sufficient evidence 
to rebut it. This burden, however, cannot be discharged by producing isolated counter-examples, 
allegedly incompatible with the factual basis of the CC’s case, but only by undermining it in a 
comprehensive manner; at any rate any arguments or proofs that the defendant undertaking put 
forward to show that its actual behaviour was not compatible with the spirit or the content of the 
agreement, must be dismissed as inoperative. Further, the appellant’s contention that the counter-
examples that it had put forward in evidence, in order to rebut the CC’s conclusion that the agreement 
had been put into practice, could not be rejected without a thorough and comprehensive economic 
analysis, were rejected by the Court, on the ground that, since the CC had sufficiently proven its case 
in the first place, isolated counter-examples were insufficient to undermine it. It was therefore 
incumbent upon the appellant to put such a comprehensive economic analysis before the court.  
To round up its analysis, the Court held, further, that even if there was not enough evidence to 
establish a judicial presumption, it might still be sufficient to place a burden to provide an alternative 
convincing explanation of the facts on the undertaking. This final remark is both more general and 
more stringent than the ‘Woodpulp’ test, since it requires not merely a ‘plausible’, but a ‘convincing’ 
alternative explanation, but it was strictly obiter; a case where the Court is invited to examine 
precisely the extent to which CC may rely exclusively on parallel behaviour to prove an infringement, 
is still under advisement. 
In a final step, the Court rejected the appellant’s complaint that, by relying on judicial 
presumptions, the AACA had, in effect, reversed the burden of proof: a recourse to judicial 
presumptions does not lead to a reversal of the objective burden of proof; instead, it merely constitutes 
a rule for the appraisal of evidence that is based on general experience. However, the appraisal of 
evidence and the interplay between the respective burdens to adduce the proof of the parties, is prior to 
consideration of the objective burden of proof. For obvious reasons, this part of the analysis was a 
collage of almost verbatim quotes from the ECJ
10
. 
Compatibility with ECHR 
The next stage of the analysis was to examine the compatibility of proof through judicial presumptions 
with the presumption of innocence. The Court chose to approach the issue in a somewhat roundabout 
manner, by pointing out that the presumption of innocence does not preclude a recourse to 
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presumptions of fact or law, even in the case of offences that form part of the hard core of criminal 
law and that are characterised as criminal in nature by domestic legal orders; neither does it preclude 
the drawing of adverse inferences from the failure of the defendant to provide an explanation or 
response in situations where such a response should be reasonably expected. It does not even preclude 
a partial reversal of the burden of proof. The only restriction is that these should be kept within 
reasonable limits, taking into account the importance of what is at stake and maintaining the rights of 
the defence.  
This part of the judgment was again a collage of almost verbatim quotes from the case law of the 
ECHR, followed by a long list of citations from both the ECHR and the EU courts. It was also a mere 
prelude to the next step: the Court went on to hold that, if that is the case in the domain of stricto sensu 
criminal law, then, a fortiori, there is no requirement to extend the scope of the rules, means, methods 
or standard of proof that is applicable to criminal trials in the domain of administrative sanctions. This 
was followed by an oblique questioning of the value of the classification of competition sanctions as 
‘criminal’, which is implicit in its choice of ECHR citations, which included not only cases such as 
Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal
11
, where the Strasbourg court had held that issues such as that of the 
admissibility of evidence are a matter for domestic law alone, but also cases where it had, in the 
context of disciplinary cases (which fall under the civil heading of Art. 6), made a distinction between 
civil and criminal standards of proof. 
This was only the third time ever that the Court had made a reference to the concept of the 
‘standard of proof’. The first reference was in a minority opinion in a smuggling case12. In that case, a 
member of the Court had taken the view that the distinction made by the Code of Procedure before the 
Administrative Courts, whereby criminal convictions are binding upon the administrative courts, while 
criminal acquittals are not, was not compatible with the principle of equality of arms, because ‘there is 
no indication in law that the administrative judge shall form a view on the basis of a standard of proof 
lower than that applicable in criminal trials’. The second reference was in a concurrent opinion in 
another smuggling case
13
, where another member of the Court had taken exactly the opposite view 
(the other judges, in the majority, reached a similar conclusion, but without a reference to the concept). 
While there had been a long line of cases where the Court had consistently rejected a contention that 
various rules of criminal procedure, including rules of evidence, such as the inadmissibility of 
unsworn testimony, should apply by analogy in the context of administrative sanctions, this was the 
first time that a solid majority had backed the general proposition that those differences between 
criminal procedure and administrative law amount to a different standard of proof. In a purely 
domestic context, the majority of the Court would probably have resisted the idea, or at the very least 
questioned the necessity of introducing a concept that presupposes a comparative analysis of the 
modes of evidence evaluation that are used in actual practice by civil, criminal, and administrative 
judges. It was the European dimension of competition law that forced the Court to take the step. This 
dimension was further reinforced by citing, again for a first time (or second, if one counts the citation 
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Impartiality 
The issue of impartiality may arise in two different situations. The first is that of a conflict of interests 
in the person of the decision-maker (personal bias). The second is when the same person is called to 
exercise mutually incompatible functions (predetermination bias). In the DELTA and the FAGE cases, 
the Court was invited to examine both issues. In those cases, the appellants argued that the CC had 
failed to respect the ‘principle of impartiality’ that is guaranteed by Art. 6 para. 1 of the ECHR and 
Art. 7 para. 2 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (CAP)
15
, on two counts: 
The first complaint was that an administrative officer (the head of Unit B/Dominance and 
Agreements of the Implementation Division of the General Directorate for Competition) had taken 
part in the initial stage of the investigation of the case by issuing the initial requests for information 
and also processing the application of leniency of an undertaking, despite the fact that she was related 
(first cousin) to the President of the Board of Directors of that very undertaking; the fact that she had 
recused herself, once a formal sector inquiry was opened, should not be considered relevant. 
The second complaint was that, since the President of the CC had ordered the investigation of the 
case, he should have been barred from participating in its final disposition; and, secondly, his decision 
that an undertaking’s application was admissible was, in essence, tantamount to an implicit finding 
that there was an infringement. 
In view of these arguments, the first question that the Court had to decide on was whether Art. 6 of 
the Convention applies to the CC. The issue was less straightforward than it might appear at first 
glance. In a case involving a fine imposed by the Independent Authority for the Security of 
Telecommunications (IAST), the applicant (a mobile telecommunications company), on a recours 
pour excès de pouvoir before the CoS, had argued that, since the IAST is an administrative body and 
the procedure before it is not public and the CoS has reviewing powers only, it had been denied its 
right to have its case, which involved a ‘criminal charge’, in the sense of Art. 6 para. 1 of the ECHR, 
tried in ‘a fair and public hearing [..] by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law’. In 
that case, the Grand Chamber of the Court, in a judgment, which, in view of later developments
16
, 
including its erosion in the DELTA and FAGE cases, must now be considered an arrêt d'espèce, had 
reached the conclusion that, since the independence of members of the IAST in exercising their 
functions, is guaranteed by Art. 19 para. 2 and 101A of the Constitution, the Authority is an 
‘independent tribunal’, in the sense of Art. 6 para. 1 of the Convention. The decision to impose a fine 
was quashed on the ground that the hearing before the IAST was not public
17
. The Court thus had no 
alternative but to rely explicitly on the MENARINI ruling, in order to distinguish, albeit implicitly and 
without mentioning or citing it
18
, its prior judgment. The appellants’ arguments were dismissed on the 
grounds that Art. 6 of the Convention does not apply to the CC, which is not a tribunal but an 
administrative body, while the appellant’s right to have his case tried by an independent, impartial 
tribunal is fully satisfied by the existence of an appeal on the case’s merit before the AACA. 
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The next step in the Court’s reasoning was to examine the scope and content of the principle of 
impartiality in domestic law, where, long before it was confirmed by Art. 7 of the CAP, it had been 
recognised by the Court as an essential aspect of the RechtStaatPrinzip
19
, that is, as a principle of 
constitutional status, applicable not only in judicial, but also in all administrative proceedings.  
With respect to the appellants’ first complaint, the Court drew a distinction between participation in 
the decision-making process, either in an advisory or in a decision-making capacity, and in the 
carrying out of ancillary, procedural, or preparatory tasks, such as the collection of information, 
material, or other evidence, falling short of drafting an opinion or a report. In the latter case, the 
existence of a conflict of interests, in the person of an official carrying out such a task, is not in and of 
itself a sufficient ground for calling into question the impartiality either of the procedure before 
another body, or of its judgment.  
With respect to the applicants’ second complaint, the situation was more complicated. According to 
the settled case law of the Court, an official is disqualified from participating in the determination of 
an issue in two circumstances. Firstly, unless it is otherwise expressly provided by statute, he may not 
participate in the review of the regularity of a decision in which he has also taken part
20
. Secondly, in a 
seminal judgment
21
, the Court held that, in view of the (constitutional) principle of impartiality and the 
right to a fair trial, guaranteed by Art. 6 para. 1 of ECHR, the official who has instituted disciplinary 
proceedings may not subsequently sit as a member of the disciplinary board
22
. On the other hand, there 
is also a long line of cases where the Court had held that the exercise by a public official of a specific 
duty that is explicitly entrusted to him by law, such as carrying out an onsite inspection, compiling an 
expert report, drafting an advisory opinion on the case, or acting as a rapporteur, will not give rise to a 
presumption of predetermination bias
23
. In the end, the Court held that any action of the President of 
the CC that is related to the general direction of the works of the Commission, such as a decision to 
open an ex officio investigation, or a decision on the admissibility of a leniency application, amounts 
to no more than the discharge of a duty entrusted by law, therefore no presumption of bias could arise, 
all the more so since those duties did not even entail the expression of an opinion on the merits of the 
case. 
The Rights to Defence and Access to the Record 
Unlike the other issues, where the Court had reached a unanimous decision, the question of access to 
the record provoked a strong and protracted controversy within the Court.  
In the DELTA and FAGE cases, the appellants had asked, before the CC, for unrestricted access to 
all documents that had been classified as ‘confidential’. These documents belonged to three classes: 1) 
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Internal communications and memoranda of the CC, in other words, documents which are not part of 
the evidentiary record; 2) the names of milk farmers who had testified to the CC; this was not, in fact, 
material that had been relied upon by the CC in order to prove the infringement, and the information 
was kept confidential under the British Gypsum rule, and 3) the business secrets of other undertakings, 
such as the results of quality control tests on the milk produced by their suppliers and information on 
their internal organisation and their pricing and business policy – in other words, information that they 
had voluntarily passed to each other, their behaviour would have constituted in and of itself an 
infringement by object of competition rules! The appellants’ complaint, that their rights to defense 
under the ‘criminal heading’ of the ECHR had been infringed by the CC’s refusal to grant them access 
to these classes of documents, was duly rejected by the AACA, on the ground that the appellants had 
only made a blanket request to the CC, without specifying which documents were absolutely 
necessary for their defence. Further, they had failed to show that they had suffered any prejudice from 
the CC’s refusal to grant them access to the particular classes of documents. 
The appeals against the judgments of the AACA were initially heard by a panel of five members of 
the Court. Surprisingly, a majority of the panel took the view that any document listed in the Director 
General’s report to the CC, or included in the list of documents that were a record of the case, loses eo 
ipso its confidential character vis-à-vis the defendant undertaking, irrespective of its content or 
usefulness, which is a matter for the defendant alone to assess, after having access to it. For that 
reason, it is not incumbent upon the undertaking to show prejudice due to lack of access; one member 
of the panel concurred in the result, on the ground that the CC should have applied the 2006 Rules of 
Procedure (which established a special procedure for allowing limited access to a non-confidential 
version of classified documents), instead of the 2001 Rules of Procedure; and one member of the 
panel, in a vigorous dissent, pointed out that: 1) that, in the past, the Court had already accepted that 
even in the sensitive area of freedom of movement, the applicant’s access to confidential information 
on which an expulsion order is based, may be restricted subject to a full assessment of that information 
by the Court itself, and 2) there was well settled case law of the Court that a complaint of procedural 
impropriety must be accompanied by a showing of prejudice.  
In view of the importance of the issue, the case was referred for rehearing to an enlarged panel. 
This time, the Court unanimously confirmed that the appellant must show that he had suffered 
prejudice because of his lack of access to the specific documents. In other words, he must show that 
the documents were potentially useful for his defence. However, it then went on to hold that the rules 
of procedure before the administrative courts, as they stood at the time, contained no provision 
restricting the applicants’ right of access to the judicial record of the case, and the appellants did not 
allege that these documents had not been part of the record that had been communicated to the AACA. 
The appellants’ complaints were rejected on the narrow ground that, even though there was no 
demonstration that they had been denied access to these documents at the judicial stage, and it could 
therefore be presumed that they were in a position to assess whether these documents contained either 
incriminating evidence that had been relied upon by the CC, or exonerating evidence that they 
themselves could had relied upon, they had failed to plead before the AACA that they had suffered 
prejudice through lack of access at the administrative stage. One member of the panel dissented, on the 
equally narrow ground that there was no positive evidence that the appellants had had access to these 
documents at the judicial stage. The issue was thus provisionally closed in a sort of anticlimax, which, 
apart from sanctioning the principle that prejudice must be shown, provides rather limited guidance for 
the future. 
Conclusions 
Even before it reached the courts, the milk cartel investigation was important, both for the legal issues 
raised and for their non-legal context, which had led to the necessary and successful 2009 reform of 
the CC (Act 3784/2009) and the subsequent modernisation of competition procedure (Act 3959/2011). 
Iannis Symplis 
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The cases themselves were important because the breadth of the appellants’ arguments gave the 
Court the opportunity to provide a general overview and a concise restatement of the rules on 
anticompetitive agreements, evidence, and due process. In that respect, its attitude was at the same 
time both outward and inward looking, although always mindful of its responsibility as part of a 
network of European courts, to take a strong and clear position, at least whenever a majority inside the 
court was equally clear and robust on topics such as the gravity of vertical infringements, or the 
implications of the ECHR, which have been the object of long and intense discussion at the European 
level. Nevertheless, the Court’s clear priority was, firstly, to provide clear and operationalisable 
guidance to the lower courts and the CC, and, secondly (although probably in the reverse order), to 
ensure consistency and to guide the development of its own case law across various areas of 





2.4. Elena Diana Ungureanu (Pitesti Court of Appeal, Romania), S.C. Alpiq Romindustries 
s.r.l. v. Romanian Competition Authority 
- Name of the Court of First Instance: Court of Appeal, Bucharest 
- Name of the Court of Last Instance: High Court of Cassation and Justice 
- Case reference number No. 6369/2/2012;  
- Date of the judgment: Decision No.7026, issued on 26
th
 November, 2012  
Facts 
By Order of the President of the Competition Council. 297/23.03.2012, an investigation was initiated 
on the possible violation of Art. Article 5. 1 of Competition Law No. 21/1996, competitive market 
segment production and sale of electricity and the electricity supply market in Romania. 
Two of the companies active in those markets are Alpiq and Romindustries Ltd, companies 
suspected of having participated in a cartel / concerted practices. 
Based on Order No. 307/26.03.2012, on 27.03.2012 unannounced inspections were carried out at 
the premises of the claimant, Alpiq (former name: Buzmann Industries). During the investigations, the 
principle of legal priviledge was invoked by Alpiq in respect of a document (No. 44) in order to 
safeguard the communication between the company and attorney. 
In accordance with procedures prescribed by Competition Law, the document that it was claimed 
would benefit from legal protection was submitted in a sealed envelope and then, taking into 
consideration the explanations written and requested, the President of the Competition Council issued 
Decision No. 39/2012, rejecting the protected nature of the documents under seal. 
Pursuant to Art. 36 para. 11 of the Competition Act, Decision No. 39/18.07.2012 was attacked, the 
claimant Alpiq seeking annulment of the decision. 
In support of the action, the claimant essentially indicated the following: 
Alpiq Romindustries believes that the Competition Council's decision is unlawful and groundless, 
as the document is a confidential communication with external lawyers, and the confidential document 
falls within the scope of legal privilege. 
The defendant Competition Council answered that the action should be dismissed as unfounded. 
The defendant raised the following: 
The contested decision was made in full compliance with substantive and procedural provisions 
under the Competition Act. Unexpected correspondence sealed during the investigation could not be 
regarded as meeting the requirements to benefit from the legal protection provided by Art. 36 para. 8 
of the Competition Act. In essence, the defendant considered that the investigation of the competition 
authority does not cover the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract that are stipulated 
therein, on which there are negotiations / renegotiations, but, naturally, the anti-competitive nature of a 
business relationship between these companies is possible. 
The Competition Council asked the company to provide additional information that might lead to a 
solid conclusion on the content of the correspondence and the extent to which it might enjoy the 
protected nature that is referred to in Art. 36 para. 8 of the Competition Act. 
Subsequently, the defendant issued Decision no. 39/18.07.2012, challenged in litigation, dismissing 
the protected nature of the document in question, given that Alpiq ha failed to prove the fulfillment of 
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the two conditions cumulatively referred to in Art. 36 para. 8 of the Competition Act, namely: that the 
correspondence was exchanged between a firm and its lawyers; that the correspondence is carried in 
order to exercise Alpiq’s right to a defence in connection with the investigation by the Competition 
Council. 
Analysis of the Legality of the Contested Administrative Act 
Previously, the Court had noted that the analysis should be carried out on the following grounds: 
firstly, that of clarifying the limits of the rights to a defence, in the light of the specific provisions of 
the Competition Act and, secondly, that of clarifying the specific nature of the disputed confidential 
documents’ content. 
The Right of Defence 
General considerations regarding the relationship of Art. 36 para. 8 of Law no. 21/1996 (Competetion 
Act) and Art. 35 of Law no. 51/1995 (The Law of the Organisation of Lawyers) 
Regarding the right of defence, including the principle of confidentiality in light of competition 
law, Article 36 para. 8-12 of Law. 21/1996, reads as follows: 
(8) Communication between the undertaking or association of undertakings under investigation 
and the attorney thereof, carried out during and for the sole purpose of defending the undertaking, 
i.e., after commencing the administrative proceedings based on this law or subsequent to 
commencing the administrative proceedings, provided that this communication pertains to the 
scope of the proceedings, may not be seized or used as evidence, during the proceedings carried 
out by the Competition Council. Preparatory documents drawn-up by the undertaking or 
association of undertakings under investigation for the sole purpose of defence may not be seized 
or used as proof. 
(9)Whenever undertakings fail to prove the protected character of the communication, according to 
par. (8), competition inspectors carrying out the inspection can seal and seize the documents in 
question, in two copies. 
(10)The President of the Competition Council will make a decision, on an emergency basis, based 
on the proof and arguments collected. Should the President of the Competition Council make the 
decision to reject the protected character of the communication, the document may be unsealed 
solely after the expiry of the deadline within which the decision can be challenged, according to 
provisions in par. (11), or should the decision be challenged, after the court ruling becomes final 
and irrevocable. 
(11)The decision of the President of the Competition Council as regards the protected character of 
the communication can be challenged in an administrative proceeding before the Bucharest Court 
of Appeal within 15 days after notification, with an exemption from Law 554/2004, and further 
amendments and completions. The decision of the Court of Appeal is under recourse, which is 
declared 5 days after the notification. Courts will solve the case in emergency and as a priority. 
(12) Inspection power scanning be used in compliance with the regulations on the organisation, 
functioning and procedure of the Competition Council. 
According to Art. 36 para. 9 of the Competition Act, the Council's inspection powers are thus to 
explore any area held by the company inspected, to examine any documents, records, financial 
accounts, regardless of their support, and to apply seals in situations where it is necessary. 
Inspection power limits, with the effect that: an empowering inspection is made solely for the 
purpose of investigating violations of the Competition Act; inspection powers can be exercised only 
on facts and documents relating to the object and purpose of the inspection, as described in the order 
of inspection issued in regard to the order of the investigation; the right to raise and then use 
communications between lawyer and the firm inspected is limited when those communications are 
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made within, and solely to exercise their right to a defence in connection with the Competition 
Council’s subject of investigation. 
Article 35 of Law no. 51/1995 reads as follows: 
(1) To ensure the professional secrecy of professional papers and proceedings, the attorney or his 
office shall be inviolable. Raiding the lawyer, his home or his office, the raising of documents and 
goods, can be done only by the prosecutor, under a warrant issued under the law. 
(2) The lawyer and telephone calls shall not be intercepted and recorded by any technical means, 
and the professional correspondence opened only under the conditions and procedure provided by 
law. 
In respect of Article 10 para. (4) of the Statute of the legal profession, also invoked by the claimant, 
the Court stated that it must first be interpreted as circumstantiating principles and rights enshrined in 
the Law no. 51/1995 and, secondly, it cannot be considered to have a higher legal force than a law, 
such as competition law. 
In addition, the establishment of the principles of Art. 35, mentioned above, has ‘to ensure the 
secrecy’ that a lawyer must keep. Consequently, this is the distinction between the concepts of 
professional secrecy in Law 51/1995 and the Competition Act’s protected communication. 
The secrecy is a requirement, and it is the responsibility of the lawyer to preserve the 
confidentiality of discussions with customers and third parties. As a corollary, in criminal proceedings, 
this principle must be respected by third parties, as distinguished in Art. 35 of Law no. 51/1995. 
The Court noted that the concept of professional secrecy in Law. 51/1995 tale quale cannot be 
applied to competition, as the investigation into the incident falls under the special provisions of Law 
no. 21/1996, and assessment of the extent to which the document is or is not protected must be made 
through the legal provisions. 
The concept of legal protection that is stipulated in Art. 36 para. 8 of the Competition Law, and 
which is conferred on attorney-client communication, is not identified by the classification as being 
‘confidential’, of information / documents. 
For lawyers, confidentiality covers any communication with the customer, not just with those who 
enjoy the legal protection afforded by the law of competition, with the result that the lawyer has an 
obligation not to disclose such information (in this respect, the provisions of Art. 46 paragraph 2 of 
Law No. 51/1995). 
In the context of investigations into anti-competitive acts, the concept of ‘information’ covers facts 
that would cause damage to a business. For this reason, the Competition Council has an obligation to 
ensure the confidentiality of such information (trade secrets), without, however, businesses being able 
to rely on their confidential nature as a basis for limiting his/her right to obtain such information and to 
use samples. 
According to Art. 36 para. 8 of Law No. 21/1996, in order to be protected, communications must 
be made under and for the sole purpose of exercising the rights to a defence; must be prepared on or 
before the opening of administrative proceedings, but not necessarily be related to the procedure. The 
consequences of these conditions are the limited powers of inspection conferred by Art. 36 para. 1: 
there is no right to raise such communications and this makes it impossible to use them as evidence in 
the Competition proceedings. 
The Confidential Nature of the Document in Question 
The claimant claims that the document in question, sealed, Minutes no. CC/DIE/794/27.03.2012, is an 
email sent by Mr. Octavian Caragea - Executive Director SC Buzmann SRL (the current Alpiq 
Romindustries) - by Mr. Dragos Nicholas, CEO. It also shows that the e-mail contains an attachment, 
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representing an early draft letter prepared by Hidroelectrica Boştină SCPA and ASOC are played 
mainly with relevant legal arguments in a defence’s position on a possible modification of the 
contractual relationship of Buzmann Industries with Hidroelectrica (address Alpiq no. RG-
7146/29.05.2012). 
Moreover, the advice was given under a legal contract in 2006 (possibly on or around 12th May, 
2006), with the purpose of advising and assisting Alpiq. 
The trigger for the application for legal aid was the ‘potential change in the contractual relationship 
with Hidroelectrica’. It is evident, therefore, that Buzmann (Alpiq)’s need to obtain legal advice does 
not have its origin in consideration of the exercise of a right to a defence against a possible (imminent) 
sanction, but the need to protect its commercial interests as being effectively involved in the 
contractual relationship with Hidroelectrica. 
Firstly, none of the arguments raised by the claimant are to motivate the existence, in its 
correspondence with his lawyers, of a request / giving legal advice, which Alpiq needs in order to 
exercise its right to a defence. 
Secondly, since the letter was drafted before the opening of the investigations by the Competition 
Council, the Court assessed whether the condition laid down in Art. 36 para. 8 of the Law was met 
(i.e. that the document was relevant for the investigations). 
From the description of the facts that triggered the investigation and with respect to its object, as is 
apparent from Order No. 297/23.03.2012, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the research for the 
content of the disputed confidential documents (especially the last three lines of the attached document 
(E-mail) that is in question), it does not appear that requests / provision of legal advice to Alpiq, by its 
lawyers, were related to the procedure. 
The investigation of the competition authority thus does not cover the rights and obligations of the 
contracting parties stipulated therein and in respect of which there are negotiations / renegotiations, 
but the possible anti-competitive nature of the business relationship between these companies. The 
terms of this relationship relate to both the written clauses in contracts, and those resulting from the 
actual conduct of the parties. 
So, the defendant correctly concluded, in the contested decision, that the applicant's arguments 
were not likely to show that this correspondence was conducted in order to exercise the right to a 
defence in the administrative proceedings of the Competition Council.  
For all these reasons, the Court found that Decision No. 39/18.07.2012, issued by the Competition 
Council, was legal and the action was dismissed. 
Comment 
The judgment is the first Romanian competition case that deals with the legal privilege. 
In AM & S Europe v Commission, the Court, taking account of the common criteria and similar 
circumstances existing at the time in the national laws of the Member States, held, in paragraph 21 of 
that judgment, that the confidentiality of written communications between lawyers and clients should 
be protected at Community level. However, the Court stated that that protection was subject to two 
cumulative conditions. 
In that connection, the Court stated, first, that the exchange with the lawyer must be connected to 
‘the client’s rights to a defence’ and, second, that the exchange must emanate from ‘independent 
lawyers’, that is to say, ‘lawyers who are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment’. 
As to the second condition, the Court observed, in paragraph 24 of the judgment in AM & S 
Europe v Commission, that the requirement as to the position and status as an independent lawyer, 
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which must be fulfilled by the legal adviser from whom the written communications which may be 
protected emanate, is based on a conception of the lawyer’s role in collaborating in the administration 
of justice and in being required to provide, in full independence and in the overriding interests of that 
cause, such legal assistance as the client needs. The counterpart to that protection lies in the rules of 
professional ethics and discipline, which are laid down and enforced in the general interest.  
The Court repeated those findings in paragraph 27 of that judgment, according to which written 
communications which may be protected by legal professional privilege must be exchanged with ‘an 
independent lawyer, that is to say one who is not bound to his client by a relationship of employment’. 
The principle was recalled in the case Akzo Nobel: ’It follows that the requirement of 
independence means the absence of any employment relationship between the lawyer and his client, so 
that legal professional privilege does not cover exchanges within a company or group with in-house 
lawyers. 
The concept of the independence of lawyers is determined not only positively, that is, by reference 
to professional ethical obligations, but also negatively, by the absence of an employment relationship. 
An in-house lawyer, despite his enrolment with a Bar or Law Society and the professional ethical 
obligations to which he is, as a result, subject, does not enjoy the same degree of independence from 
his employer as a lawyer working in an external law firm does in relation to his client. Consequently, 
an in-house lawyer is less able to deal effectively with any conflicts between his professional 
obligations and the aims of his client.’ 
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2.5. Patrizia Puccini (Venice Court of Appeal, Italy), Pasquale Savarese v. Lloyd Adriatico 
S.p.A. 
Judgment of the Italian Supreme Court No. 00104230321 
Introduction 
An insured person who files an action for damages, pursuant to Art. 33, second paragraph, of the law 
of the 10th October, 1990, No. 287 (the so-called anti-trust law), against the insurance undertaking 
sanctioned by the Antitrust Authority for participating in an anti-competitive agreement, bears the 
burden of submitting the contracted insurance policy and the decision ascertaining the existence of the 
anti-competitive cartel in the administrative PROCEEDING, so that these circumstances are sufficient 
to establish the presumption of undue premium increase as a result of collusive behaviour, and of the 
relative extent of the increase.  
In fact, in the computation of the damage suffered by most insured people due to the antitrust 
offence, determined on the basis of serious, precise and consistent presumptions, an essential 
component is represented by the damage suffered by the insured individual. It should therefore be 
accepted that this damage, although conceptually distinguishable on a logical level, is not 
distinguishable on the factual level and, accordingly, does not require, in order to be demonstrated, the 
operation of a further presumption. 
Facts 
On the 28th July, 2000 the Competition Authority for the market (henceforth, the Authority) 
sanctioned a large number of insurance companies, including the company Lloyd Adriatico SpA (now 
Allianz SpA), because they had entered into an agreement in the form of a concerted practice, 
consisting of the systematic exchange of sensitive business information between competitors, with 
reference to the policies of RCA (insurance for civil liability) 
The authority noted that this practice caused a significant increase in premiums during the period 
affected by the unlawful conduct (years 1994-2000), both in the level of premiums in force in Italy 
until 1994, before the liberalisation of tariffs, and to the average premiums on the European market, 
lower by about 20% compared to those premiums charged in Italy. 
Pasquale Savarese sued Lloyd Adriatic before the Naples Court of Appeal, alleging that it had 
entered into a contract of insurance for RCA and had paid the premium for the period 10th December, 
1990-10th December, 2000, and they asked for compensation for the damages suffered under the law 
of October 10th, 1990, No. 287 (Art. 33) for breach of the rules for the protection of competition by 
the effect of the cartel that was sanctioned by the Authority. 
Judicial Proceedings 
The Court of Appeal granted the request and ordered Lloyd to compensate for damages amounting to 
€500.00, plus legal interest. In doing so, it invoked the principles established by the Supreme Court 
(section a. n. 2207/2005) on the reach of Law No. 287/1990, which aims not only to regulate the 
relationship between the companies, i.e., to ensure respect for the free exercise of competition, but also 
aims to protect consumers, which are therefore entitled to apply for a declaration of the invalidity of a 
restrictive cartel and for compensation for the damage suffered through the stipulation of the contracts 
‘downstream’ that constitute the outlet and its implementation. Such damage ought to be such as to 
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account for the removal of the effects of the surcharge that was unconsciously accepted by them, 
having deprived consumers of the opportunity to enjoy the benefits that are naturally produced by the 
rules of free competition. 
It also ruled that the certainty of damages to most of the insured is a fact from which the damage for 
each insured can be inferred, unless the insurer manages to provide evidence - in this case, not 
provided - to have granted differential and favourable treatment to that particular customer if 
compared with the treatment practiced for the other insured customers. 
The Lloyd Company appealed to the Supreme Court against that judgment, alleging infringement 
of Article. 2043 cc and asserting that, in order to award compensation, the undertaking which was part 
of an anti-competitive agreement would be required to present proof of the distorting effects of the 
market (the damage alleged by the final consumer) that could not be equated with the mere existence 
of the cartel, given that, in this case, the cartel consisted purely in the ‘exchange of information’ 
between the insurance companies and not in a ‘price-fixing cartel’. 
The question was, in the words of the appellant, that a presumption (on the damage suffered by the 
individual insured) cannot be inferred from another presumption (that concerning the generalised price 
increase that is assumed as a result of the exchange of information, constituting the antitrust offence) 
and, more particularly, that the presumptions would still lack qualities of precision, concordance, 
gravity. 
Furthermore the appellant observes that the increase in policy premiums is due to different causes 
rather than unlawful competitive behavior, and that are external to the intention of insurance 
companies - that had experienced a significant increase in costs (the scams against themselves; the 
increase in litigation; the rise of compensation due to the new criteria for quantifying biological 
damage, the incidence of taxation, the adjustment of claims reserves imposed in the Community, the 
level of inflation in Italy, strong liabilities that marked the economic situation of insurance companies 
on the eve of privatisation in 1994). 
The Court stated that the pleas were unfounded because if it is true that the Authority found only an 
agreement suitable for the distortion of normal competition, and not a cartel agreement on the level of 
premiums, there is no doubt that the detection of the abnormal increase in premiums relating to RCA 
policies, during the period of the cartel, was, on the one hand, an assumption of the illegality of that 
behaviour and, on the other hand, a reliable determination of its detrimental effect on insurance service 
users. 
The Supreme Court also held that insured people who act for damages, pursuant to Art.33 of Law 
No. 287 of 1990, have the right to use the presumption that the award was improperly increased as a 
result of collusive behaviour, and that the extent of the increase (and, therefore, the extent of the 
damage suffered) was not less than 20 per cent. The Supreme Court clarified that the defendant's 
insurance company should be allowed to provide evidence contrary to the above-mentioned 
presumption of responsibility with regard to both the existence of a causal link between the unlawful 
act and the damage, and the extent of the injury itself. However, this evidence cannot be based on 
relevant circumstances regarding the general situation of the insurance market, but must relate to 
situations and specific behaviours of the insurance company in question, the individual insured and the 
individual policy (including a comparison of the rates charged by the insurance company and those 
applied by other companies who were not participating in the illegal cartel). 
Comment 
The White Paper suggests that where proof of fault is required in a claim for damages, the infringer is 
presumed to have acted with fault unless he can prove that the infringement was due to a genuinely 
excusable error. 
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2.6. Ambrasaite Goda (Vilnius Regional Court, Lithuania), Šiaulių tara v. Stumbras 
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of Lithuania on 26
th
 May, 20061 
Facts 
The case of private enforcement was started by the claimant CJSC Šiaulių tara, a distributor of 
Lithuanian alcoholic beverages in the territory of Lithuania, against the JSC Stumbras - one of the 
biggest producers of strong alcoholic drinks in Lithuania. 
During 2000, the defendant was selling its products to 37 wholesalers, including the claimant, and 
2 retailers. By the end of 2001, the defendant was already selling its product to only 9 wholesalers and 
2 retailers, the vast majority of its production being sold to 5 companies. The defendant also had 
contracts for marketing, advertising and similar services with some of the wholesalers. Payments for 
the same amounts of the product realised, paid by the defendant to different wholesalers under those 
contracts (marketing payments) differed significantly, despite the fact that the other conditions were 
similar. During 2001, the defendant paid over 3 million Litas, the most significant amounts being paid 
to the same 5 companies.  
In 2002, the National Competition Authority of Lithuania fined JSC Stumbras for the violation of 
Paras. 1 and 3 of Article 9 of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania.
2
 The National 
Competition Authority ruled that, by their very nature, the payments under the marketing contracts 
were hidden discounts on production. The actions of the defendant when applying different payments 
to the wholesalers for the same services, distorted competition, as some retailers, due to the discounts 
granted, thus had the possibility to sell their products at lower prices than others. The ruling of the 
National Competition Authority was not appealed against in the administrative courts.  
The claimant, who was not granted any payments from the defendant, applied to the civil court 
claiming 2,864,809 Litas of damages, calculated as 878,336,45 Litas of lost marketing payments 
(based on factual purchases of production from the defendant and applying the highest payment rate 
that the defendant had applied to the wholesalers) and 1,986,472,55 Litas of damages caused by the 
loss of market (loss of profit and lost marketing payments on the potential purchases of products from 
the defendant). 
The defendant contested the claim, arguing that:  
1) the ruling of the National Competition Authority was defective due to the incorrect definition of 
the relevant market, the inaccurate establishment of the dominant position of the defendant and the 
unfair evaluation of the actions of the defendant as an abuse of its dominant position;  
2) the calculation of damages was ungrounded, as the claimant was not able to provide marketing 
services at the same level as other wholesalers, and was not entitled to payment for such services. 
The loss of market was caused by the actions of the claimant itself, but not by the actions of the 
defendant.  
                                                     
1
 The case was not appealed to the Supreme Court of Lithuania. 
2
 Prohibition of abuse of a dominant position, in particular - the direct or indirect imposition of unfair prices or other 
purchase or selling conditions, and the application of dissimilar (discriminatory) conditions to equivalent transactions 
with certain undertakings, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. 
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The Ruling of the First Instance Court 
The main issues dealt with by the Courts concerned the legal significance of the uncontested ruling of 
the National Competition Authority when judging the illegal actions of the defendant as an essential 
condition of civil liability, and the calculation of damages caused by the anti-competitive behaviour of 
the defendant.  
The Court of First Instance, when hearing the case, appointed a court expert to provide an opinion 
on the calculation of damages. The expert gave the conclusion that although calculation of damages 
that took as its basis the highest payment rate that the defendant had applied to the wholesalers was 
legally correct (as the distortion of competition could only be eliminated by applying the same 
conditions to all the wholesalers), it was ungrounded from the economic point of view, as it is unclear 
whether the defendant was able to apply the same (highest) rate to all of them, and the basis of the 
application of different payment rates remained unclear. In addition, the claimant was not able to 
provide marketing services at the same level as the wholesaler that had received the highest payment 
rates. In the opinion of the expert, it was economically justifiable to calculate damages on the basis of 
the factual purchases of production from the defendant by applying the average payment rate that the 
defendant had applied to the wholesalers, and deducting the expenditure.  
The Court of First Instance partially satisfied the claim. The ruling of the National Competition 
Authority was regarded by the court as prima facie evidence
3
 of the illegal actions of the defendant. 
The court also ruled, disregarding the expert’s opinion, that calculation of damages that took as a basis 
the highest payment rate that the defendant had applied to the wholesalers, is justifiable, as it is the 
only way to rectify the violation of competition rules. Although finding the claim well grounded, the 
Court reduced the amount of damages to 500,000 Litas,
4
 having regard to the fact that the defendant 
had already been fined 100,000 Litas for the distortion of competition, the ultimate amount of the 
claim was based on predicted income, and market prognosis is never 100 per cent fulfilled.  
The judgment was appealed by both parties.  
The Ruling of the Court Of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal of Lithuania accepted the evaluation of the First Instance Court regarding the 
legal significance of the ruling of the National Competition Authority and concluded, without going 
into many details of the relevant arguments of the appeal, that the defendant had not provided 
sufficient evidence that the facts established by the National Competition Authority were incorrect.  
The Court also noted that the Law on Competition does not provide any special rules for the 
calculation of damages in competition cases, so the general rules of the Civil Code for damage 
calculation should be applied. However, due to the peculiarities of the case, special knowledge for the 
calculation of damages is essential. In the opinion of the Court, the Court of First Instance 
unreasonably disregarded the expert’s opinion,5 and also disregarded that the solution on the 
calculation of damages, which had been proposed by the expert, was correct.  
The Court found that the claim for 1,986,472,55 Litas in damages caused by the loss of market was 
ungrounded, basing this conclusion on the fact that, following the general rules of civil liability, loss 
of income cannot be calculated on the basis of the lost income itself. 
                                                     
3
 According to Article 197 of the CPC, facts contained in prima facie evidence (official written evidence) are presumed to 
be true, until clearly disproven by other evidence, with the exception of witness testimony.  
4
 The Civil Code of Lithuania gives some discretion to the Court when deciding on the amount of damages. 
5
 According to Article 218 of the CPC, the expert‘s opinion is not binding on the court, but disregard of this opinion must 





Rating the ruling of the National Competition Authority as prima facie evidence of illegal actions 
means that, in general, civil courts are not bound by the findings of the National Competition 
Authority, whose ruling can be contested before the Civil Court in actions for damages, without even 
following the procedure of challenging the ruling before the Administrative Courts. However, in 
reality, the possibilities of challenging the relevant findings are very limited. In judgments on the 
amount of damages, courts tend to refer to court experts’ opinions, which, under national civil 
procedural rules, have more significance than other evidence provided.  
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2.7. Yulia Todorova (Sofia Regional Court, Bulgaria), X Ltd. V. Z Ltd. 
Judgment No. 171 of 11th February, 2013, of the Bulgarian Supreme Court of 
Cassation, Commercial College, on Commercial Case No. 64/2012. 
Facts 
The subject of appeal before the Supreme Court of Cassation is Judgment No. 230 of 27th October, 
2011, delivered by the Varna Appellate Court, Commercial Division, whereby the court confirmed 
Judgment No. 4 of 25th March, 2011, of the Razgrad District Court on the Commercial Case No. 
35/2009. The latter judgment grants claims for BGN 230,091.19 laid by X Ltd. against Z Ltd., together 
with the legal interest thereon as from the date of the lodging of the claim – indemnity for damage 
caused by the actions of the defendant, sanctioned as an infringement under Art. 30 of the Protection 
of Competition Act /repealed/. 
The infringement is ascertained by Resolution No. 866 of 9th October, 2007, on file No. 
К.217/2007 of the Commission for the Protection of Competition, confirmed by a three-member bench 
and a five-member bench of the Supreme Administrative Court and, additionally, for the sum of BGN 
90,124.10, being the legal interest on the principal as indemnity for delay in payment.  
The appellant claims that the Judgment of the Varna Appellate Court was delivered in conflict with 
Art. 104 of the Protection of Competition Act, repealed, in relation to Art. 30 of the said Act as 
regards the elements of the factual basis of the tort/delict to be proven in the specific hypothesis of 
alleged damage caused by infringement with qualification under Art.30 of the Protection of 
Competition Act /repealed/, which was effective at the time of damage. The Judgment of the Varna 
Appellate Court is also allegedly in conflict with the Underground Natural Resources Act /Art. 29/ and 
the Concessions Act /Art. 4, para. 2/ in substantiating the legitimacy of the plaintiff as the holder of 
the concession rights for the extraction of rock masses, in view of depriving the plaintiff of the 
opportunity to exercise the said right and the earning of revenue from this business, which is the cause 
of the action of the tort/delict claim.  
By virtue of Ruling No. 512 of 4th July, 2012, in the hypothesis of Art. 280, item 1 of the Civil 
Procedure Code, the appeal was allowed on the matter of whether the effect of the resolution 
ascertaining the infringement of the Protection of Competition Act, taken by the Commission for 
Protection of Competition and confirmed by the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court, the 
said effect being binding on the Civil Court pursuant to Art. 104, para. 4 of the Protection of 
Competition Act, in regard to claims for damages that are claimed in causality, with actions consisting 
of an infringement of the Protection of Competition Act, the said claim being lodged on the grounds of 
tort/delict in relation to Art. 104, para. 3 in relation to item 1 of the Protection of Competition Act, 
releases the plaintiff from the burden of proving the elements from the factual basis of the tort/delict 
out of guilt-infringement, damage and of causality between infringement and damage.  
The plaintiff has referred expressly to the infringement ascertained in the proceedings under the 
Protection of Competition Act and has claimed damages corresponding to lost profits /not net profit, 
but a price without VAT received on purchase and sale transactions/ given that the defendant has 
disposed with rock masses and crushed stone fractions extracted from the plaintiff and located in the 
quarry, which the plaintiff claims he was forced to leave after 1st July, 2007, given the behaviour of 
the defendant.  
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36 
The Ruling of the Supreme Court 
The resolution of the Commission for the Protection of Competition holds that by its actions involving 
unlawful extraction and sale of resources from quarry ‘T’, for which the defendant had no concession 
rights after the termination of the validity of the agreement for the purchase and sale of rock mass with 
the plaintiff, made on 11th June, 2003, in addition to violating the Underground Natural Resources 
Act, the defendant has further violated the Protection of Competition Act. The latter violation consists 
in the fact that, as a consequence of the bypassing of legally mandated requirements for the exercise of 
concession rights by omitting to pay concession remuneration, and to undertake obligations in 
connection with the exercise of concession rights, the defendant has gained unfair advantage over 
other competitors in the same geographical /North-eastern Bulgaria/ and product /crushed stone mass/ 
market. The Commission for the Protection of Competition has held that this unfair advantage is in 
conflict with the bona fide commercial practice within the meaning of Para. 1, item 6 of the Additional 
Provisions of the Protection of Competition Act /repealed/ and amounts to violation, according to the 
general definition of unfair competition - Art. 30 of the Protection of Competition Act /repealed/. The 
provision prohibits every action or inaction in conducting business, which is in conflict with the bona 
fide commercial practice, and which impairs, or may impair, the interests of competitors, or relations 
between them. The Commission held that Х Ltd. was directly affected by the violation of Z Ltd., since 
Х Ltd. was prevented from conducting normal business in quarry ‘T’, whereby, in essence, Х Ltd. was 
pushed out of the respective geographical and product market. In its Judgment No. 8693 of 14th July, 
2008, on Administrative Case No. 11045/2007, a three-member bench of the Supreme Administrative 
Court confirmed the resolution ascertaining the infringement by Z Ltd., qualified pursuant to Art. 30 
of the Protection of Competition Act /repealed/, giving identical motives and stating as the 
infringement precisely the wrongfully obtained unfair advantage over the other competitors by the 
illegal extraction and sale of resources from quarry ‘T’ without the paying of concession remuneration 
by the defendant. The Court held that by its actions that were aimed to push out its competitor, X Ltd. 
from this market segment, Z Ltd. deformed the competition environment. A five-member bench of the 
Supreme Administrative Court confirmed the Judgment of the three-member bench of the Supreme 
Administrative Court by Judgment No. 2189 of 17th February, 2009, on Administrative Case No. 
11800/2008. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the behaviour of the defendant in the 
operation of the quarry, aiming to wrongfully obtain unfair advantage at the expense of the plaintiff’s 
competitor company, including the actions of duress on the latter to continue their use of the quarry 
and to push out the plaintiff from the respective market, should be qualified as a violation of bona fide 
commercial practice, given the obtaining of an unfair advantage and having, as a consequence, the 
deformation of the competition environment.  
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Cassation holds as follows: 
Pursuant to Art. 104, para. 1 and para. 3 of the Protection of Competition Act, for damage caused 
as a result of infringements of this Act, the person at fault owes an indemnity and claims for indemnity 
are lodged under the procedure set forth in the Civil Procedure Code. Pursuant to Art. 104, para. 4, 
proposition one of the Protection of Competition Act, the judgment of the Supreme Administrative 
Court, which has taken effect and which confirms the resolution of the Commission ascertaining 
infringement of the Act, has binding force on the Civil Court regarding whether the resolution of the 
Commission is valid and lawful. The substantive lawfulness of the instrument consists in its 
consistency with the prerequisites contemplated in the applicable law and in the scope of its 
determination, which is the subject matter of administrative proceedings. Pursuant to Art.104, para. 4, 
proposition one of the Protection of Competition Act, the mandatory effect of an administrative 
instrument confirmed by a judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court extends to its substantive 
lawfulness in the ‘ascertainment of the infringement’. The Supreme Court of Cassation further 
elaborates that the mandatory character of the resolution of the Commission for the Protection of 
Competition, as regards its substantive lawfulness, extends in addition to the framework of its scope – 
the ascertainment of specific behavior that is qualified as infringement within the meaning of the 
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Protection of Competition Act, and also to all affected physical persons and legal entities, regardless 
of whether the infringement is directly targeted at them /Art. 104, para.2 of the Protection of 
Competition Act/, respectively, regardless of their participation in the administrative proceedings, 
where the Court judgment confirms the resolution of the Commission.  
According to the Supreme Court of Cassation, the resolution of the Commission for the Protection 
of Competition, whereby the Court ascertains the infringement of Art. 104, para. 4, proposition one of 
the Protection of Competition Act, which is confirmed by the judgment of the Supreme Administrative 
Court in the event of a tort/delict claim lodged under the procedure set forth in the Civil Procedure 
Code in causality with the ascertained infringement, binds the Civil Court solely in regard to the 
ascertainment of the infringement by its contents, corresponding to the qualification given by the 
Commission for Protection of Competition under the Protection of Competition Act. In accordance 
with the general court proceedings rules, the remaining elements of the factual basis of tort/delict are 
subject to proof before the Civil Court, i.e., damage, causality between the infringement of the 
Protection of Competition Act, damage and its scope, causality between the damage and unlawful 
behaviour. 
The Commission for the Protection of Competition held in the course of the proceedings thereat, 
being administrative proceedings, that the extraction and marketing of product is in conflict with the 
legal requirements for concessionary rights proceedings that are held from the omitted payment of 
concession remuneration and expenses and obligations that are characteristic of the exercise of 
concession rights, the Commission has held that the defendant company has gained unfair advantage 
in the respective geographical and product market, including ousting a market competitor, i.e., Х Ltd. 
Such behaviour is in conflict with bona fide commercial practice and leads to the deformation of the 
respective market environment. In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Cassation holds that there is no 
causality between the infringement ascertained by the Commission and the claimed damages. The 
Supreme Court of Cassation thus concludes that the plaintiff is not entitled to indemnity on the 
grounds of infringement of the Protection of Competition Act since the causality between the property 
damage and unlawful anti-competition behaviour has not been proven. The Supreme Court of 
Cassation reverses judgment No. 230, delivered on 27th October, 2011, on Commercial Case No. 
367/11 of the Varna Appellate Court, Commercial Division, in the part where it was confirmed by 
Judgment No. 4 of 25th March, 2011, of Razgrad District Court on Commercial Case No. 35/2009 in 
the part appealed before the Appellate Court. 
Comment 
The case is quite significant for Bulgarian private enforcement of competition rules, because the 
decision of the Supreme Court is based on Art. 290 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision is 
obligatory for all national courts which have jurisdiction, that the Decision of the Commission for the 
Protection of Competition binds the civil court solely in regard to the ascertainment of the 
infringements. The other remaining elements of the factual basis – damage, causality between the 
infringement of the competition law and the damage, must be proven before the Civil Court, when the 
company claims damages. 
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3. Cartels and Anti-Competitive Agreements 
3.1. Jana Zemkova (Supreme Court, Slovakia), Slovenská Sporiteľňa v. Slovakian 
Competition Authority 
- Judgment of the Supreme Court No 3Sžh/4/2010  
-Case C-68/12, Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky v Slovenská sporiteľňa 
a.s. (2013) n.y.r. ECR 
 
Facts 
By a decision of 9th June, 2009, the Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky, odbor dohôd 
obmedzujúcich súťaž (the ‘Restrictive Agreements’ Division of the Competition Authority of the 
Slovak Republic; ‘the Division’), a first-level authority with competence in the protection of 
competition, found that three major banks with their principal places of business in Bratislava 
(Slovakia) – namely Slovenská sporiteľňa a.s., Československá obchodná banka a.s. and Všeobecná 
úverová banka a.s. – had infringed Article 81 EC (now Article 101 TFEU) and the corresponding 
provision of Law No 136/2001 by entering into an agreement: i) to terminate contracts relating to the 
current accounts of Akcenta CZ a.s. (‘Akcenta’), a company whose principal place of business is in 
Prague (Czech Republic), and (ii) to refrain from concluding new contracts with Akcenta.  
The Division considered that Akcenta, which is a non-bank financial institution providing services 
comprising cashless foreign exchange transactions, needed to have current accounts in banks in order 
to carry on its activities, which included foreign-exchange transfers from and to other countries, 
including those for its customers in Slovakia. In the Division’s view, the three banks concerned 
regarded Akcenta as a competitor that was providing services to their customers and were not best 
pleased that their profits had fallen as a result of its business, and they monitored Akcenta’s activity, 
conferred with each other and decided by common agreement, to terminate, in a coordinated manner, 
the contracts they had concluded with Akcenta. Relying on evidence of contact between the three 
banks, including in particular a meeting held on 10th May, 2007, and subsequent email 
correspondence, the Division established that each of the three banks had agreed to terminate its 
contract with Akcenta on condition that the other two did the same, in order to prevent part of its 
clientele switching to whichever bank continued to hold Akcenta’s current accounts. The Division 
concluded that the conduct of the banks in the relevant market, defined as the Slovak market for 
cashless foreign-exchange operations, constituted an agreement that was intended to restrict 
competition and it imposed fines of EUR 3,197,912 on Slovenská sporiteľňa, a.s., EUR 3,183,427 on 
Československá obchodná banka a.s., and EUR 3,810,461 on Všeobecná úverová banka a.s.  
Following Slovenská sporiteľňa, a.s.’s, commencement of proceedings against the Division’s 
decision, the Rada Protimonopolného úradu Slovenskej republiky (Council of the Competition 
Authority of the Slovak Republic ‘the Council’), a second-level administrative authority, adopted, on 
19th November, 2009, a decision that amended the contested decision by broadening the legal 
categorisation of the conduct at issue in the main proceedings. The Council did not alter the amounts 




Slovenská sporiteľňa, a.s., challenged the Council’s decision, bringing proceedings before the Krajský 
súd Bratislava (Bratislava Regional Court). By a judgment of 23rd September, 2010, the Krajský súd 
Bratislava annulled the decisions of 9th June and 19th November, 2009, in so far as they concerned 
Slovenská sporitel’ňa, and referred the case back to the Protimonopolný úrad. In its judgment, the 
Krajský súd Bratislava stated, inter alia, that the Protimonopolný úrad had misinterpreted the concepts 
of the ‘competitor’ and the ‘relevant market’. According to that Court, the Protimonopolný úrad had 
not determined whether Akcenta could be regarded as one of Slovenská sporitel’ňa’s competitors in 
the relevant market, given that it was operating in Slovakia without the requisite authorisation from the 
Národná banka Slovenska (Slovak National Bank); nor had that authority considered the question as to 
whether Akcenta’s illegal activity could be accorded legal protection. The Krajský súd Bratislava 
pointed out in that regard that the Národná banka Slovenska had imposed a fine of EUR 35,000 on 
Akcenta on the ground that, from January, 2008, to June, 2009, it had been carrying out foreign 
exchange transactions in Slovakia without a license. At the same time, however, the Krajský súd 
Bratislava stated that the decision of the Národná banka Slovenska to impose the fine had been 
annulled by the Banková rada Národnej banky Slovenska (Banking Council of the Slovak National 
Bank) and that the investigation into Akcenta had been closed on the basis that a penalty could no 
longer be imposed on it because the limitation period applicable to financial penalties had expired. In 
addition, the Krajský súd Bratislava pointed out that it was clear from the documents before it that 
Akcenta was not a competitor to the banks concerned but merely one of their customers, since it was 
not providing services at the same level as the banks and it was operating on the basis of a different set 
of rules. The Krajský súd Bratislava also noted that the Protimonopolný úrad had not taken sufficient 
account of the circumstances in which the agreement at issue in the main proceedings had been 
entered into. It considered that it had not been proven, inter alia, that Akcenta had attempted 
unsuccessfully to reopen bank accounts with Slovenská sporitel’ňa.  
The Protimonopolný úrad brought an appeal against the judgment of the Krajský súd Bratislava 
before the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky (Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic). The 
Protimonopolný úrad submitted that it had sufficiently substantiated its finding that Akcenta was one 
of the competitors to the banks concerned in the relevant market, namely the Slovak market for 
cashless foreign exchange operations. With regard to the allegedly illegal nature of the business 
carried on by Akcenta in Slovakia, the Protimonopolný úrad maintained that the fact that Akcenta 
carried on its business activity without the requisite license was not relevant to the purpose of 
examining the conduct of the banks concerned under the competition rules. It also noted that neither 
Slovenska sporiteľňa, a.s., nor the other banks, had questioned the legality of Akcenta’s activity before 
initiating the procedure at issue in the main proceedings. It did not consider there was any proof that 
Akcenta was operating illegally. So far as the decision of the Banking Council of the Slovak National 
Bank was concerned, the Protimonopolný úrad noted that it concerned the period from January, 2008, 
to June, 2009, while Akcenta was operating on the Slovak market from 2003, and the relevant banks 
had coordinated their conduct and terminated the contracts with Akcenta in 2007. The Protimonopolný 
úrad also points out that that decision was annulled. 
Slovenská sporiteľňa, a.s. contended that the Protimonopolný úrad had not given sufficient weight 
to the fact that Akcenta, which did not have the requisite license, was operating illegally on the 
relevant Slovak market. It submitted that since the necessary conditions of competition law were not 
met, a restriction of competition could not be pleaded. It argued that there was no reason to penalise 
conduct resulting in the exclusion of an undertaking that was operating illegally. It had not been 
established that the meeting held by the three banks on 10th May, 2007, resulted in an agreement, 
given that the employee who attended the meeting for Slovenská sporiteľňa, a.s. merely gathered 
information on the projected termination of contracts relating to Akcenta’s current accounts.  
In those circumstances, the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky decided to stay the proceedings and 
to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:  
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1. Is Article 101(1) TFEU … to be interpreted as meaning that it is of legal relevance that a 
competitor (trader) adversely affected by a restrictive agreement between other competitors 
(traders) was operating on the relevant market illegally at the time when the agreement was 
concluded?  
2. For the purposes of interpreting Article 101(1) TFEU … is it of legal relevance that, at the time 
when the restrictive agreement was concluded, the legality of that competitor’s (trader’s) conduct 
was not questioned by the competent supervisory bodies in the Slovak Republic?  
3. Is Article 101(1) TFEU … to be interpreted as meaning that, in order to find that an agreement 
is restrictive of competition, it is necessary to demonstrate personal conduct on the part of a 
representative who is authorised under the undertaking’s constitution, or the personal assent in the 
form of a mandate, of that representative, who has, or may have, taken part in that agreement, to 
the conduct of one of the undertaking’s employees, where the undertaking has not distanced itself 
from the conduct of that employee and, at the same time, the agreement has been implemented?  
4. Is Article 101(3) TFEU … to be interpreted as also applying to an agreement that is prohibited 
under Article 101(1) TFEU … which, by its nature, has the effect of excluding from the market a 
specific individual competitor (trader), which has subsequently been found to have been carrying 
out foreign exchange transactions on the cashless foreign-exchange operations market without 
holding the appropriate license required under national law?’  
Ruling of the ECJ   
The Court (Tenth Chamber) hereby rules in Case C-68/12: 
1. Article 101 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that an undertaking that is 
adversely affected by an agreement, whose object is the restriction of competition, was allegedly 
operating illegally on the relevant market at the time when the agreement was concluded, is of no 
relevance to the question of whether the agreement constitutes an infringement of that provision. 
2. Article 101(1) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to find that an agreement is 
restrictive of competition, it is not necessary to demonstrate personal conduct on the part of a 
representative who is authorised under the undertaking’s constitution or personal assent, in the 
form of a mandate, of that representative to the conduct of an employee of the undertaking who 
has participated in an anti-competitive meeting. 
3. Article 101(3) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that it can apply to an agreement 
prohibited under Article 101(1) TFEU only when the undertaking which is relying on Article 
101(3) TFEU has proved that the four cumulative conditions laid down therein are met. 
The Ruling of the Supreme Court  
The Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic decided to make a judgment No. 3Sžh/4/2010 on 
21.05.2013, and so changed the judgment on the Krajsky sùd Bratislava and dismissed the action by 
Slovenská sporiteľňa,a.s. In its judgment, the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic stated, inter alia, 
that it must be recalled that Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits as incompatible with the internal market all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices 
which may affect trade between Member States, and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the internal market. For the purpose of applying 
Article 101(1) TFEU, there is no need to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement once it 
appears that it has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition (Joined Cases 
56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299; Joined Cases C-238/99 P, 
C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl 
Maatschappij and Others v Commission [2002] ECR I-8375, paragraph 508; and Case C-389/10 P 
KME Germany and Others v Commission [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 75).  
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The agreement entered into by the banks that were specifically concerned had, as its object, the 
restriction of competition, and none of the banks challenged the legality of Akcenta’s business before 
they were investigated in the case that resulted in the main proceedings. The alleged illegality of 
Akcenta’s situation is therefore irrelevant to the purpose of determining whether the conditions for an 
infringement of the competition rules are met. Moreover, it is for public authorities and not for private 
undertakings or associations of undertakings, to ensure compliance with statutory requirements. 
Relying on the evidence of contacts between the three banks, including, in particular, a meeting held 
on 10th May, 2007, and subsequent email correspondence, the Supreme Court established that 
Slovenská sporiteľňa, a.s. had agreed to terminate their contract with Akcenta on condition that the 
other two did the same, in order to prevent a part of their clientele from switching to whichever bank 
continued to hold Akcenta’s current accounts. The Supreme Court concluded that the conduct of the 
banks in the relevant market, defined as the Slovak market for cashless foreign-exchange operations, 
constituted an agreement that was intended to restrict competition and imposed fines of Euros 
3,197,912 on Slovenská sporiteľňa, a.s.   
It is the person who relies on Article 101(3) TFEU who must demonstrate, by means of convincing 
arguments and evidence, that the conditions for obtaining an exemption are satisfied 
(GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others, paragraph 82).  
Comment 
It is the opinion of the Supreme Court that Slovenská sporitel’ňa, a.s. put forward only one of the four 
cumulative conditions referred to in Article 101(3) TFEU. Even if, as stated by the parties to that 
agreement, the purpose was to force Akcenta to comply with Slovak law, it was for those parties to 
lodge a complaint with the competent authorities in that respect, and not to take it upon themselves to 
eliminate the competing undertaking from the market. 
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3.2. Lorenza Calcagno (Court of Genova, Italy), Butangas Spa and Liquidas Spa v. Italian 
Competition Authority 
Facts 
Butangas Spa, Liquigas Spa and ENI Spa are undertakings working in the Italian market in the 
distribution of LPG (liquid petroleum gas, in Italian the acronym is GPL), in particular in small tanks 
and bottles. In 2008, the Authority initiates proceedings on a presumed cartel among not only the firms 
named but also others, to determine the prices of GPL in tanks in Sardinia and other contractual 
clauses so as to compartmentalise the market. During the investigation, some undertakings presented 
proposals, but the Authority denied closing the procedure because of the nature of anti-competitive 
behaviour. At this point, ENI Spa asked to enter a leniency program and to give information about the 
existence of an agreement among the most important firms in distribution (such as Liquigas, Butangas 
and ENI) throughout the country, so as to control the price of LPG in tanks and bottles. As a 
consequence, the proceedings were limited to the three undertakings in order to verify an infringement 
of Art. 101 TFEU, which lasted for more than ten years. At the end of the procedure, the Authority 
showed the existence of an illegal agreement that had been finalised to control prices before the 
variations in the international quotations for the raw material, and the agreement was enacted through 
many meetings between the managements of the partners (Liquigas, Butangas and ENI). As a 
consequence of the application of leniency programme, ENI was not fined, but the other two firms 
were ordered to pay around six million euros (Butangas), and seventeen million euros (Liquigas). 
The firms firstly filed an appeal to the TAR Lazio (the regional appeals tribunal which hears 
appeals from NCA decisions), as the judge of First Instance, asking that the decision be overturned. 
They held that the Authority had based the decision only on the information given by ENI and on the 
external circumstances of the common trend in the price lists, without a correct evaluation of the 
historical reasons for the trend being explained by the undertakings, so the decision was based only on 
presumptions. The First Instance judge confirmed the decision, so Liquigas and Butangas appealed to 
the Administrative Supreme Court (the Consiglio di Stato). 
The Ruling of the Administrative Supreme Court 
The first question examined by the Court is the role as evidence of the declarations of the applicant 
within the administrative procedure. The Judges first recalled the fundamental role of the declaration 
of the applicants, especially in inquiries on horizontal cartels that they defined as being one of the 
most serious threats to the free market (in this part it appears that the Judges know the words of the EU 
Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, in 2005 at the International Forum on European Competition Law). The 
Court declared that it was necessary in the judgment to balance, on one side, the necessity not to 
extend the use of presumptions too much and, on the other, the difficulties in finding evidence of anti-
competitive behaviour in cases such as the one under discussion, in which normally no documentation 
exists. The Court, referring also to the case law of the General Court (Case T-68/00, JFE Engineering 
and Case T-59/07, Polineri Europa), stated that the declaration alone cannot be considered as full 
evidence of collusion, but it has a value that must be considered, above all when it comes from a 
manager of a company that plays an important role in the cartel. According to the Court, taking in 
consideration that it is rather difficult to find “full” evidence (i.e. a “smoking gun”) in relation to a 
cartel agreement, a too restrictive interpretation could jeopardize competition law enforcement. 
Consequently, in its ruling the Court affirms that an applicant’s declaration could considered as full 
evidence of collusion confirmed by other elements. So, the declaration of the applicant remained 
central to the judgment into which other elements can be entered, as, for instance, in the case analysed, 
the inclusion of the trends in the list of prices; all relevant elements must be considered in a complete 
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and comprehensive framework. In conclusion, the declaration is central to the judgment and is 
considered to be of particular importance if it comes from the manager of one of the most important 
actors in the illegal collusion, and, at the end of an evaluation of presumptions, can give full evidence 
of a cartel.  
In relation to the prices, the defendants argued that the only circumstance confirming ENI’s 
declaration were the trends in the price lists, which are different from the final prices and are only 
important in evaluating the effectiveness of competition in the relevant market. On this question, the 
Court stated that it is not necessary to have proof of the exact levels of prices, considering their 
necessary flexibility, but the evidence must be aimed at the situation that pertains in the competitive 
process that determines the final prices. 
So the Court confirmed the AGCM’s (the Italian Competition Authority) decision.  
Comment 
The judgment that is examined here demonstrates the actual position of public enforcement on the 
declaration of leniency from the applicant. It is very clear how important the leniency procedure in a 
case such as the one treated, relating to hard-core cartels, can be. In this cartel, the declaration was 
considered the principal argument of the evidence, with the addition of other elements of 
presumptions. To conclude on the use of information, it is useful to remember that the declaration can 
be known only at the end of the investigation, when the Authority has transmitted the results of the 
inquiry. However, the real problem is the relationship between public and private enforcement in 
relation to the use of the leniency declaration in damages claims. In fact, the leniency programme is 
applicable in the framework of an infringement procedure, and is not directly applicable in civil 
actions. The importance of addressing the use of evidence found in leniency applications by plaintiffs 
in damages actions has been addressed in the Damages Directive. Actually, in Italy, administrative 
judges had already stated that it is possible to ask in civil procedures (such as follow-on actions) for 
access to the documents of the investigation file, using the tools of private procedure. For instance the 
judge may ask information directly from the Authority (because of the public nature of this subject), or 
the parties can ask the judge to order the Authority to permit access to documents that are relevant to 
the civil procedure (as, for example, in TAR Lazio n. 1344/2012, and for data access in TAR Lazio n. 
10615/2009).   
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3.3. Andzej Maciejevski (Vilnius Regional Court, Lithuania), Eksortus and Specialus 
Montažas – NTP v. Lithuania Competition Authority 





Upon receiving the request of the applicant, SE Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, the Competition 
Council by its decision of 03/09/2010 started an investigation into the actions of the business entities 
UAB Eksortus and UAB Specialus montažas – NTP, who were engaged in activities selling industrial 
metal and other products and in other related activities. 
The request of the applicant, SE Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, stated that the business entities 
referred to might have negotiated their tenders (proposals) with one other before submitting bids under 
public procurement procedures.  
The Competition Council established that UAB Eksortus and UAB Specialus montažas – NTP had 
had a specific type of relationship that was not typical of competing business entities: each company 
shared information with the other about organised public calls for tenders. They helped each other to 
prepare commercial tenders and consulted one another about questions relating to their preparation, 
when they also revealed their prices. The business entities examined kept contact with one another 
regarding those questions which should have been confidential, according to the usual practice of 
competing business entities.  
The Competition Council stated that the relevant business entities had not only kept in contact 
during the examined period of time, but had also cooperated in regard to several public procurements 
which were organised by SE Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant and UAB Vilniaus energija. 
During the investigation performed at the premises of the examined business entities, it was 
established that they had communicated before submitting their tenders (proposals), phone calls 
between employees of the companies were registered on the eve of the public calls for tenders, and the 
final tenders submitted by both companies in response to the public call for tenders of SE Ignalina 
Nuclear Power Plant were, in principle, identical, i.e., the tenders had the same form, structure and 
layout, the title and font of the tenders were completely alike, as well as the numbers of the tenders, 
identical grammatical mistakes, text formatting and layout inaccuracies were in the same places, the 
prices of the offers were also written in an identical font, other documents included in the tenders were 
also the same: technical specification, the list of documents proving qualification, and the same 
grammatical mistakes and formatting inaccuracies were also found in these documents. 
By the decision of 12th May, 2011, the Competition Council (National Competition Authority) 
decided that this similarity in tenders could not be explained by the objective circumstances or by 
explanations submitted by the business entities, and this meant that the tenders had been prepared 
jointly.  
The Competition Council stated that UAB Specialus montažas – NTP could have submitted a 
supporting tender with a higher price so that UAB Eksortus would win the call for tenders organised 
by SE Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant. The tenders were negotiated between the examined business 
entities, UAB Eksortus and UAB Specialus montažas – NTP were not competing by submitting a 
better tender to SE Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant and they submitted tenders which had been 
negotiated in advance; therefore, the organiser of public procurement could not use the real benefits of 
competition and was forced to purchase goods under conditions of competition that had been imitated. 
Andzej Maciejevski 
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The Competition Council recognised that by negotiating the prices of the tenders, UAB Eksortus 
and UAB Specialus montažas – NTP violated the requirements of Article 5(1)(1) of the Law on 
Competition. UAB Eksortus was fined 52,400 Lt for violating Article 5(1)(1) of the Law on 
Competition, whereas UAB Specialus montažas – NTP received a fine of 334,200 Lt. 
The Ruling of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court 
By the decision of 29th December, 2011, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the 
appeals of UAB Eksortus and UAB Specialus montažas – NTP as unfounded. 
The Court stated that an agreement between competitors to directly or indirectly determine the 
prices of a specific good was seen as having an aim in itself to limit competition, and its negative 
impact on competition was presumed.; therefore, the argument of the applicants that the Competition 
Council had to prove that the business entities had the aim to limit competition was unfounded. With 
regard to the established circumstances, the Court concluded that the applicants had negotiated the 
tenders. They did not compete with one another to submit a better tender to the organisers of the 
procurement, but submitted tenders which had been negotiated in advance or in the course of later 
negotiations, which was why the organisers of the calls for tenders were unable to assess the real 
competitive conditions. The argument of the applicants that no other business entity suffered any 
damage due to the cooperation of the applicants in the relevant calls for tenders, which was established 
in the case, was considered by the Court to be unfounded because the mere fact that the contracting 
authority could not use the benefits of normal competition was considered as damage, since the 
tenders of the specific suppliers had not actually competed. As a result, the Court noted that the 
Competition Council had been right to conclude that, by their actions in the public calls for tenders, 
UAB Eksortus and UAB Specialus montažas – NTP had violated the provisions of Article 5 of the 
Law on Competition. 
The Court stated that taking into account the fact that the agreements between the companies, their 
coordinated actions and decisions in the public call for tenders were considered one of the gravest 
violations of competition. The gravity of the offence of the applicants, which was the cartel agreement 
consisting of two episodes, was assessed as being very serious. The Court stated that it had not been 
established in the examined case which of the offenders was the initiator of the offence, and the data 
collected in the case confirmed that both business entities had taken actions which constituted the 
offence defined in Article 5 of the Law on Competition. There was therefore no ground for reducing 
the size of the fines. The Court noted that the performance of the orders of the Competition Council 
and the submission of the information requested might not be assessed as help provided by the 
business entities in the course of the investigation. In addition, the disputed decision imposed fines on 
the applicants amounting to 1.2% of their gross annual income, i.e., the imposed fine was not high if 
compared with the maximum size established by law. A greater reduction in the fine would therefore 
have denied the effectiveness of the fine’s size, which had been imposed for the relevant offences and 
that had been determined by the legislator, as well as the determined aims for this kind of a sanction.  
In the present case, the applicants had entered into the cartel agreement (i.e., the horizontal 
agreement between competitors on price coordination in public procurements), so the provisions 
concerning the impact of the minor importance of an agreement limiting competition are not applied.  
The Ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court 
By the decision of 21st June, 2012, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania dismissed the 
appeals and upheld the decision of 29th December, 2011, of the Vilnius Regional Administrative 
Court.  
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The Court stated that the construction of Article 5 of the Law on Competition and the aim of the 
provisions laid down in this law made it possible to distinguish two categories of prohibited 
agreements: 1) agreements which in themselves limit competition and, 2) agreements where it is 
necessary to establish and prove that their aim is contrary to competition law or has a negative impact 
on competition. Having established that there was price fixing (a price cartel) in the case examined, 
the Competition Council was not obliged to prove that this agreement had been intended to achieve 
illegal aims. The agreement between competitors on the determination (fixing) of prices in presumes 
the existence of the intent to limit competition. Even if the parties to the agreement had other legal 
aims, as they claim, the aim of the agreement was assessed in this case not in the context of the civil 
law, but in the context of the competition law. The Court noted that the fact that there had been an 
agreement between the business entities was proven. 
The Court concluded that the exception laid down in Article 5(4) of the Law concerning 
agreements of minor importance was not applied in relation to horizontal agreements on prices, 
irrespective of the scope of the agreements, the part of the market occupied by the business entities 
and other criteria – the de minimis rule (Article 101(1) TFEU) is not applied to agreements on the 
fixing of the prices of goods sold to third parties.  
The Court noted that in a circumstance where the business entities were related by some mutual 
shareholders and employees and, for this reason could be seen as being related companies, this was not 
significant in terms of the competition law because the business entities that participated in the public 
procurements and that submitted commercial tenders, were seen as competitors.  
The Judicial Panel noted that it was at the discretion of the Competition Council to perform a 
proper and comprehensive assessment of the factual circumstances by imposing sanctions on the 
business entities for not following the requirements laid down in the Law on Competition of the 
Republic of Lithuania and in determining their size. It was highlighted that one of the aims of 
imposing a fine for violations of the competition law was as a deterrent to committing an offence and 
therefore the imposition of very small economic sanctions, or exemption from paying them, would not 
help to achieve this aim. When imposing the fine, the Competition Council took into account the 
nature of the offence committed (a cartel agreement on prices), its gravity (serious), the procurements 
in which the applicants participated and negotiated the prices (two), the duration of the offence (which 
does not exceed the period of one year), aggravating and mitigating circumstances (none), as well as 
the impact each of the business entities had on the committing of the offence (the initiator was not 
identified, both entities had the same role), and it was right to impose fines which amounted to 1.2% 
of the gross annual income of the applicants. These fines made up only 1/8 of the size of the maximum 
fine which could be imposed; therefore, it was concluded that the size of the fines was founded and 
legal.   
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3.4. Csilla Szabó (Budapest Metropolitan Court, Hungary), Adeptus Zrt. and others vs 
Hungarian Competition Authority  
Judgment of the Hungarian Supreme Court No. Kfv.III.37.084/2009/15. 
Facts 
The Road Management and Coordination Directorate (a state authority) published some public 
procurement tenders on road and bridge construction and renovation in 2001 and 2002. The leaders of 
fourteen noted construction companies met several times in 2001 and 2002 and kept negotiating. The 
participants agreed which companies would win which public procurement tenders, what amount and 
percentage they would share from each project, what construction work they would or would not do, 
and what consideration they would get.  
The Hungarian National Competition Authority initiated a procedure ex officio to examine the 
public procurement tenders on road and bridge construction. They especially examined whether there 
were any anti-competitive negotiations or agreements between the market participants. During the 
procedure they held dawn raids at the premises of six companies. All of them took part in the above 
mentioned negotiations.  
As a result of the dawn raids, of the documents found and the witness statements, the National 
Competition Authority held that the fourteen undertakings involved had infringed section 11 of the 
Hungarian Competition Act, which contains the same ruling as Article 101 of the TFEU.  
The Authority defined as a relevant market the road and bridge construction and renovation activity 
of 2001 and 2002 in the territory of Hungary, where the Directorate was the procurer (the demand 
side), and the road and bridge construction companies the entrepreneurs (the supply side). The 
Authority found that the documents impounded during the dawn raids, together with the witness 
statements, proved that market sharing and price fixing agreements had existed and the companies had 
agreed on the winner of each of the tenders. Although one of the companies had only a passive role, 
the lack of protest that was expressed related to a unity of will. The undertakings involved were 
competitors in this market, because all of them are construction companies which can enter into public 
procurement tenders as tenderers.  
The Authority imposed on the fourteen undertakings involved an 11,897,000,000 HUF (40,943,906 
EUR) lump sum fine. In determining the basis of the fine, the Authority took into account the turnover 
of the relevant market, but amended the income from the public procurement tenders published by the 
Directorate in 2001 and 2002, by the payments that had been made between the undertakings involved 
and that they had paid to each other. It considered as aggravation that, as the result of the hardcore 
cartel, the procurer’s (and through this the consumers’) interests had been seriously harmed, and 
considered and also that the Authority had found similar violations in many of the 2001-2002 tenders, 
so it was a widespread practice in the road and bridge construction market in those years. It also 
calculated, against the undertakings, that the national budget was attacked by their anti-competitive 
conduct. The Authority did not qualify any of the companies as being the organiser of the cartel. It did 
not identify any extenuating circumstances.  
According to the Authority’s published point system for stipulating the sum of the fine, each 
undertaking got 25 points because they had endangered competition, 20 points because of the market 
effect of their anti-competitive conduct, 10 points because of the common market share of the related 
companies, 5 points for their active conduct in the cartel, 5 points for their negligence, and 5 further 
points because they had involved the national budget.  
(Budapest Metropolitan Court, Hungary), Adeptus Zrt. and others vs Hungarian Competition Authority 
49 
Judicial Proceedings 
The undertakings challenged the decision of the National Competition Authority before the Court. 
They stated that their agreements were only negotiations between a general constructor and 
subcontractors and consortium settlements, which are legitimate under the Public Procurement Act. 
They did not accept the definition of the relevant market. They asked the Court to ignore some 
illegally gained evidence. Regarding the amount of the fine, they lacked individual consideration and 
referred to improper discretion being used in regard to the facts and evidence.  
The First Instance Court essentially approved the decision of the National Competition Authority. 
The Court settled on the same facts that were relevant to the Authority’s decision and agreed the legal 
arguments of the Authority. It held that the definition of the relevant market was correct and, 
according to the decision, the Authority had evaluated the conduct of each company individually when 
it had decided on the amount of the fine. Referring to the companies’ argument that the negotiations 
between the general constructor and the subcontractors and consortium settlements are legitimate 
under the Public Procurement Act, the Court emphasised that conduct which is legitimate under the 
Public Procurement Act can be anti-competitive and can break the rules of the Competition Act. The 
Court stressed that the limit of the fine is the net revenue of the undertaking, under that limit its 
bearing orients the amount. The Court found that considering the turnover of the relevant market as 
the basis of the fine was against the law, but the fines imposed were only 0.007–1.5 % of the 
companies’ annual net revenues. However, while the Court did not accept the determination of the 
basis of the fine, it did accept the discretion of the Authority in determining the amount of the fine.  
The undertakings appealed against the First Instance Judgment on the basis of the same reasons as 
they had offered in challenging the decision of the Authority, but the Second Instance Court approved 
the First Instance Judgement. It corrected the definition of the relevant market as being the road and 
bridge construction and renovation activity in the scope of the public procurement tenders in 2001 and 
2002 in the territory of Hungary, where these companies are substitutes for each other on the supply 
side.  
The entrepreneurs submitted an appeal to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court approved the 
judgment of the Appeal Court.  
Comment 
The public procurement market is a special market, where competition is restricted. The aim of the 
restriction is to ensure the transparency of state procurements, to reach prices for state investments that 
are as low as possible and to ensure the proficiency of the participants in state projects. When the 
tenderers go into a price-fixing and market sharing hardcore cartel, it harms not only the procurer, the 
state, but through this all citizens because, indirectly, all the citizens are consumers in the market for 
public procurements. The relevance of this case is to emphasise that, even in this, market competition 
must be maintained among the companies that are able to meet the requirements for public 
procurement tenders. 
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3.5 Francisco Paneda Usunariz (Gijón Commercial Court, Spain), TOBAR v. CEPSA, 
Estaciones de Servicio S.A. 
Facts 
The current procedure started with a claim issued on 3rd February, 2004, by a company (from now on 
TOBAR) against the enterprise CEPSA, ESTACIONES DE SERVICIO, S.A (CEPSA). In short, 
TOBAR wanted the ruling to be the following: 1) They wanted to be recognised as a re-seller of 
petroleum products; 2) They wanted the court to rule that the contract with a service station for the 
‘use of brand name and image, technical and commercial assistance and supply on a 
commission-agent basis’, dated on 7/2/96, be declared void, to apply to both parties, arguing that this 
was against the law (Art. 81(1) EC), and the Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83 of 22nd June, 
1983, on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing 
agreements, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1582/97 of 30th July, 1997; 3) and, as a 
consequence, they claimed that CEPSA should pay the difference between the prices effectively paid 
by TOBAR to CEPSA (without commissions), in accordance with the contract, and the weekly prices 
that were proven to have been offered or paid by other authorised operators/suppliers in the same 
regime. 
The defendant, CEPSA, opposed the claim and issued a counter-demand with the following 
petitions:  
1) That the contract be declared valid and in force; 
2) That TOBAR broke the contract by ignoring the exclusivity clause included in the contract; 
3) That TOBAR has the obligation to fulfill the contract until it expires; 
4) To condemn TOBAR to compensate for the damages generated by the breach. 
TOBAR´s arguments can be summarised in three points: 
1) the economic regime of the contract was not an agency agreement, but a sales agreement; 
2) They also use\d as a defence the fact that the contract overcomes the maximum length allowed 
by the Commission Regulation of 1983, and this would allow CEPSA to unilaterally and 
absolutely fix the prices of fuels, the final price to the consumer, and the profit margin at point of 
sale.  
CEPSA’s arguments were that:  
1) the contract was an agency agreement, thus it wasn´t affected by the prohibition in Art. 81(1) 
EC,  
2) in regard to the contract´s length, they argued that important investments meant there was an 
advantage for TOBAR, in that its market share was not above 30%. 
In relation to the true nature of the contract, the judge followed the ‘financial risk’ criteria to conclude 
that TOBAR had assumed the risk according to the clauses included in the contract: risk for 
fluctuations in the price of the petroleum products supplied; the risk of loss or damage of the products, 
and so on. These circumstances led the judge to consider the contract one that was a ‘firm purchase 
commitment’, and not an agency agreement. In regard to the length of the contract, the judge affirmed 
that it exceeded the five year term established by the law (specifically, the agreed term was 10 years).  
It is pointed out that the contract imposed contained restrictive practices as CEPSA (supplier) fixed 
both prices: the one paid by TOBAR to CEPSA, and also the retail price (RP).  
The court rejected CEPSA’s counter claim, and declared void the contract agreed by the parties, 
condemning CEPSA to pay the price difference claimed. 
(Gijón Commercial Court, Spain), TOBAR v. CEPSA, Estaciones de Servicio S.A 
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The ECJ’s Preliminary Ruling  
Once the appeal was issued, the national court requested a preliminary ruling to clarify what it called 
the ‘agency concept’ in European Competition Law.  
In relation to sales distribution, if the relationship between the two parties located in different steps 
in the distribution channel was based on a sales contract, Art. 81.1 EC was to be applied to the 
relations. However, if it was about a representation contract, then it wasn´t. That´s how it was 
understood by the Communication in 1962 regarding exclusive representation contracts subscribed to 
by agents. 
The reason for not applying Art. 81.1 EC to authentic agency contracts is that, according to Art. 
81.1, there is no ‘agreement among companies’, but the agent is acting while integrated with the 
principal. 
The ECJ ruled on September 11
th
, 2008 (Case C-279/06), when answering the preliminary 
questions posed by the national court, mostly reproducing what it had already declared in its previous 
ruling from 14th December, 2006 (Case C- 217/05, CEEES). 
More specifically, the ruling declared the following:  
‘35- The Court held, at paragraph 38 of CEEES, that vertical agreements such as the agreements 
between CEPSA and service-station operators were covered by Article 81 EC only where the 
operator is regarded as an independent economic operator and there is, consequently, an agreement 
between two undertakings’ 
The Court explained the criteria which would allow the national Judge to appreciate, taking the facts 
into account, the effective distribution of the commercial and financial risks between the owners of the 
petrol stations and the fuel suppliers. The Court ended up by affirming that a contract for the exclusive 
supply of fuel can be included into Art. 81.1 EC when the owner of the petrol station assumed in a 
relevant proportion, one or more of the commercial and financial risks that are related to the sale of 
these products to a third party, and such a contract includes clauses that could undermine the game of 
competition, such as the one referring to the fixing of retail prices.  
On the contrary, if the petrol supplier doesn´t assume those risks (or not a relevant part of them) the 
only clauses that could be applied, according to Art. 81.1 EC, are the exclusivity and the no 
competition clauses. 
In the end, the ECJ declared that: ‘(1) An exclusive supply contract for motor-vehicle and other 
fuels, as well as lubricants and other related products, is capable of falling within the scope of Article 
81(1) EC where the service-station operator assumes, in a non-negligible proportion, one or more 
financial and commercial risks linked to the sale of those products to third parties and where that 
contract contains clauses capable of infringing competition, such as that relating to the fixing of the 
retail price. If the service-station operator does not assume such risks or assumes only a negligible 
share of them, only the obligations imposed on the operator in the context of services as an 
intermediary offered by the operator to the principal, such as the exclusivity and non-competition 
clauses, are capable of falling within the scope of that provision. It is for the referring court to 
ascertain, moreover, whether the contract concluded on 7th February, 1996, between CEPSA 
Estaciones de Servicio SA and LV Tobar e Hijos SL, has the effect of preventing, restricting or 
distorting competition within the meaning of Article 81 EC’. 
The second questions requested by the Court of Madrid concerned the interpretation of Regulation 
nº 1984/83, and the possibility of extending the term for more than the five years. 
More specifically, the Court asked if the contract’s object of this dispute fulfilled the requirements 
established by Art. 10 and 12 of the Regulation of 1984/83, regarding the application of Art. 85.3 EEC 
(currently 101.3 TFEU), to certain categories of exclusive sale agreements in relation to the maximum 
length of the ‘no competition covenant’. The national court asked if, in order to allow the exclusive 
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supply clause to exceed five years, the economic and financial advantages must be substantial, or if 
they only need to be more than significant. 
The answer of the ECJ was as follows: 
‘54.- It follows that the concept of ‘special commercial or financial advantages’, referred to in 
Article 10 of Regulation No. 1984/83, must be interpreted as meaning that those advantages are 
indeed specific to the contractual relationship, but that they must also be substantial in order to 
justify an exclusivity of supply for 10 years. Those advantages must be such as to lead to an 
improvement in distribution, to facilitate the establishment or modernisation of the service station 
and to lower the distribution costs’ 
Finally, the ECJ established that:  
‘2. An exclusive supply contract, such as that referred to in the preceding paragraph of this 
operative part, is capable of benefiting from a block exemption provided for in Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83 of 22nd June, 1983, on the application of Article [81](3) of the 
Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements, as amended by Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 1582/97 of 30th July, 1997, if it complies with the maximum duration of 10 years 
referred to in Article 12(1)(c) of that regulation and if the supplier grants the service-station 
operator, in return for exclusivity, substantial commercial advantages which contribute to an 
improvement in distribution, facilitate the establishment or modernisation of the service station 
and lower the distribution costs. It is for the referring court to assess whether those conditions are 
satisfied in the case in the main proceedings’. 
The Ruling of the Court of Appeal of Madrid 
The ruling of the Court was in favour of dismissing the First Instance Court ruling by declaring the 
validity of the contract. Regarding this, the Court resolved the questions placed following the ruling of 
the ECJ: 
Firstly, regarding the condition of TOBAR, it concluded that it has features characteristic of the 
commission or agency contract, as the risk is not a defined item of the agency contract from the 
internal law point of view, but an accidental feature that exists according to agreement from the 
parties. However, at the same time, it remarks that ‘this agent’ does assume other risks that are not 
insignificant (commercial and financial), that is why it can´t be considered as a ‘genuine’ agent, but as 
a ‘non genuine’ agent, and thus the contract between TOBAR and CEPSA can be considered to be 
included in Art. 81.1 EC, not only in what is referred to as exclusivity and non-competition clauses 
(which would be in every case, according to the ECJ’s case law), but also to those regarding price 
fixing. 
Secondly, regarding the agreement covered by Art. 81.1 EC, the Court analysed whether it was 
exempt from being void as it fulfilled the requirements demanded by the Block Exemption regulation. 
So, starting from the interpretation carried out by the ECJ in the ruling of 11th September, 2008, the 
Spanish Court concluded that there are specific advantages of the contractual relationship since they 
referred to the technical facilities necessary for the activity of the petrol station, which improve the 
distribution, facilitate the installation or modernisation of the petrol station, and reduce the distribution 
costs, as they prevent the owner of the petrol station from spending an important amount of money at 
the moment of settling or renewing its installation and, because of their nature, they appeared as key to 
justify an exclusivity of supply for ten years.  
Finally, the Court concluded that the contract was null because CEPSA had unilateral power to fix 
the sale price without any possibility for TOBAR to apply discounts. In relation to this subject, the 
preliminary ruling of 2008 declared that the Spanish courts had the competence to decide whether 
TOBAR had any real opportunity to reduce the consumer sale price (nº 71). 
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In this case, on November 2
nd
, 2001, CEPSA sent an authorisation letter to TOBAR to apply 
discounts, and the Appeal Court understood that this communication proved the impossibility of 
TOBAR applying any discounts during the contract. 
The Ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court 
The Spanish Supreme Court dismissed the CEPSA appeal, arguing that the Madrid Court of Appeal 
had correctly interpreted the ECJ’s preliminary ruling, The Supreme Court insisted that the Appeal 
Court correctly ascertained that the contractual clause relating to that sale price can be amended by the 
unilateral authorisation of the supplier, and whether the contract, which is automatically void, may 
become valid following an amendment of that contractual clause. 
Comment 
The importance of this case law is the exclusion of a principal-agent relationship from the scope of 
Art. 81 EC (currently 101 TFEU) when the agent is not an independent trader. The significant 
preliminary ruling issued by the ECJ on 11th September, 2008, during the Spanish proceedings, 
related to a contract between a service-station operator and its supplier, and identified a ‘genuine 
agency agreement’ as being when the agent does not bear any of the risks, or bears only negligible 
risk, resulting from the contracts negotiated with third parties on behalf of the principal. In this case, as 
well as the Case C-217/05 (Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio – 
CEEES), the Court ruled that the decisive factor for determining whether the supplier is an 
independent economic operator is the agreement, express or implied, relating to the assumption of the 
financial and commercial risks linked to the sales of goods to third parties, which must be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis.  
Consequently, where, under an exclusive supply contract, the operator assumes the financial and 
commercial risks are linked to the sale of products to third parties to a non-negligible extent, any anti-
competitive clauses that fix the retail price in such an exclusive supply contract fall within Art. 101.1 
TFEU. 
Even in the case of a genuine agency agreement, Art. 101 applies to a non-competition or 
exclusivity clause requiring the agent to source its fuel exclusively from the principal. This is because 
that kind of clause restricts the agent´s commercial freedom as an operator on the agency services 
market. 
Nonetheless, such a clause may merit exemption if the relevant conditions are met. In particular, a 
ten year exclusivity clause may be justified if the financial and commercial benefits conceded by the 
supplier are so important that, in their absence, the service station operator could not have entered the 
agency services market for the sale of fuel.  
This is one of the Supreme Court’s numerous rulings relating to relationships between service 
station operators and suppliers (in civil jurisdiction as well as public enforcement, such as SAN 
7/11/2007 and 1/21/2008; STS (3ª) 3/3/2005 and 5/4/2007; STS (1ª) 10/3/2007, 11/20/2008, 
4/15/2009, 6/30/2009; 2/15/2012…) which have taken place in Spain in recent years and have 
generated several rulings by the ECJ. 
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3.6. Francisco Paneda Usunariz (Gijón Commercial Court, Spain), BCN Aduanas y 




, 2011, the Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (CNC) – a national institution in 
charge of guaranteeing compliance with laws relating to competition – sanctioned the enterprises BCN 
ADUANAS Y TRANSPORTES, S.L. (BCN) and BOFILL ARNAN, S.A with a fine of €1,184,000, 
due to infringement of Article 1 of Law 15/2007, July 3
rd
, on the Defence of Competition, and Art. 
101 of TFEU, which consists of fixing prices, either directly or indirectly, as well as other sales or 
service conditions. 
This Decision was appealed by BCN before the Audienca Nacional (AN), asking for the nullity of 
the decision and the sanction, which delivered its ruling on June 24
th,
 2013. 
It is not the aim of this paper to deal with the behaviour declared as being collusive by AN. A great 
amount of documentation was presented by CNC in the case, which led to the conclusion that BCN 
had taken part in numerous meetings that were carried out in order to fix prices with its competitors on 
a regular basis. The relevance of this Decision is, in our opinion, in the considerations around the 
quantifying of the fine, and the nature of the 10% of the total turnover obtained by the firm during the 
previous business year, which is included in Art. 63.1.c of the Spanish Defence of Competition Act, as 
well as in Regulation 1/2003, in Art. 23(2) 
The Limit of 10% in the Calculation of the Fine 
The Decision of the AN, in its point nº 6 (page 15, a), offers a singular interpretation of Article 63, by 
reference to Article 25 of the Spanish Constitution regarding the rule of law, which denies the 
possibility of imposing sanctions that are not previously referred to by the law (nulla poena sine lege). 
According to this Court, the minimum sanction will be 0% and the maximum 10%, making it 
necessary for the fine to be adjusted within this scale, bearing in mind any mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances, evaluating the length and the gravity. The violation of Art. 1 of the Defence of 
Competence, Spanish Law is considered as being very serious (up to 10% of the total turnover made 
by the undertaking in the business year prior to the fine). 
The Spanish Court considers that the limit of 10% of turnover represents the will of the law 
regarding what is the biggest sanction that can be imposed, due to infringement of the Competition 
Law. In this sense, when the Spanish Competition Authority calculates the sanction it will have to 
assume that 10% is the maximum sanction and must be reserved for the most serious infringements, 
whereas the less severe ones must be sanctioned with a fine far below 10%. This interpretation would 
be in accordance with the Spanish Constitutional Court that, following the principle of the Rule of 
Law, demands that the law determine the criteria with which to calculate the fine. 
However, this doctrine contradicts European jurisprudence and the European Commission, more 
specifically, the judgment of the General Court on December 12
th
, 2012, (Case T-352/00 Novacke 
Chemicke v European Commission), which points out that the amount that corresponds to 10% of the 
worldwide turnover would be a ‘capping ceiling’, which means a limit on the sanction that can be 
demanded, and not so much on the sanction that can be imposed. In this case, the 10% limit would not 
affect the calculation of the fine, which would be settled by the Commission according to its 
seriousness and to the length of the infraction, it can only be taken into account after the fine is 
declared in the case that it exceeds the 10% limit, thus reducing it to such an amount.  
The decision of the General Court says the following:  
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(161) (‘With regard to the applicant’s argument that the fine imposed on it was very close to the 
maximum ceiling of 10% of worldwide turnover (see paragraphs 152 and 153 above), it must be 
observed that the applicant misconstrues the nature of that ceiling. The sum corresponding to 10% 
of the worldwide turnover of a participant in an infringement of the competition rules is not, 
contrary to what the applicant seems to believe, a maximum fine, to be imposed only in respect of 
the most serious infringements. As is apparent from the case-law, it is, instead, a capping ceiling, 
the only possible consequence of which is that the amount of the fine calculated on the basis of the 
criteria of gravity and duration of the infringement will be reduced to the maximum permitted 
level. Its application implies that the undertaking concerned will not pay the fine which in 
principle would be payable if it were assessed on the basis of those criteria (Dansk Rørindustri and 
Others v Commission, cited in paragraph 47 above, paragraph 283)’).  
In the same way, the ruling of the General Court of June 16
th
, 2011 (Case Putters International vs 
Commission). 
The practical consequences of adopting one interpretative criterion or another is clearly important, 
for the following reasons: 
1) the interpretation of the limit by the Spanish Court gives greater importance to mitigating 
factors, since they would apply to a fine that cannot exceed 10% of the business turnover, and not 
to the total amount of the fine (which could be greater than this 10%);  
2) this criterion leads to the principle of proportionality: that the 10% fine can only be applied for 
the most serious behaviour possible, which is  why the majority of fines will be below that limit. 
This Decision of the Spanish Court seems to follow the German Supreme Court doctrine expressed in 
its judgment of February 23rd, 2013 (Bundesgerichtshof, KRB 20/12), regarding a cement cartel, in 
which, based also on the principle of the Rule of Law, in other words, the Law (and not the 
Administration) must be the one to establish the criteria with which to calculate the fine. So, the Court 
understands that the 10% limit it is only applicable once the sanction has been fixed.  
The Calculation of the Total Turnover in the Previous Financial Year 
In this case, the Spanish Court also carries out an interpretation of the Law with important practical 
consequences. It thus moderates the penalty imposed by the Spanish Competition Authority, stating 
that it must refer exclusively to the worldwide turnover of the specific branch of the activity in which 
the infringement occurred, and not to the worldwide turnover of all the economic activities of the 
undertaking. 
To reach this conclusion, the Spanish Court considered the following elements: 1) the 
proportionality between the fine and the infringement; 2) the purpose of the Law, none other than the 
penalising behaviours that are contrary to free competition in a specific area; 3) the segment affected 
by the collusive behaviour. The Spanish Court, to support its argument, uses the criteria followed by 
the EC in the application of the 2006 Guidelines (Guidelines on the method of setting fines) that 
appeared in point 21 of the Sentence previously quoted:  
(‘21. In the first place, the Commission determines a basic amount for each undertaking or 
association of undertakings. The Commission takes the value of the relevant undertaking’s sales of 
goods or of services to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates in the relevant 
geographic area (point 13). The basic amount of the fine is related to a proportion of the value of 
sales, depending on the degree of gravity of the infringement, multiplied by the number of years of 
infringement (point 19). Periods longer than six months but shorter than one year are counted as a 
full year (point 24). The proportion of the value of sales taken into account may, as a general rule, 
be set at up to 30% of the value of sales (point 21)’. 
As we have said, the practical consequences are especially relevant because the ECJ considers all the 
companies that take part in the same business holding as an ‘undertaking’, even if the infringement 
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was carried out by a small branch with no active intervention from the parent company of the group 
as, in these cases, the 10% limit cannot be applied.  
However, it cannot be mistaken for the ‘value of sales to which the infringement relates’, which is 
taken into account by the 2006 Guidelines in calculating the fines imposed when applying Art. 23.2.a 
of Regulation EC 1/2003 (DO 1/9/2006; Method for setting of fines, ‘value of sales’ -point 13-), with 
the ‘total turnover in the preceding business year’, which is not limited to the market affected by the 
infringement, on which the 10% limit is applied.  
It is obvious that, if we follow the first criterion, the fine will lose its deterrent effect, due to its 
substantial decrease, since the penalty seeks to take into account the economic strength of the 
undertaking in each case.  
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3.7. Cláudia Roque (Competition Tribunal, Portugal), Madeira’s driving schools SMTZ and 
others v. Portuguese Competition Authority 
Judgment of the Lisbon Commercial Court; Proceeding No. 659/11.3TYLSB 
Facts 
The Portuguese Competition Authority decided on 24/2/2011 that by establishing contacts for the 
purposes of discussing future prices, some driving schools, notably those mentioned above, infringed 
TFEU Article 101(1) and similar provisions of the Portuguese Competition Act, and they consequently 
imposed sanctions, namely fines.  
The administrative authority held that such behaviour distorted competition in Madeira’s driving 
schools market and this led to a rise in the applicable prices. 
The above-mentioned driving schools appealed to the First Instance Court (at the time, the Lisbon 
Commercial Court) saying that there were no contacts on the subject of future prices, and that prices 
did not rise any higher than they would have done as a result of the normal play of supply and 
demand. 
On 27/2/2012, the decision was upheld on appeal by the Court in relation to the driving school 
SMTZ – Ensino de Condução Automóvel, Lda., as there was no proof that the other driving school 
participated in any meeting or equivalent contact on the subject of future prices. 
The Court judgment emphasised that this was a clear infringement by object, regardless of the 
effects of such behaviour. 
The Court also stated that the fine of 2.731,36 Euros, applied by the Portuguese Competition 
Authority could not be raised, because of the prohibition of reformatio in pejus. 
Comment 
This case is a typical cartel case. 
Some of Madeira’s driving schools were having meetings and other types of contact on the subject 
of future prices that could be applied, distorting competition in the relevant Madeira Island driving 
schools’ market. 
This case was an opportunity for the Court to recall that the Commercial Court, under Law 
18/2003, of 11th June, was limited by the principle of prohibition of reformatio in pejus, meaning that 
the Appeal Court could not impose a fine higher than that imposed by the Competition Authority.  
In the meantime, the law has been changed, and presently the Competition, Regulation and 
Supervision Court may impose fines higher than those imposed by the Administrative Authority in an 
appeal filed by the defendant (Article 88 of Law 19/2012, of 8th May). 
This has been a very controversial issue and is still being discussed, as some people consider it is 
an inadmissible limitation of the defence’s rights. 
However, we have to bear in mind that this is not a criminal proceeding, and that the defence’s 
rights must be balanced with the other principles and values that are to be protected. 




‘The General Court has unlimited jurisdiction with regard to fines imposed by the Commission. 
The General Court is therefore empowered, in addition to carrying out a mere review of the 
lawfulness of those fines, to substitute its own appraisal for that of the Commission and, 
consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase the fine or penalty payment imposed’ (Judgment of 
22nd November, 2012, on the basis of Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003). 
The Court of Justice also has the jurisdiction to ‘assess for itself the circumstances of the case and the 
nature of the infringement in question in order to determine the amount of the fine’ (Case Case C-
441/11 P. Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens NV, Judgment of 6
th
 December, 2012). 
The effectiveness of the fine is essential for the purposes of Competition Law in order to dissuade 
future infringements. It is important, therefore, that the Court has the powers to review the case in 
matters not only of facts and law, but also of the amount of the fine imposed. 
 
 59 
3.8. Helena Nogueira (Competition Tribunal, Portugal), Portuguese Competition Authority v. 
Baxter – Médico Famaracêutica, Lda and Glintt – Business Solutions, Lda. 
Facts 
Since 2/01/2002 Baxter has been the only owner of representation rights in Portugal for ‘Automed’ 
products, including the ‘FDS 330’ and its components and accessories. 
The FDS 330 is equipment that combines a component - a dispensing system - with a computer and 
its software, that allow the reception and processing of information, namely, from the hospital 
pharmacy system. This permits, among other things, the automatic debiting, in individual and 
identified packages, of every patients’ medication. 
On 11/11/2005 Baxter agreed a contract with Glintt, in which Glintt would have the exclusive 
commercialisation of that equipment to the final consumers, but they would be obliged to abide by 
Baxter’s price policy and to agree with Baxter on the annual sales objectives. Baxter would still 
maintain the possibility to commercialise the same equipment (in the position of being a competitor 
with Glintt itself) and would maintain the exclusivity of its installation, technical support and 
assistance. 
In an addendum to the contract (Anexo II) it was established that, in 2006, Glintt would have to 
buy three of FDS 330; ‘the Glintt price’ (acquisition price that Glintt would pay) and ‘the market 
price’ (the retail price that Glintt could offer) was also established for the years 2005 and 2006, for the 
equipment, the connected components and consumable items.  
During 2006, both undertakings, who were the only contestants, presented proposals to three 
different public contests to provide three Hospitals with an automatic system for the repackaging and 
dispensation of medication in unitary doses, offering the supply of FDS 330.  
At the time, FDS 330 was the only equipment that had been commercialised in Portugal for 
automatic repackaging, in units, of solid oral forms of medications. 
That specificity was an essential requirement in the three contests. 
In those contests, Glintt’s proposal to supply FDS330 offered the same price as that agreed with 
Baxter in the contract as being the ‘market price’. 
In another contest during 2006, Glintt has also offered the price that had been established with 
Baxter for the sale of FDS 330.  
The Decision of the National Competition Authority 
The National Competition Authority (AdC) considered that the two companies had violated Articles 
4º, 42º, 43º, nº1, al.a) and 44º of the Law 18/2003, of 11/06, and that their conduct was likely to affect 
trade between Member States, also violating Article 101(1) TFEU. 
The NCA therefore condemned Baxter – Médico Famacêutica, Lda and Glintt – Business 
Solutions, Lda to pay, respectively, a €145,296.77 fine and a €385,471.24 fine, and to publish an 
extract of the decision, at their expense, in the Diário da República (The Portuguese Official Journal) 
and in a nationwide newspaper. 
 The two defendants appealed against this decision to the Lisbon Commercial Court. 
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The Ruling of the Lisbon Commercial Court 
The Court, in essence, confirmed the NCA’s decision, although it reduced Baxter’s and Glintt’s fines 
to €100,000.00 and €300,000.00. In short, the Court considered that: 
-Being commercial societies, seeking profits, both defendants were to be considered 
‘undertakings’ and could be submitted to national competition law; 
-The contract was a vertical agreement, since it was agreed between a supplier and a retailer, and it 
related to the determination of a ‘market price’, as a price at which to sell to the final consumers; 
The identification of the relevant market that was presented by the NCA – the supply of automatic 
equipment for the repackaging of oral solid medications, FDS and its connected services – was 
correct, since the specificity of the automatic repackaging function was an essential requirement of 
the contests in which the defendants took part, there were no existent equivalent or exchangeable 
products that consumers could use and, as it was the national territory, the geographic market had 
to be taken into account; 
- Pricing must result from the play of a free market, adjusted between the provider of the good or 
service and the client, and it was not for a third party to impose that price on the others. The 
agreement therefore interfered, in a noticeable way, with the regular functioning of the market, in 
spite of the effective results that it may or may not have caused; 
-The defendants did not prove the cumulative requisites for ‘economic benefit’ that could justify 
their practice; 
The CNA did not prove that the defendants’ conduct had, or could have, an impact on the economic 
activities of at least two member states, interfering, in a noticeable way, in those activities, thus 
violating Article 101 of TFUE.  
Comment 
This case is one of the few in the Portuguese courts that concerns anti-competitive agreements. The 
most interesting aspect, from my point of view, is that it illustrates the similarities of the national legal 
criteria and European law criteria, as we can see in the analysis of the definitions of terms such as 
‘undertaking’, ‘agreement’ and ‘relevant market’, or in the application of the de minimis rule. 
However, the lack of use of, or appeal to the European Court’s jurisprudence to integrate those legal 
concepts also reveals how national judges are still unfamiliar with that resource. 
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4. Competition Law Enforcement vis a vis Professional Associations 
4.1. Mira Raycheva (Supreme Administrative Court, Bulgaria), Bulgarian Medical 
Association v. Bulgarian Competition Authority 
Decision No. 508/03.05.2012 of the Bulgarian Commission for the Protection of 
Competition 
Decision No. 13/13.01.2013 on Case No. 7144/12 of the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Bulgaria (First Instance Court) 
Decision No. 7351/30.05.2013 on Case No. 3538/13 of the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Bulgaria (Second Instance Court) 
Facts 
The Bulgarian Medical Association is a non-governmental organisation established under the 
Professional Associations of Physicians and Dentists Act. According to this Act, all doctors practicing 
in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria must be members of the Bulgarian Medical Association 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Association’). 
The organisation is independent from the government. The specialised executive body - the 
Ministry of Health – has no right to take part in the Association’s decision-making and has no control 
mechanisms that relate to its decisions. 
By virtue of the Professional Associations of Physicians and Dentists Act, the Association can 
impose sanctions that are provided for in the Act concerning the way the doctor’s profession is 
practiced. 
The national management of the Association is carried out by Convention, an Administrative 
Council, a Control Committee and a Committee for Medical Ethics. 
The Convention is convened for regular sessions once every three years, and for extraordinary ones 
when necessary, and it represents a national representative body which has the powers, along with 
others, to accept or amend the Association’s Statute and the Code of Professional Ethics (the Code). 
Observance of this document is obligatory for all doctors (who are also mandatorily members of the 
Association). The document mentioned above provides for the seeking of material or non-pecuniary 
liability for any breaches by any of the Association’s members.  
According to domestic legislation (Article 81 of the Health Act), every Bulgarian citizen has the 
right to accessible health care, which is provided under the law and the National Health Insurance Act. 
Bulgarian citizens have the right to a package of medical services that are paid for on the basis of 
insurance coverage by the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF). 
Health insurance for Bulgarian citizens is obligatory. Every medical treatment that is included in 
the medical services package, is paid for by the NHIF at previously specified and agreed prices. 
The medical services that are not included in the main insurance package, as well as those provided 
to non-insured citizens (for whatever reason), are paid for at prices that are specified by every doctor 
providing the service in their individual medical practice. 
When the above mentioned medical care is provided by a medical institution it is paid for at prices 
approved by the medical institution itself. Articles 56 to 59 of the Code regulate the remuneration 
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doctors receive for their work. The Code also sets a minimum threshold rate, approved by the Union, 
for each respective activity. 
Article 63 of the Code provides that the Commission of Professional Ethics controls the 
observation of this obligation and has the right to sanction any breaches thereof. 
At the Convention held on 15th-17th April, 2011, a decision was taken that the minimum fee for a 
medical examination in the conditions of an individual practice should be at the rate of 10% of the 
minimum salary for the country (at that time, around 240 BGN – 120 Euros), or not less than 24 BGN 
(12 Euros). 
The Decision of the Bulgarian Competition Authority 
During the proceedings, the Association stated that the legal procedure is inadmissible because the 
Bulgarian Medical Association is not an undertaking in accordance with Art. 15 of the Protection of 
Competition Act. The Association also claimed that the approved minimum price for a given medical 
service is a guarantee of quality and does not limit competition, since each doctor has the right to 
individually negotiate the price for the medical service above the mentioned minimum rate. 
In Decision No. 508/03.05.2012, the Commission held that the legal procedure is properly 
constituted and that there should be a pronouncement on the essence of the problem, as the decision of 
the Convention is valid and applicable to a particular activity that is an essential part of the relevant 
market and that involves its realisation in the territory of the entire country. 
In its decision, the Commission held that the Association, in general, is not an undertaking 
according to Art. 15, para. 1 of the National Competition Act, but its members have the same status as 
that given to undertakings, since it provides a service that is paid for by the patient. In this regard, the 
Commission based its arguments on the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and 
especially on the Pavel Pavlov case (Joined Cases C 180/98/ C 184/98 Pavel Pavlov v Stichting 
Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten [1998] ECR I-6451). On this basis, the Commission defined the 
Association as being an ‘association of undertakings’ that can be subject to a violation according to the 
Protection of Competition Act. 
The Association’s decision to set a minimum price for a medical service was qualified by the 
Commission as being a ‘decision of an association’, according to Art. 15 of the Protection of 
Competition Act, and that it can be qualified as a violation of Art. 15, para. 1 of the same act since it 
has an anti-competitive aim. 
In its decision the Commission accepted that there was no denying that the above-mentioned anti-
competitive aim has been pursued, since the decision restrained the effective competition by not 
giving any possibility for an independent and liberal determination of the prices of a given medical 
service. 
The Commission also noted that the decision of the Association referred to the specific market 
segment (considering the essence of the product and the geographical market) and that, in practice, it 
affected the prices for medical care, as it was binding on the practising doctors in Bulgaria.  
In the light of the foregoing, the Commission did not accept the arguments of the Association that 
its action constituted the ‘positive regulation of an activity which is a liberal profession’, stating that 
this regulation should be directed at the quality of the service delivered, rather than to a restriction on 
the right to the liberal formation of the due monetary remuneration. 
The Commission also refused to accept the arguments that the above-mentioned activity is in the 
powers of the Association in accordance with Art. 57, para. 2 of the Code of Professional Ethics. It 
noted that this activity is a violation of Art. 15, para. 1 of the Protection of Competition Act in so far 
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as it is void by virtue of law and cannot be accepted as a reason for minimum prices for the care 
provided. 
When defining the sanction imposed on the Association, the Commission assessed the violation as 
being severe and it imposed a fine amounting to 120,000 BGN (approximately 60,000 EUR). In its 
argumentation, the Commission emphasised the duration of the violation, its significant impact on the 
relevant market and on the fact that it hindered the access of the parties to medical help. 
The Proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court 
The Association appealed the Commission’s decision before a three-member panel of the Supreme 
Administrative Court. 
The particular complaints were based on the alleged unlawfulness of the decision, due to the fact 
that the Association could not be subject to the violation because it is a public body recognised by 
legislation and judicial practice, and not ‘an association of undertakings’. The Association also 
claimed that the decision had been taken on the basis of a legislative act that was in force and that fell 
under the exceptions of Art. 17 of the Protection of Competition Act. The claimant also stated that the 
decision was discriminatory and not in conformity with the fact that the prices for services, delivered 
by notaries and private officers of the Court, are regulated in an analogical way. The amount of the 
fine was also contested. 
In its judgment of 3rd January, 2013, the Court considered all the complaints against the 
Commission’s decision and decided to leave the decision as it stood. The Court pointed out that the 
Association was a legal entity - a public organisation that implemented its activities by virtue of the 
law, but these functions were not connected with the possibility to determine the minimum prices of 
the care provided. On these grounds, the Court rejected the complaint that the Association’s decision 
came under the scope of Art. 17, para. 1 of the Protection of Competition Act. 
The Court rejected the claimant’s thesis that the decision was pronounced in accordance with Art. 
57 of the Code, thus accepting the Commission’s conclusion that this decree (order) is null and void as 
it contradicted Art. 15, para. 2 of the Protection of Competition Act. 
Examining the complaint that the Commission’s decision was discriminatory, the Court did not 
share the Association’s position and pointed out that the regulation of the prices for medical care, 
services delivered by notaries and private officers of the Court, is not made by the respective 
professional organisation, but by the Government. 
The First Court Instance accepted that the Commission’s decision is, in substance, lawful as to the 
conclusion on the amount of the fine. The additional arguments for substantiating the above-
mentioned conclusion are the annual income of the Union - over 800,000 BGN (approximately 
400,000 EUR), and also the fact that the amount of the fine corresponds to the violation made. 
An action for annulment was brought by the Bulgarian Medical Association against the decision of 
the three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court before a five–member panel of the same 
Court. The Association disagreed with all the above-mentioned conclusions of the Court. 
As an argument in support of its complaints, the Association stated that the Commission and the 
First Instance Court had unlawfully refused to consult experts as to the value (price) of the medical 
examination, thus depriving the Association of its right to prove that the sanctioned activity fell under 
the scope of Art. 17, para. 1 of the Protection of Competition Act. 
The Highest Court Instance accepted as lawful the following conclusions of the First Instance 
Court: 1. that the Association could be subject to violation of Art. 15, para. 1 of the above-mentioned 
Act; 2. that its decision in fixing the minimum prices for medical attention constitutes a violation of 
Art. 15, para. 1. In this context, the Court accepted that the activity, the object of the cases, is relevant 
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to the respective market on the basis of a product and a geographical principle, and it is also relevant 
to all the medical care that is delivered and not paid for by the National Health Insurance Fund in the 
territory of Bulgaria. These services are estimated as being an economic activity. The doctors 
delivering them are qualified as being ‘an undertaking’ according to paragraph 1, p. 13 and p. 7 of the 
Protection of Competition Act. 
The Highest Court Instance also assessed as being lawful the Court’s conclusion on the 
unlawfulness of the Association’s decision, due to its contradiction of Art. 15, p. 1 of the law. 
According to the Court, the complaint that the Association’s right to collect evidence is violated is 
unfounded, and the motives for this can be derived from the fact that the law provides no opportunity 
to assess the cost price of a medical examination and, consequently, consulting experts on such a task 
is completely pointless. 
In the Highest Instance Court’s decision, the Court also shared the conclusions of the Bulgarian 
Competition Authority and the First Instance Court, that the fine imposed is fair and proportionate 
given the severity of the violation. 
On these grounds, the appealed decision was left in force. 
Comment 
I find this case interesting as its object is an action of a non-governmental and non-economic 
organisation to whom regulatory functions in regard of a substantial segment of the market-protection 
for health have been delegated. One of the decisions of this organisation has been considered to have 
violated the special law that protects competition. I consider the Commission’s and the Court’s 
decisions, that the competitive environment may be affected not only by economic subjects but also by 
all other non-governmental and non-economic organisations, fundamental, and all the relevant 
conclusions should be drawn only from the essence of the decision taken and its meaning in the 
relevant market segment. 
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4.2. Elisabete Assunção (Lisbon Court of Commerce, Portugal), Association of Navigation of 
Portugal (AGEPOR) v. Portuguese Competition Authority 
Dates of the judgments: 28.07.2006 – First Instance Court of Lisbon; 
       15.03.2007 – Second Instance Court of Lisbon; 
      29.04.2009 – Portugal Constitutional Court. 
Introduction 
This case is one of the cases concerning price fixing and was decided in the Commercial Court of 
Lisbon. This particular case concerns the existence of a table of maximum prices that is not 
compulsory. The decision was confirmed in the Second Instance Court, with the intervention of the 
Portuguese Constitutional Court, but this Court didn´t decide the object of the appeal. I must say that 
most of the cases decided in Portugal that concern public enforcement are ‘price fixing cases’. 
Facts 
By a decision of 24.05.2006, the Portuguese Competition Authority applied a fine of €195,000.00 on 
the Association of Navigation of Portugal, because they had established a table of maximum prices for 
navigation agents (although these were not compulsory). The Portuguese authority considered that the 
decision had the effect of restraining competition between navigation agents, interfering in the 
determination of prices for services in a free market. The Portuguese authority also considered that the 
decision of the Association was a decision of the association of undertakings. 
The AGEPOR – The Association of Navigation of Portugal -- appealed the decision saying, among 
other things, that: 
1. The decision was not valid, because the Portuguese Competition Authority didn’t give access 
to all of the documents in the process to the appellant; 
2. The decision did not respect the right to defence of the appellant, and the privilege against 
self-incrimination; 
3. The Association was not subject to competition law, because it wasn’t an association of 
undertakings.  
4. The table of prices did not infringe competition law, because it was not compulsory.  
Judicial Proceedings  
The First Instance Court considered, in a preliminary judgment, that the defendant could have access 
to some of the documents of the process, those that did not protect the secrets of third party businesses. 
Then, in the final judgment on the First Instance, the Court considered that the Portuguese 
Competition Authority respected the rights of the defendant throughout the process, particularly the 
right not to self-incriminate.  
Concerning the question of the application of competition law to associations, such as the 
defendant, the Court concluded that the Association could be considered an association of 
undertakings, quoting some European rulings. The Court also analysed the relevant market and 
concluded that the price fixing affected competition, restricting competition in the market. It also 
concluded that the fixing of prices violated Article 81 of the E.C. Treaty.  
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The Court applied a fine of €130.000,00 and ordered the publication of part of the decision. The 
Court also decided that the defendant must cease their conduct.  
The Second Instance Court confirmed all their decisions. The Portuguese Constitutional Court 
didn’t decide for the object of the appeal, because it understood that the articles that were considered 
unconstitutional were not applied in the decisions of the First and Second Instance Courts.  
Comment 
This decision is very important because it was one of the first decisions that decided on questions of 
the: 
Defendant’s access to confidential documents, respecting the secrets of third party businesses; 
The ‘right to silence’ of the defendant. 
It was also relevant, again, to clearly determine that this type of association could be considered an 
association of undertakings. 
 67 
4.3. Elisabete Assunção (Lisbon Commercial Court, Portugal), Association of Doctors of 
Portugal v. Portuguese Competition Authority. 
Date of the judgments:  18.01.2007 – First Instance Court of Lisbon; 
     22.11.2007 – Second Instance Court of Lisbon; 
     03.12.2009 – Portugal Constitutional Court. 
Introduction 
This case was decided in a period when the Portuguese Competition Authority applied fines on some 
professional associations in Portugal for price fixing. This particular case was very interesting, 
because it was confirmed, not only in the Second Instance Court, but also in the Portuguese 
Constitutional Court.  
The intervention of this last Court was very particular because, among other questions, it had to 
rule on whether the intervention of the Portuguese Competition Authority and of the Portuguese 
Commercial Court violated the Portuguese Constitution.  
Facts 
By a decision of 26.05.2006, the Portuguese Competition Authority applied a fine of €250,000.00 on 
the Professional Association of Portuguese Doctors, because they established mandatory prices for 
doctors, offering a minimum and maximum price. The Portuguese authority considered that the 
decision had the effect of restraining competition between doctors in the liberal regime, interfering in 
the determination of the prices for services in a free market.  
The Portuguese authority also considered that the decision of the professional association was a 
decision of an association of undertakings. 
It is important to note that only the doctors who are members of this association, are allowed to 
practice in Portugal. The Association has a code that practitioners are obliged to respect. 
The Professional Association of Doctors appealed the decision, saying that: 
1. The Portuguese Competition Authority wasn’t competent to apply the fine, because of the 
public quality of the Association, and because this authority had no competence to apply 
Articles 81 and 82 of the E.C. Treaty; 
2. The Portuguese Court had no jurisdiction to rule on the issue, and also, because of that public 
quality, the competent court should be the Administrative Court. 
3. The Association was not subject to competition law, because it wasn’t an association of 
undertakings.  
Finally, it also said that the decision to fix prices did not infringe competition law, and the elements 
used to apply the fine were incorrect.  
Judicial Proceedings 
The First Instance Court considered, in a preliminary judgment, that the Court had the jurisdiction to 
judge on the matter, because it was a decision of the Portuguese Competition Authority to apply a fine, 
and the Commercial Court was, at the time, the competent court to consider these decisions on appeal. 
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Then, in the final judgment on the First Instance, the Court considered that the Portuguese 
Competition Authority was competent to apply fines on professional associations, such as the 
defendant, because the Portuguese law of competition makes no distinction. The Court also considered 
that the Portuguese Competition Authority could exercise all of the competencies that Community law 
gives to the national competition authorities. 
Concerning the question of the application of competition law to professional associations, as the 
defendant, the Court concluded that the Association could be considered an association of 
undertakings, quoting some European rulings. The Court also analysed the relevant market and 
concluded that the price fixing affected competition, restricting competition in the market. It also 
concluded that the fixing of prices violated Article 81 of the E.C. Treaty.  
The Court applied a fine of €230.000,00 and ordered the publication of part of the decision. 
The Second Instance Court confirmed all of the decision. 
The Portuguese Constitutional Court considered that there was no violation of the constitution in 
the decision. 
Comment 
The decision, or decisions, referred to here were important in shedding some light on the competence 
of the Portuguese Competition Authority to apply fines to this type of association, and of the 
competence of the Court in the matter. 
It was also relevant to clearly determine that competition law could be applied to liberal 
professionals and their associations, which are considered to be associations of undertakings, and also 
because of the intervention of the Constitutional Court.   
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4.4. Cláudia Roque (Competition Tribunal, Portugal), Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas 
v. Portuguese Competition Authority 
- Judgment of the Tribunal of Lisbon No. 938/10.7TYLSB.L1-5 
- C-1/12, Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas v Autoridade da Concorrência 
(2013) n.y.p. ECR 
Facts 
The Order of Chartered Accountants (Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas - OTOC), is a 
professional association under a public law statute, with training, ethical and disciplinary powers over 
all of the chartered accountants in Portugal, who must be members of this association. 
The OTOC adopted a Training Credits Regulation, establishing a system of compulsory training 
for accountants (Regulamento da Formação de Créditos, published in the Portuguese Official Journal, 
Diário da República, II, of 12/7/2007). According to this regulation, accountants are required to have 
obtained an annual average of 35 training credits that are provided or approved by the association. A 
minimum of 12 credits per year should relate to ‘institutional training’, and they are intended to make 
the accountants aware of legislative initiatives and amendments and of questions of ethical and 
professional conduct, provided exclusively by the OTOC. ‘Professional training’, consisting of study 
sessions on topics that are central to the profession, can be provided either by the OTOC or by other 
bodies that are approved by the Association. The decisions for approval of the registration of such 
training bodies, and of the approval of the training sessions that are proposed, should be taken by the 
Association after the payment of the respective fees and in compliance with several criteria that are 
imposed by the OTOC (e.g., applications for approval should be submitted at least 3 months prior to 
approval, professional training programmes must last longer than 16 hours). 
The Portuguese Competition Authority decided, on 14/5/2010, that by adopting such regulations, 
the OTOC had infringed, inter alia, TFEU Article 101(1) and the similar provisions of the Portuguese 
Competition Act. The administrative authority held that the regulation constituted a decision of an 
association of undertakings that distorted competition in the market for the compulsory training of 
chartered accountants, as it reserved one third of the market for OTOC and in the remainder of the 
market, which was segmented by the OTOC, the Association decided who were its competitors and on 
what conditions. Consequently, sanctions were imposed on the Association, including a fine and the 
prohibition of the application of the above-mentioned regulation.  
Judicial Proceedings 
The OTOC appealed to the First Instance Court (at the time, the Lisbon Commercial Court), but the 
decision was upheld on appeal by the Court in relation to the infringement of Article 101(1) (Judgment 
of 29/4/11). 
The Association appealed to the Second Instance Court (at the time, the Lisbon Court of Appeal), 
which, on 15/11/11, decided to stay the proceedings and submit the case to the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. 
In Case C-1/12, on 28/2/2013, the ECJ declared that a regulation adopted by a professional 
association, such as the one under analysis, should be regarded as a decision of an association of 
undertakings within the meaning of TFEU Article 101(1). 
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The Court recalled Wouters (Case C-309/99), saying that EU competition rules do not apply to 
activities that do not belong to the area of ‘economic activity’, considering the nature of their aims and 
the rules to which they are subject. However, the compulsory training regulation had a direct impact 
on the market for compulsory training for chartered accountants, where the OTOC itself carried out an 
economic activity. 
The fact that the OTOC was required by law to implement a system of compulsory training for 
accountants was found not to be relevant, as it is unable to remove the rules adopted by that 
Association from the scope of EU competition law. Rules adopted by a professional association 
remain government measures, outside the scope of EU rules that are applicable to undertakings only 
when the EU State defines the public interest criteria and the essential principles with which the 
association’s rules must comply, and retains its power to adopt decisions in the last resort, which is not 
the case. 
The Court stated that a regulation adopted by a professional association that puts into place a 
system of compulsory training for chartered accountants constitutes a restriction on competition, 
which is prohibited by EU law to the extent to which, and this is a matter for the national court to 
ascertain, it eliminates competition within a substantial portion of the relevant market, to the benefit of 
that professional association, and in so far as it imposes on the remaining portion of that market, 
discriminatory conditions to the detriment of the competitors of the association. 
The ECJ stated that, for the purposes of analysing the effects which the regulation has on 
competition, the Portuguese Court will have to analyse the structure of the market in order to decide 
whether there is justification for the distinction drawn between the two types of training – institutional 
and professional – on the basis of their objectives, duration and the bodies authorised to provide them. 
By decreeing that 12 of the mandatory annual credits had to be obtained from institutional training, 
which could be provided only by the OTOC, the ECJ found that the regulation reserved for the 
Association a significant part of the relevant market. The Court also mentioned that, for example, the 
matter of legislative developments could be included in the professional training, open to other 
operators. Furthermore, each professional training programme had to last longer than 16 hours, which 
might prevent alternative training bodies from offering short training programmes.  
Secondly, the Portuguese Court will have to examine the conditions of access to the market for 
bodies other than the OTOC, in order to establish whether equality of opportunity is guaranteed 
between the various economic operators or if the conditions of access to the relevant market are to be 
considered discriminatory. The court noted that the OTOC’s professional training was not subject to 
an approval procedure, although private bodies had to ask for specific approval for each of the training 
sessions at least three months in advance and to pay a fee. Furthermore, the regulation’s rules for 
training bodies were found to be drafted in vague terms, which could lead the OTOC to distort 
competition by favouring its own training programmes. The requirement that applications for approval 
must be submitted at least 3 months prior to approval may also deprive others of the opportunity to 
offer training on current issues in the immediate 3 months. 
The ECJ rejected the argument that the regulation was exempt under Articles 101(3) and 106(2) as 
the regulation eliminated competition in a substantial part of the training for accountants, and appeared 
to go beyond what was necessary to ensure the improvements in accountants’ services (Article 101(3)) 
and, furthermore, it appeared to go beyond the performance of the particular tasks assigned to the 
OTOC, even if considered to be a general economic interest activity (Article 106 (2)).  
A final judgment of the Lisbon Appeal Court is expected to be handed down soon. 
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Comment 
This case may be considered particularly interesting in the future when regulations issued by 
professional associations in relation to compulsory training for their members, for example, doctors, 
lawyers, engineers, architects, pharmacists, are analysed.  
In the light of the ECJ ruling, such associations may be considered to operate in the market for 
compulsory training in direct competition with other private training bodies.  
Applying the well-known principle that entities that carry out economic activities are subject to 
competition law rules, a regulation of a public association regarding compulsory training for its 
members must be considered as coming from an association of undertakings for the purposes of 
Article 101(1). Even if a professional association is mandated by national law to provide compulsory 
continuing education to its members, it is not immune to the effects of EU law. 
Consequently, when enacting rules on the compulsory training of their members, such public 
associations must comply with competition law, and unless there is a serious objective justification – 
to be subject to a cautious case-by-case analysis–, not reserved to themselves a significant part of the 
market, affecting the normal play of supply and demand, and it should establish conditions of access to 
the market which grant equality of opportunity to all operators, whether public or private. Such rules 
should be clear, objective, transparent and non-discriminatory, and allow for further control, including 
by the courts. 
This ECJ preliminary ruling may allow us, in future cases, to raise questions in relation to the 
institutional and professional training activities that must be opened to competition with privates and 
the importance of implementing a clear separation between the economic and regulatory functions of 
certain professional associations. 
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4.5. Ambrasaite Goda (Vilnius Regional Court, Lithuania), Orthopaedics companies and 
National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) v. Lithuania Competition Authority 





On 17th May, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania passed the final ruling upholding the 
Competition Council’s decision of 20th January, 2011, to impose fines on the Association of Providers 
of Orthopaedic and Rehabilitation Services and nine companies engaged in the production of, and 
trading in, orthopaedic devices, for concluding a cartel agreement.  
Facts 
The investigation was started in response to information from a participant in the market concerned. 
The inquiry carried out by the Competition Council led to the conclusion that in the period from 2006 
to 2010, members of the Association of Providers of Orthopaedic and Rehabilitation Services and the 
Association of Orthopaedic and Medical Industry Undertakings had concluded agreements concerning 
the prices of orthopaedic technical articles, quantities for production, and were sharing the funds 
allocated by the NHIF for compensation for orthopaedic means. These agreements caused the 
distortion and restriction of competition in the market for orthopaedic means that is paid for by the 
budget of the CHIF for those who are insured. The agreements concerned damage inflicted on the 
State budget, as the participants therein had been using non-competitive prices, which further led to an 
inefficient use of the budget funds, and the NHIF, operating with limited resources, could thus provide 
services to many fewer patients. The agreements also incurred direct damage to patients, as the 
companies supplying orthopaedic technical means, by acting in concert, did not compete, which 
caused higher prices and the poorer quality of the articles. Having assessed the data obtained in the 
course of the inquiry, the Competition Council concluded that by entering into the agreements 
concerned, the undertakings did infringe Article 5 of the Law on Competition of the Republic of 
Lithuania. Having considered that the agreements entered into by the undertakings could affect trade 
between Member States, the Competition Council also concluded an infringement of Article 101 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Competition Council also arrived at the 
conclusion that, having provided the preconditions for such prohibited agreements and by organising 
the compensation for such orthopaedic means, the NHIF had selected inappropriate measures and had 
thus failed to ensure fair competition in the market and therefore had infringed the requirements of 
Article 4(1) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania. 
The undertakings claimed that they had concluded the agreements as obliged by the relevant legal 
acts and the NHIF, and that the competition law provisions mentioned could not be applied to them. 
The claimants argued that their actions were not subject to individual decisions, but were imposed by 
intensive legal regulation and the actions of administrative authorities, directed towards balancing the 
budget of the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund.  
The Ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court 
The SAC, basing its judgment on the relevant practice of the ECJ (ECJ judgments in Joined Cases C-
359/95 P and C-379/95 P, Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78, Case No. 41/83 (1985), Joined Cases 
240/82, 242/82, 261/82, 262/82, 268/82, 269/82, Case No. C-198/01, Case No. T-66/99), has ruled that 
(Vilnius Regional Court, Lithuania), Orthopaedics companies and National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) v. Lithuania 
Competition Authority 
73 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (presently Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU)) apply only to anti-competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings on 
their own initiative. If anti-competitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation, or 
if the latter creates a legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on 
their part, Articles 85 and 86 do not apply. However, the ECJ has recognised only a very limited 
possibility not to apply Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU on the grounds mentioned. The conclusion 
that the operators in question enjoyed no autonomy (that their anti-competitive behaviour was required 
by the actions of the state authorities) can only be reached if it appears, on the basis of objective, 
relevant and consistent evidence, that that conduct was unilaterally imposed upon them by the national 
authorities through the exercise of irresistible pressure, such as, for example, the threat to adopt State 
measures likely to cause them to sustain substantial losses. 
The SAC later noted that just the fact that the basic price of orthopaedic devices is fixed at the state 
level by the legal norms, does not mean that competitive activity between companies engaged in the 
production and trading in orthopaedic devices was eliminated. Firstly, companies can compete when 
proposing that the basic price be established - the system of compensation for orthopaedic means 
allows competition in the procedure of establishing the basic price. Secondly, competition is possible 
when selling partially compensated orthopaedic means, as the companies engaged in the production 
and trading in orthopaedic devices can freely decide whether to apply surcharges, and how big those 
surcharges should be.  
The SAC also stated that none of the applicable legal acts granted the Ministry of Health or the 
NHIF the powers to impose compulsory decisions related to the procedures of the establishment of 
basic prices on the companies. Legal acts also do not obligate either the Ministry of Health or the 
NHIF to demand a concerted position or concerted data from the companies. Moreover, the evidence 
of the case does not prove that the Ministry of Health or the NHIF have requested the anti-competitive 
behaviour of the companies through the exercise of irresistible pressure, eliminating the possibilities 
for the companies to act otherwise. It was established that the NHIF was informed about the 
agreement on prices, had supported the actions of the companies in agreeing on the output rates, and 
was providing the companies with the information that was necessary for the relevant decisions. 
However, those actions, in the opinion of the SAC, cannot be regarded as irresistible pressure. These 
kinds of actions by a state authority means they have knowledge about the anti-competitive behaviour 
of the companies and, to a certain extent, of the stimulation and tolerance of it, which, following the 
practice of the ECJ, does not eliminate the liability of companies (e.g., Judgments of the ECJ in Cases 
No. 229/83, T-7/92). The fact that the NHIF was found to be failing to ensure fair competition in the 
market, and therefore to be infringing the requirements of Article 4(1) of the Law on Competition of 
the Republic of Lithuania, does not preclude sanctioning the companies for violation of the Article of 
the TFEU.  
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5. Abuse of Dominant Position 
5.1. Agnieszka Pieńkowska (Myszków District Court), Stalexport Company v. Polish 
Competition Authority 
Facts 
In 2008, the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) imposed a PLN 1.3m fine on 
StalExport Autostrada Małopolska Company, (SAM) the concessionaire of the A4 motorway stretch 
running from Katowice to Cracow, for collecting the full road toll fees, despite conducting road works 
which made using the motorway difficult for drivers, as the number of lanes available was not up to 
the motorway standard. According to the Office, the repair work should not affect the traffic and, if it 
does, the toll should be lower. The company had two weeks to appeal against the decision to the Court 
for Competition and Consumer Protection, and then to subsequent court instances, which might take 
several months. Until a legally binding ruling was reached, SAM did not have to comply with the 
UOKiK's decision. However, if the company lost the appeal, they would have to pay up to EURO 
10,000 per day of delay in enforcing the decision. The UOKiK President, Marek Niechciał stated that 
the Office's proceedings proved that the repair work had taken up nearly one third of the whole 60 
kms. stretch at a time. 
By resolution of KRT No. 09/2008 of 25th April, 2008, the Chairman of the Office for Competition 
and Consumer Protection imposed a PLN 1.3m fine on StalExport Autostrada Małopolska SA. The 
reason for the decision was a violation of the Bill of 2007 on Competition and Consumer Protection 
(Art 10 and 9) by StalExport through the abuse of their dominant position in the market of road 
transportation between the cities of Katowice and Kraków. The fine was imposed for charging drivers 
the standard price for using the motorway while the motorway was being renovated, and thus this did 
not comply with the motorway standards requirements. 
The StalExport Company appealed against that decision. In their appeal they asked for the fine to 
be annulled or substantially lowered. The justification they provided was that they had not been using 
any unfair business practices. 
The company also pointed out that the fine was inadequate to their possible breaking of the 
competition law. They also applied for the price they were charging to be considered a public tribute, 
rather than a price. 
StalExport committed themselves to providing their service in a continuous and uninterrupted 
manner, with the exception of those situations where maintenance works were necessary. 
The contract the company had signed, allowed the concessionaire to fix and adjust the toll price in 
accordance with the terms contained in the contract and its appendix. 
Court Proceedings 
The court proceedings found that, in 2007, the repair works were being carried out on consecutive 
stretches at times with a traffic flow that was open in only one lane, which caused traffic congestion 
and consequently slowed traffic down. 
It must be put forward that there were no other roads in the area that would comply with the 
requirements necessary for the road to be classed as a motorway. 
The court proceedings also established that the notion put forward by the StalExport Company, for 
circumstantial witness evidence to be allowed in the case, did not in fact contribute anything 
substantial to the case and only served to delay the court proceedings. 
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The following was established based on the fact that all the circumstantial evidence substantial to 
the case had already been brought into the proceedings. 
With that situation in place, the regional court - the Department for Fair Competition and 
Consumer Protection -- established that the appeal did not meet the requirements so that it could be 
allowed.  
The Court put forward the fact that the claim that the road toll was not a price but a public tribute, 
cannot be a serious one. 
Here, the simple justification is that the StalExport Company operates with a view to financial gain 
and is therefore not a charitable institution. 
The road toll is the company's income and is by no means the government's or the country's 
income. The Court also pointed out that the terms of the concession contract provide the maximum 
range of road toll prices that are due to be paid to StalExport. 
This allows the company to adjust or change the price within the specified range in certain 
situations. 
The Court recognised that there were no roads in the surrounding area that met the criteria in order 
to be classed as a motorway - that is, a road that has at least two lanes running in each direction with 
the maximum speed allowed of 120 km/h. 
A motorway is also supposed to have a central reservation with barriers running alongside it. 
Travelling on a motorway is carried out at greater speeds than it is on other public roads. That 
convenience is the justification for the road toll being in place. 
The claimant - the StalExport Company -- has the whole 100% of the specified local market as 
there is no other motorway connection between the cities of Katowice and Cracow. 
The Court did not allow the claim that the company was obliged to impose the road toll. According 
to the rules of the right to negotiate the terms of the contract, only the maximum rate of the toll price is 
specified in the contract, which allows the concessionaire to lower the toll, or not to charge it at all. 
With that taken into account, the court decided that since the motorway did not meet the criteria in 
order to be classed as such, it was illegal to charge the road toll, especially during repair works. 
The StalExport Company appealed against that ruling to the Appeal Court in Warsaw, claiming on 
the same terms as they had with their first appeal before the Regional Court. 
The Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, sharing the opinion of the Regional Court. 
The Appeal Court stated that the term ‘local market’ is defined in one of the European Commission 
rulings, according to which it is an area where entrepreneurs conduct their business activities. In this 
case, the local market is contained within the area between the cities of Cracow and Katowice. 
Accordingly, the Appeal Court advised that it shared the opinion of the First Instance Regional 
Court, saying that there were no substantial motorway connections between the two cities. StalExport, 
at the time of the road works on the stretch of the A4 motorway between Cracow and Katowice, also 
charged the maximum (under the terms of the contract) toll without adjusting it, and the road, at the 
time of the works, did not meet the criteria for motorways. 
For this reason, the Appeal Court dismissed the company’s appeal. 
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5.2. Colm Mac Eochaidh (High Court, Ireland), Island Fisheries Teoranta v. The Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources 
Facts 
The plaintiff company (Island Fisheries Teoranta) is the owner and operator of a number of vessels 
engaged in the provision of passenger services between Rossaveel Harbour, in Co. Galway, and the 
Aran Islands. The company is obliged to pay certain harbour charges which are defined, imposed and 
payable under orders made by the first named defendant under the provisions of the Fishery Harbour 
Centres Acts 1968-1980 (the ‘1968 Act’). The dispute in this case arose from the imposition of 
increased charges introduced by Ministerial Order with the adoption of the Fishery Harbour Centres 
(Rates and Charges) Order 2003 (the ‘2003 Order’). The plaintiff contested the legality of these new 
charges and of the new regime and refused to pay the increased amounts on the basis that it was ultra 
vires the powers of the Minister under the 1968 Act; that the Minister acted unlawfully in imposing 
charges by abusing a dominant position in breach of s. 5 of the Competition Act 2002 (the ‘2002 
Act’); or, alternatively, that the provisions of the 1968 Act were unconstitutional. As a result of the 
failure to pay the fees, the plaintiff had one of his vessels detained for a period until it was released on 
a bond.  
The First Ruling of the Irish High Court (18th October, 2011) 
The three complaints were examined in turn by the High Court. It was held by Justice Cooke that the 
2003 Order was ultra vires the powers of the Minister as having been made upon a basis that could not 
have been contemplated by the Oireachtas (Parliament) in conferring the charging power under the 
1968 Act. In reaching this finding, Justice Cooke held that the 2003 Order had a ‘manifestly severe 
and unreasonably oppressive impact upon the plaintiff’. In particular, he criticised the manner in 
which charges under the 2003 Order were introduced by imposing an immediate and dramatically 
increased operating cost on the plaintiff; the manner in which the charge was formulated as a departure 
fee for passengers, failing to take into account public service contracts with another Government 
Department which constrained the plaintiff; the failure to consider the distinct uses and facilities of the 
harbour in question; the failure to fix a fair or reasonable commercial price; and the ambiguity around 
whether the charge was imposed as the price for the use of the harbour by the ferry operator and its 
vessels, or as a fee to passengers for its use in embarking and disembarking. 
Justice Cooke then proceeded to address the contention that the Minister abused a dominant 
position, rendering the 2003 Order illegal as a violation of s. 5 of the 2002 Act. In that regard, the 
alleged abuse consisted of the Minister’s use of his statutory control over the operations of the harbour 
and his ability to fix prices for the unilateral use of facilities to extract additional revenues in order to 
defray a deficit by the imposition of prices which were excessive, unfair and discriminatory. However, 
as the Court held that the attempt to impose those charges failed, the abuse did not occur and the 
coercive use of market power did not take place. As such, he held that it must follow that there could 
be no infringement of the prohibition contained in s. 5 of the 2002 Act. 
However, Justice Cooke then went on to examine that claim on the basis that the 2003 Order was 
valid in aid of any potential assessment and remittal of the matter to the High Court by the Supreme 
Court, should one of the parties appeal the decision. He found that the Minister was an ‘undertaking’ 
for the purposes of the 2002 Act. In this regard, he noted that the Minister was operating the harbour 
facility by allowing commercial activities and services to be provided in return for fees and charges 
imposed and that the harbour was an essential facility due to its particular characteristics. Justice 
Cooke was of the view that it was clear that the Minister, as operator of the harbour, occupied a 
dominant position in respect of the market for the provision of facilities for the operation of sea 
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transport services to the Aran Islands and as such s. 5 of the 2002 Act was applicable to the conduct of 
the Minister. Further, he was of the view that the imposition of a per capita passenger charge by the 
2003 Order on one class of harbour user would have infringed s. 5 of the 2002 Act. Finally, he noted 
that the fact that the Minister has a statutory function and a duty to promote the fishing industry did 
not alter the effect of s. 5, and that once it was established that the Minister is an ‘undertaking’ and 
that the undertaking occupies a dominant position in the relevant market, the competition rule applied 
as it stands. There is no provision of the Competition Acts 2002 – 2006 which mitigates or alters the 
prohibition in deference to the obligation of a public undertaking to discharge public interests tasks, he 
found. 
The Second Ruling of the Irish High Court (25th June, 2012) 
Following the delivery of the above judgment, Justice Cooke heard further evidence and submissions 
on the plaintiff’s claim for damages on the basis of the findings made therein. The plaintiff sought 
both compensatory and exemplary damages and, while acknowledging that the findings of the Court in 
relation to s. 5 of the 2002 Act were made on a conditional basis, also asked the Court to additionally 
make a conditional award of damages under s. 14 of the 2002 Act for breach of competition rules. The 
plaintiff sought a total of €249,825 made up of: the cost of the bond in respect of the detained vessel; 
lost profits on the non-operation of vessels; and staffing costs, inter alia, in this regard  
Justice Cooke followed the decision of Pine Valley Developments v. Minister for the Environment 
[1987] I.R. 23 in his assessment of damages, to the effect that the ultra vires exercise of a power does 
not of itself provide the basis for an action in damages. Rather it will found an action in damages in 
any of the following situations: ‘1. If it involved the commission of a recognised tort, such as trespass, 
false imprisonment or negligence. 2. If it is actuated by malice, e.g., a personal spite or a desire to 
injure for improper reasons. If the authority knows that it does not possess the power which it purports 
to exercise.’ The plaintiff contended that the detention of its vessels was an actionable trespass, there 
being no legal debt due to the Minister as it had not been lawfully imposed. This view was accepted by 
Justice Cooke, who proceeded to examine the differing estimates provided in respect of the various 
costs incurred. Having assessed the costs incurred and also holding that certain costs were not 
recoverable, the Court granted €67,243 in special or compensatory damages to the plaintiff.  
The Court then looked at the plaintiff’s claim in respect of exemplary damages and noted the dicta 
of Lord Devlin in Rookes v. Barnard [196] A.C. 1129, as approved in McIntyre v. Lewis [1991] 1 I.R. 
121 and Conway v. I.N.T.O. [1991] 2 I.R. 305, to the effect that: ‘(1) The plaintiff cannot recover 
exemplary damages unless he is the victim of the punishable behaviour. (2) The power to award 
exemplary damages constitutes a weapon which, while it can be used in defence of liberty, can also be 
used against liberty. The learned judge was there pointing out the need for restraint in the amount of 
damages that should be awarded. (3.) The means of the parties, irrelevant in the assessment of 
compensation, are material in the assessment of exemplary damages. Everything which aggravates or 
mitigates the defendant's conduct is relevant.’ Justice Cooke held that the facts of this case did not 
come within any of the above circumstances where exemplary damages would be justified. However, 
in the assessment of general damages, the Court took into account the disruption caused to the general 
day to day administration of the business due to the diversion of staff from their normal tasks, and 
while he deemed damages were not recoverable under either special or exemplary headings, he 
awarded €25,000 in general damages in this respect.  
Finally, in respect of the claim for additional and conditional damages pursuant to s. 14 of the 2002 
Act, Justice Cooke examined the question on the same basis as he addressed the issue at hearing (in 
aid of the Supreme Court in the event of an appeal) and found that an award of damages under s. 14 
would have followed the same assessment of loss and compensatory damages set out above. He also 
held that punitive or exemplary damages would not have been appropriate for the purposes of s.14, in 
this instance. The Court noted that, unlike the cartel infringement, the conduct involved in an abuse of 
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dominance can arise innocently without realisation of the existence of the position of dominance. In 
this case, the Court indicated that insofar as it considered that there had been an abuse of a position of 
dominance, it was one which arose out of the statutory position of the Minister and was not the 
consequence of aggressive exploitation by a purely commercial undertaking of a position of market 
dominance.  
It was important, in the view of the Court, to bear in mind that the Minister’s position is not 
equivalent to that of a public authority under Article 106 TFEU. Rather, the Court had to strike a 
balance between the application of the competition rule in s. 5 and the commercial task assigned to the 
undertaking in question by the Oireachtas. Justice Cooke noted that in the 1968 Act certain objectives 
were to be pursued in the public interest, and it was found that in adopting the 2003 Order, the 
Minister erred as regards the scope of the power conferred in relation to the charges imposed at 
Rossaveel. However, the error was made in good faith and the steps taken for enforcement on foot of it 
were not undertaken maliciously or recklessly. Accordingly, Justice Cooke held that, had the Court 
been required to rule on an application for damages under s.14 of the 2002 Act, its approach to the 
measure of damages would have been the same as that adopted on the claim based on the general and 
special losses suffered.  
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5.3. Csilla Szabó (Budapest Metropolitan Court, Hungary), Private Radio Broadcaster v. 
State-owned Hungarian radio company 
Judgment of the Hungarian Supreme Court No. Gfv.IX.30.280/2011/4 
Facts 
In Hungary, radio and television programme broadcasting was a state monopoly until our accession to 
the European Union on 1st May, 2004. According to the concession contract with the State, the 
plaintiff had the monopoly right in Hungary to broadcast all Hungarian radio and television 
programmes until accession to the EU.  
The respondent is a Hungarian radio company (also state-owned). The parties entered into a 7 year 
long contract on 1st July, 2003. According to this contract, the plaintiff’s obligation was to broadcast 
the radio programmes of the respondent on a certain frequency, and the respondent’s obligation was to 
pay the fee. The parties settled the length of the broadcasting per week (264 hours) and agreed that this 
time could be amended by mutual consent. 
The respondent notified the plaintiff that it was to decrease its weekly programme period from 264 
hours to 35 hours, according to the decisions of its directorial board. The parties did not amend their 
written contract. The plaintiff reserved its capacity for the respondent’s programming to the weekly 
time period negotiated in their contract and billed for the whole agreed fee. The respondent refused to 
pay it because it did not entirely take up the reserved broadcast time. 
The Ruling of the First Instance Court 
The plaintiff brought an action against the respondent and claimed the whole agreed broadcast fee. 
The respondent asked the court to reject the plaintiff’s claim. It argued – amongst other things – that 
their broadcast contract was void because it breaks Section 21 of the Hungarian Competition Act 
(which is the same as Article 102 of the TFEU). According to the respondent, some terms of the 
contract allowed the plaintiff to abuse its dominant position in the market. When they entered into the 
agreement, the plaintiff had the concession for the state monopoly of broadcasting radio programmes, 
so there is no question that it had a dominant position in the radio programme broadcasting market. 
The plaintiff abused this position because it added a ‘take or pay’ clause to their contract, as the 
respondent had to pay the whole broadcast fee, even if it did not take the broadcast service because of 
the decrease in its programming time. Moreover, the contract’s 7 year term leads to the result that the 
contract remains exclusive after the termination of the legal monopoly. During this long period there is 
no possibility for the respondent to decrease the service and the fee, or to dissolve the contract. As a 
result of this abusive behaviour, no possible competitors can enter the market, and the contracting 
party has no opportunity to amend the terms of the contract during the 7 year period or to dissolve it. 
To the respondent’s argumentation on anti-competitive behaviour by the abuse of its dominance, 
the plaintiff emphasised that its activity did not fall within the scope of the Competition Act because 
both the plaintiff and the respondent were state-owned companies, so their contract was the result of a 
state decision and not of free market behaviour.  
The First Instance Court obliged the respondent to pay the fee. It did not accept the argumentation 
on the abuse of dominance. It held that the activity of a state monopoly does not fall within the scope 
of the Competition Act because the legal relationship of the parties had not been created as the result 
of the free market-based decision of those parties. Moreover, the ‘take or pay’ clause and the long 
term of the contract are reasonable terms only because the respondent is entitled to use the frequency 
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determined in the contract and the capacity for broadcasting on this frequency, which was configured 
according to the demands of the respondent, so the plaintiff could not purchase it from another 
undertaking. 
The Ruling of the Appeal Court 
The respondent appealed against this decision. The Appeal Court did not amend the decision of the 
First Instance, but examined the anti-competitive argument on its merits. It held that the existence of a 
legal monopoly does not exclude the behaviour of the monopoly from the scope of the Competition 
Act. There is no question that the plaintiff had the dominant position in the relevant analogue radio 
broadcasting market. Until 1st May, 2004, it was a state-owned company which had a legal monopoly. 
Although the monopoly was terminated less than a year after the contract had been signed, there was 
no real chance for any other undertaking to compete after 1st May, 2004, because of the extremely 
high costs of the investment. The question is whether the plaintiff abused its dominance in the market 
by applying the contract terms that are challenged.  
As there were no other competitive broadcasting companies because of the legal monopoly, and 
later because of the high investment costs, the exclusivity of the contract caused no real disadvantage 
to the respondent because it was not the exclusivity term of the contract that restrained it from 
negotiating with any other company. The long term of the contract, which ensures the same conditions 
for the plaintiff after the termination of the legal monopoly, might be abusive, but in these special 
circumstances the Court found it reasonable. On one hand, the high costs of the investment that the 
plaintiff had paid to develop its capacity according to the demands of the respondent justified this 
provision; on the other hand, the respondent had a 7 years long obligation to the State to provide radio 
programmes on its frequency, so the long term of the contract served not only in the interest of the 
plaintiff, but also in the respondent’s. The ‘take or pay’ term of the contract is not absolute. It is true 
that there is no chance to decrease the fee automatically when the programming time of the respondent 
decreases, but the contract could be amended by mutual consent and it can be dissolved when the 
economic or legal conditions change in their essence. Applying these terms cannot therefore be found 
to be abusive. 
The Supreme Court of Hungary approved the decision of the Appeal Court.  
Comment 
The question of abusive dominance in a monopolistic market must quite often be argued in the ex-
socialist Eastern European countries. These countries had ended the former legal monopolies in most 
fields of the economy, but the effects of a former legal monopoly still survive its existence and – 
without state intervention – they actually restrict new competitors from entering the market and thus 
sustain a monopolistic market.  
The other important point in this case is that it shows how parties can use competition law 
argumentation in a general obligation law case as, in this case, the claim was to oblige the respondent 
to pay the contractual fee, and the counterclaim was that the contract was not void, so the fee did not 
have to be paid. 
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5.4. Dimitrios Titsias (Larissa Court of First Instance, Greece), Greek medicines distributor v. 
GlaxoSmithKline 
Judgment of the Greek Supreme Court No. 1286/2011 
Introduction 
The appellant in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal (the plaintiff in the proceedings before the 
Court of First Instance), made a request and took the case to the Supreme Court on the grounds that 
the Court of Appeal interpreted and wrongly implemented Article 82 EC and Article 2 of Greek Law 
703/1977 on the control of monopolies and oligopolies and the protection of free competition (which 
essentially corresponds to the provisions of Article 82 EC, now 102 TFEU) and rejected the claims.  
Facts 
The facts which the Court of Appeal accepted as proven (and which cannot be challenged before the 
Supreme Court) are the following: The defendant is the Greek subsidiary of GlaxoSmithKline plc, a 
pharmaceuticals research and manufacturing company that is established in the United Kingdom (GSK 
plc). GSK AEVE imports, warehouses and distributes the pharmaceutical products of the GSK group 
(GSK) in Greece. As such, it holds the marketing authorisation in Greece, inter alia, for the medicinal 
products Imigran, Lamictal and Serevent for the treatment, respectively, of migraine, epilepsy and 
asthma (‘the medicinal products in dispute’), which are available in Greece only on prescription. As 
far as these medicinal products are concerned, the defendant holds a dominant position in the national 
market. For a number of years, the plaintiff had bought those medicinal products in all their forms 
from GSK AEVE in order to distribute them, both on the Greek market and in other Member States. 
From 1997, the pricing of these imported products was at the lowest sales price to the wholesalers 
within the European Union, which meant, as a consequence, that in Greece these products were 
cheaper in comparison to other European Countries (especially the United Kingdom), where the 
plaintiff could export them at a higher price and thus make a higher profit percentage. Towards the end 
of October, 2000, GSK AEVE altered its system of distribution in the Greek market, citing a shortage, 
for which it denied responsibility, of those medicines. From 6th November, 2000, it stopped meeting 
the orders of the plaintiff for the medicinal products in dispute and began itself to distribute those 
products to Greek hospitals and pharmacies through the company Farmacenter AE (Farmacenter). In 
February, 2001, taking the view that the supply of medicines on the Greek market had to some extent 
normalised and that stocks at hospitals and pharmacies had been reconstituted, GSK AEVE started 
once more to supply the plaintiff and other wholesalers with limited quantities of the medicinal 
products in dispute and, shortly afterwards, brought its cooperation with Farmacenter to an end. The 
Appellate Court ruled that the refusal of GSK AEVE to supply the requested quantities of medicinal 
products to the plaintiff did not constitute an abuse. Firstly, it was not a case of an actual refusal in as 
much as, apart from a period of a few weeks between November, 2000, and February, 2001, GSK 
AEVE was always prepared to supply the wholesalers with sufficient quantities. Secondly, it did not 
put the wholesalers at the risk of being eliminated from the market, since its supplies enabled them to 
cover all the requirements of the Greek market, and even requirements that went beyond those of that 
market. According to the Appellate Court, the decisive factors for the question as to whether the 
conduct of a company that refuses to supply certain goods is abusive, depends on the economic and 
regulatory context of the situation in question. In the case of a supply restriction in medicinal products 
in order to limit parallel trade, it is thus necessary to take into account the omnipresent regulation of 
prices and distribution in the pharmaceuticals sector, the negative consequences of an unlimited 
parallel trade upon the investments of pharmaceuticals companies in the field of research and 
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development, and the minimal benefit of that trade for the final consumers of those products. After 
consideration of all these factors, the Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the refusal by the 
defendant (an undertaking holding a dominant position) to supply medicinal products to retailers with 
the aim of restricting parallel trade does not constitute, in concreto, an abuse of a dominant position 
within the meaning of Article 82 EC. On this basis, it reaffirmed the decision of the Court of First 
Instance, which had also rejected the plaintiff’s complaint, who sought, on one hand, an order that the 
products continue to be supplied in quantities corresponding to the monthly average supplied by GSK 
to them between 1st January and 31st October, 2000, and, on the other hand, compensation in respect 
of the damage caused and its loss of profits. 
The Ruling of the Supreme Court 
In its decision, the Supreme Court first provided an interpretation of Article 82 EC (based on the 
established case-law of the European Court of Justice): Article 82 EC prohibits any abuse, by one or 
more undertakings, of a dominant position within the Common Market, or in a substantial part of it, as 
being incompatible with the Common Market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
According to point (b) of the second paragraph of that Article, such abuse may, in particular, consist in 
limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers. The refusal by 
an undertaking occupying a dominant position in the market to supply a given product to meet the 
orders of an existing customer constitutes an abuse of that dominant position under Article 82 EC 
where, without any objective justification, that conduct is liable to eliminate a trading party as a 
competitor (see, United Brands and United Brands Continental v Commission [1978] ECR 207, 
paragraph 75,182 and 183 and C-95/ 2004 P British Airways v Commission, paragraph 69). With 
regard to a refusal by an undertaking to deliver its products to wholesalers in one Member State who 
export those products to other Member States, such an effect on competition may exist not only if the 
refusal impedes the activities of those wholesalers in that first Member State but, equally, if it leads to 
the elimination of effective competition from them in the distribution of the products on the markets of 
the other Member States. (Case 26/75 General Motors Continental v Commission, paragraph 12). Of 
course, only the pursuit of an undertaking occupying a dominant position in the market to minimise 
the damage caused to that undertaking by parallel exports, in the case that a customer, in addition to 
supplying the market in that Member State, exports part of the quantities ordered to other Member 
States at higher prices, seeking to incorporate the difference from the higher price offered to the other 
Member State, does not constitute sufficient reason to justify the decision of the dominant undertaking 
to cease to honour the ordinary orders (orders in the quantities which have existed so far). Such a 
refusal excludes an alternative source of supply to buyers of medicinal products in those latter States 
and therefore has an effect on competition. Even in Member States where the prices of medicines are 
subject to State regulation, parallel trade is liable to exert pressure on prices and, consequently, to 
create financial benefits not only for social health insurance funds but, equally, for the patients 
concerned, for whom the proportion of the price of medicines for which they are responsible will be 
lower. Article 82 EC must therefore be interpreted as meaning that an undertaking occupying a 
dominant position in the relevant market for medicinal products which, in order to put a stop to 
parallel exports carried out by certain wholesalers from one Member State to other Member States, 
refuses to meet ordinary orders from those wholesalers, is abusing its dominant position since the 
national markets are isolated (artificially partitioned) and this leads to the elimination of effective 
competition. In that respect, it is sufficient to state that, in order to appraise whether the refusal by a 
pharmaceuticals company to supply wholesalers involved in parallel exports constitutes a reasonable 
and proportionate measure in relation to the threat that those exports represent to its legitimate 
commercial interests and it must be ascertained whether the orders of the wholesalers are out of the 
ordinary, destined to cover parallel exports, because the refusal to supply is then justifiable and not 
abusive. Otherwise, the refusal to meet ordinary orders from those wholesalers must be regarded as an 
abuse of the dominant position occupied by that undertaking, which is liable to compensate (Case C-
468/06 and Case C- 478/06 paragraph 34-78).  
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Further, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeal misinterpreted Article 82 EC because it 
came to the conclusion that the defendant’s decision to deliver its products, from 1.9.2001 until 
31.12.2002, only in quantities of medicines that were equivalent to national consumption, and its 
refusal to meet more orders for medicines (which were indeed to be re-exported to other Member 
States) was not abusive, although the orders in the crucial period were ordinary in the light of the 
previous business relations between the defendant and the plaintiff.  
Comment  
In the case above, the Greek Supreme Court for Civil and Criminal Cases (Areios Pagos) deals with 
some fundamental questions of Community competition law relating to the abuse of a dominant 
position, which is prohibited by Article 82 EC, and parallel imports of medicinal products from the 
Hellenic Republic to other Member States, where reimbursement of the price paid for medicinal 
products dispensed under prescription is appreciably higher than it is in Greece. More specifically, the 
question was whether the refusal by a pharmaceuticals company occupying a dominant position in the 
national distribution market for certain medicinal products, to meet the orders of a wholesaler is 
abusive and, in such a case, whether this refusal is justifiable by the fact that the undertaking was 
seeking to prevent re-export to other European countries, in particular, to Germany and the United 
Kingdom.  
This was not the first time that this issue had been brought before a Greek civil court. In fact, a year 
earlier, the decision of the Appellate Court had been set out (Decision Number 7770/2007). The same 
Court (with different judges judging a similar case) had addressed a preliminary ruling to the Court of 
Justice (Decision 1565/2006). By its judgment of 16th September, 2008, in Joined Cases: C-468/06 to 
C-478/06 Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE and Others v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proïonton, 
formerly Glaxowellcome AEVE, the European Court had ruled that: ‘Article 82 EC must be 
interpreted as meaning that an undertaking occupying a dominant position in the relevant market for 
medicinal products which, in order to put a stop to parallel exports carried out by certain wholesalers 
from one Member State to other Member States, refuses to meet ordinary orders from those 
wholesalers, is abusing its dominant position. It is for the National Court to ascertain whether the 
orders are ordinary in the light of both the size of those orders in relation to the requirements of the 
market in the first Member State and the previous business relations between that undertaking and the 
wholesalers concerned’.  
When the case on which we are commenting was brought before the Supreme Court, this Court 
used the decision of the ECJ in order to say that the Appellate Court failed to interpret and implement 
Article 82 EC correctly. To do so, as we have seen, the Supreme Court ruled that the aim of the 
defendant to counter the threat to its own commercial interests that were potentially posed by the 
activities of the plaintiff, and who wished to be supplied in Greece with significant quantities of 
products that were essentially destined for parallel export, was not pursued in a reasonable and 
proportionate way (and therefore was unjustifiable) because ‘the orders in the crucial period were 
ordinary in the light of the previous business relations between the defendant and the plaintiff’.  
Are these explanations sufficient according to the above-mentioned decision of the ECJ? The 
European Court implemented the rule of reason by using two criteria (for the National Court to 
ascertain whether the orders are ordinary), one more objective (relating to the requirements of the 
market in the first Member State), and one more subjective (the previous business relations between 
that undertaking and the wholesalers concerned), but the Greek Supreme Court seems to state (at least 
in this case) that the fulfillment of the one in enough. Is this the case, especially when the ECJ seems 
to demand (using ‘and’) the fulfillment of both criteria? We find it more logical that the meeting of 
both conditions is not an absolute one. The European Court has given useful directions to national 
courts in their effort to implement the rule of reason with flexibility and according to the needs and 
characteristics of the case (within the economic and legal context in which it arises). For example, one 
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cannot exclude, in a case of rising demand, that the dominant undertaking should exceed the ordinary 
orders (except when there is an objective reason for refusal) or, on the other hand, when there is a 
reduction in demand, that it could provide less than the ordinary orders. The main issue is to prevent 
an undertaking in a dominant position from hindering parallel export by forcing the wholesaler to put a 
stop to it.  
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5.5. Mira Raycheva (Supreme Administrative Court, Bulgaria), Vitosha Ski AD and others v. 
Bulgarian Competition Authority 
Decision No. 1338/26.10.2010 of the Bulgarian Commission for Protection of 
Competition 
Decision No. 11 098/10.08.2011 on Case No. 14674/10 of the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Bulgaria (First Instance Court) 
Decision No. 718/13.01.2012 on Case No. 13238/11 of the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Bulgaria (Second Instance Court) 
Facts 
The capital of Bulgaria, Sofia, is situated at the foot of Vitosha Mountain. This mountain is one of the 
oldest winter resorts in Bulgaria and has been a candidate for host city of the Winter Olympics several 
times. As it is very close to the city, it is a favourite skiing destination for the inhabitants of Sofia.  
Vitosha has the status of a national nature park and all the sport facilities built there are either 
public or municipal property. By virtue of a long term concession agreement, all the sports facilities in 
the national park are granted to Vitosha Ski AD (a joint-stock company). This company operates 
92.74% of the skiing infrastructure and 4.94% of the equipment, and they are operated respectively by 
Machirski Sport and the state. 
The Vitosha Winter Centre offers practical ski training for children and adults. These activities 
have been carried out recently by several companies. After 2007, such activity has also been carried 
out by Vitosha Ski Schools Ltd., a company whose one-man proprietor is Vitosha Ski AD. 
During the 2009/2010 winter season, the ski instructors working for Vitosha Ski Schools Ltd. were 
reappointed by Vitosha Ski AD by virtue of labour contracts. As a consequence, they were exempted 
from paying for the right to use the infrastructure (e.g., the need to buy ski lift passes). 
During the same winter season, Vitosha Ski AD offered a 20% reduction in the price of the season 
ticket that entitled clients to use the ski hire facilities and specialised ski training offered by Vitosha 
Ski Schools Ltd. At the same time, Vitosha Ski AD offered a price for a season’s use of the ski 
equipment as follows: By clients, 590 BGN, and by ski trainers, 2,000 BGN, whilst the ski trainers 
from the same company could use it free-of-charge. 
As a result of the reductions mentioned above, the price of a five-day ski training course, including 
the hire of ski equipment and the price of the season ticket, was 20% to 30% lower than the ones 
offered by other companies for identical training at the same ski centre. 
In the period 2008-2011, the market share of Vitosha Ski Schools Ltd. put the company in third 
place amongst all of the companies providing ski training services. The first and second place were 
taken by two other companies that later became part of the Vitosha Ski and Snow-Board Schools 
Association (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Association’). 
The Decision of the Bulgarian Competition Authority 
In 2011, some of the companies providing ski training services to the Vitosha Mountain merged into 
the above mentioned Association and, together with the Sport and Tourist Company ‘Moten’ (not part 
of the Association itself), appealed directly to the Commission for the Protection of Competition (the 
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‘Commission’) by lodging a complaint against Vitosha Ski AD on the basis of a suspected violation of 
Art. 21, paras. 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the Protection of Competition Act, the abuse of a dominant position. 
The particular complaints were based on statements for: 
1. Laying down unfair trading conditions (para. 1);  
2. Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with certain trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage (para. 3); 
3. Making the conclusion of contracts conditional upon acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations or the conclusion of additional contracts which, by their nature or 
according to normal commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the main 
contract or its execution thereof (para. 4); 
4. Refusing without a valid reason to deliver any goods or to provide any service to existing or 
potential customers, with the purpose of hindering the business operations of such customers 
(para. 5). 
In its Decision, the Commission holds as follows: 
Vitosha Ski AD has a dominant position in the use of the ski infrastructure. What is essential in 
this case is that the sports facilities have been built in a national park and none of the companies 
has either the legal or factual possibility to build and use such facilities. The Commission also 
assesses the fact that the access to the above-mentioned facilities is of an exceptional importance 
when providing the ski training service. According to the Commission, the impossibility of using 
the infrastructure leads to an impossibility to develop any commercial activity. The Commission 
also accepts that the price of a season ticket for a ski instructor is proportionate to the price of a 
similar ticket in the other main Bulgarian ski resorts. The way it is calculated does not present an 
infringement of competition law. According to the Commission’s decision, the utilisation of the 
equipment and the use of the ski training service that is offered by a company managing all the 
sports facilities, is entirely granted at the free will of the consumer. As an argument in 
maintenance of this opinion, the Commission points out that the market share of Vitosha Ski 
Schools Ltd. is not considerable in comparison with those of the other participants in the relevant 
market. 
The First Ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court 
The Association and the Moten Company appealed the Commission's decision before a three-member 
panel of the Supreme Administrative Court. In its judgment, the Court partially reversed the 
Commission's decision, ruling that the way Vitosha Ski AD set the particular price for a season ticket 
for a ski instructor should situate it under the incidence of Art. 21, para. 1 of the Protection of 
Competition Act. The Court stated that there is no substantial difference between the expenses 
incurred by a ski instructor in order to use the sport facilities and those incurred by other consumers. 
The result is that the price of a season ticket is obviously higher than the price offered in other national 
ski centres. 
The Supreme Administrative Court considered the other complaints against the Commission's 
decision and decided to leave the decision as it stood. The Court pointed out that although the parties 
were competitors, the requirement that only the ski instructors working for the Association and for 
Moten have to pay for season tickets does not put them at a competitive disadvantage. An additional 
argument for this is the market share of the parties that is at issue. According to the Court, although 
Vitosha Ski AD had bound the use of the equipment to the purchase of another service, this cannot 
influence the free will of consumers. The First Instance Court accepted also that there is neither a 
refusal of access to substantial equipment (sport facilities), nor an ungrounded (ill-founded) high price 
for an ascending service in a vertically connected market. The Court found the reason for this in the 
opportunity that had been given to the complainants to use the sports facilities under certain 
circumstances that are considered correspondent to the normal market. 
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With its judgment, the First-Instance Court partially overturned the Commission’s decision and 
returned it to the Commission for delivery of a new decision in accordance with the instructions given 
for the analysis of the evidence on the alleged violation of Art. 21, para. 1 of the Protection of 
Competition Act. 
The Second Ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court 
An action for annulment was brought by all the parties concerned against the decision of the three-
member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court before a five-member panel of the same Court. 
The parties disagreed with the Court's conclusions for presence, respectively for the lack of presence, 
of a violation of Art. 21 of the Protection of Competition Act. 
The Highest Court Instance accepted that the First Instance Decision is substantially lawful as to 
the conclusion of the presence of unfair trading conditions as a result of the higher price of the season 
ticket for professional ski instructors. According to the Court, it is economically unjustified that the 
price of the service should be different for a ski instructor and for an ordinary consumer. 
The Supreme Administrative Court Second Instance further elaborated that Vitosha Ski AD is an 
undertaking with a dominant position and, as such, had laid down different conditions for the 
participants in the relevant market. The Court pointed out that this constituted price discrimination due 
to the fact that, for ski instructors, buying a season ticket is absolutely obligatory for the realisation of 
ski training services. The Court offered as an argument that the above-mentioned practice had led to a 
substantial price advantage for Vitosha Ski AD and had resulted in unequal behaviour for competitors. 
According to the Court's ruling, by its actions, Vitosha Ski AD had bound the purchase of a season 
ticket by the consumer with the use of supplementary services that were offered by the same company, 
such as ski hire and ski training. In its judgment, the Court pointed out that the price concession 
offered (from 15% to 20%) of the price of the season ticket, had led to a difference in the price of up 
to 30% in comparison with the similar ‘ski training’ service offered by Vitosha Ski Schools Ltd. and 
the other companies that are members of the Association. This price disadvantage was found to be 
substantial: it might be a threat to the normal development of the market and could be considered to be 
a prerequisite for the falling away of participants from the vertical market. 
The Second Instance Court shared the final conclusion of the First Instance ruling that there was no 
infringement, based on the lack of access to service. The Court elaborated the thesis that there would 
not be access to service at any time when an excessive price for the service is offered. In all cases, this 
would constitute an abuse of a dominant market position.  
On these grounds, the appealed judgment was enforced in the part relating to the established 
violation of Art. 21, para. 1 of the Protection of Competition Act, as well as regarding the lack of a 
violation under para. 5 of the same Act. In the part relating to the alleged violation of Art. 21, paras. 3 
and 4, the Commission for the Protection of Competition’s decision and the upholding of the judgment 
of the Supreme Administrative Court, are repealed. The judgment was returned for the delivery of a 
new judgment in accordance with the given instructions.  
Comment 
This case is a good example of the fact that competition law can provoke many contradictory theses - 
the one of the National Competition Authority, that of the First Instance Court, and that of the Highest 
Court Instance. I think that this case is an illustration that the abuses of dominant market position 
could be of a completely different nature, and therefore they should be examined with regard to the 
protection of the normal functioning of the market in cases where similar services are provided by a 
company - a natural monopolist in a sphere that is closely related with the one offered.. 
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6. Competition Distortions and Unfair Commercial Practices in Regulated Industries 
6.1. Madis Ernitis (Tartu District Court, Estonia), Estonian Competition Authority v. Estonian 
Post 
Timeline of the Judicial Proceedings 
04.08.2004 – The Estonian Competition Authority (ECA) begins with an analysis of the competition 
situation in the direct mail market. 
08.02.2007 – ECA’s decision No. 05/05 states that Estonian Post (EP) has violated § 16 No. 3 and 4 of 
the Competition Act (CA) during the period 
26.11.2004–31.12.2006, Estonian Post has committed a misdemeanor, according to § 735 CA, and 
shall be punished with a fine of 15 000 Estonian kroons (appr.1,000 €). 
25.02.2007 – The EP files an action against the ECA’s decision in the Harju County Court. 
11.05.2007 – The County Court upholds in its decision No. 4-07-852, the action annuls the ECA’s 
decision No. 05/05 and orders the termination of the proceedings. 
06.06.2007 – The ECA files an appeal against the County Court’s decision No. 4-07-852. 
05.12.2007 – The Estonian Supreme Court, in its decision No. 3-1-1-64-07, partially allows the appeal 
and replaces the reasoning of the County Court’s decision No. 4-07-852. However, it leaves the 
operative part of the County Court’s decision in the relevant part unchanged. 
Relevant Law 
§ 16 CA. Abuse of dominant position 
Any direct or indirect abuse by an undertaking or several undertakings of the dominant position in 
the goods market is prohibited, including: […] 
3) offering or applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent agreements with other trading parties, 
thereby placing some of them at a competitive disadvantage;  
4) entering into an agreement subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which have no connection with the subject of such agreement; 
§ 735 CA. Abuse of dominant position 
(1) A member of the management board, of a body substituting for the management board, or of 
the supervisory board of a legal person, who establishes unfair trading conditions, or who limits 
production, services, goods market, technical development or investments to the prejudice of 
buyers, or engages in activities involving abuse of the dominant position in the market shall be 
punished by a fine of up to 300 fine units or by detention. 
(2) The same act, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a fine of up to 500,000 kroons. 
The Decision of the Estonian Competition Authority 
The ECA made two major allegations against the EP: 
According to the first allegation, an unequal treatment of different large direct mail clients 
occurred. It was established that the EP had, according to an internal document, divided large clients 
into two groups: advertising clients and mail order clients. The terms and conditions of the contracts 
were identical because a standard contract was used. The ECA made an allegation that the EP applied 
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different discount prices to the large direct mail clients for the same services at equal volumes. They 
also added that the discounts varied even between the two types of clients. 
The second allegation stated that an additional contractual obligation was set on the clients: A 
client would obtain 100% discount only if the services of the EP were used exclusively for direct mail 
(a loyalty discount). 
The Ruling of Harju County Court 
The County Court upheld the action, annulled the ECA’s decision and ordered the termination of the 
proceedings. The County Court stated that the ECA had not analysed and proved the assumption that 
the advertising clients and mail order clients were equal and used the same services at equal volumes. 
It argued that the advertising clients bought only direct mail services, whereas the mail order clients 
additionally bought the parcel sending service. The County Court also established that the EP did not 
violate the CA because the clients had negotiated and concluded contracts with the EP, agreeing to the 
full price offered. Furthermore, the County Court found, in respect of the loyalty discount, that the 
ECA had not clarified whether the so-called loyalty discount has put any undertaking into a 
disadvantageous position at all, and, if so, how? 
The third major argument of the Court consisted in the inability of the ECA to discover, during 
proceedings that lasted over two years, which body or board member had committed the misdemeanor. 
The Ruling of the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal and replaced the reasoning of the County Court’s 
decision. However, it left the operative part of the County Court’s decision in the relevant part 
unchanged. 
The Supreme Court found, firstly, that the law does not presuppose the existence of a consequence 
(restriction or prevention of the competition). Moreover, it declares behaviour that typically distorts 
the functioning of the competition deriving from the interests of free entrepreneurship punishable. It is 
based on the prohibition of the abstract endangering of competition (No. 8.1). 
The Supreme Court continued with the argument that the defence’s assertion that the mail order 
clients obtaining additional further services does not justify different prices and discounts for the same 
services. Furthermore, EP’s clients were discriminated against within the two groups, because some of 
the advertising clients obtained a smaller discount than others. One of the clients who obtained a 
smaller discount was a competitor of the EP in the direct mail market. The Supreme Court stated that 
the ECA had correctly found that the EP had violated § 16 No. 3 CA (No. 8.2). 
The Supreme Court proceeded, ruling that the EP is in the dominant position in the direct mail 
market. Such an undertaking shall be prohibited from binding clients to an obligation to supply all, or 
most, of the need, exclusively by the undertaking that is in the dominant position. This includes the 
prohibition against applying loyalty discounts or bonuses. It is a behaviour that excludes competitors 
and it may have the effect of closing off the market to competitors. The Supreme Court refers to the 
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, Case 85/76 [1979] ECR 
461, No. 89; Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v Commission of the European 
Communities, Case T-203/01 [2003] ECR II-4071, No. 56-57, 65) (No. 8.3). 
Finally, the Supreme Court argued that the County Court’s decision to terminate the proceedings 
was correct, since the EP had committed no misdemeanor. During the period 26.11.2004–31.12.2006 
the old wording of § 735 para.1 CA was applicable. According to that norm, a legal entity was, then, 
responsible for the misdemeanor only if an abuse of a member of the management board, of a body 
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substituting for the management board or the supervisory board, was previously ascertained. The ECA 
had not ascertained the name of a concrete person in the pre-trial proceedings (No. 10). 
Comment 
Since 15.03.2007, § 735 para. 1 CA has new wording: (1) A person who establishes unfair trading 
conditions, or who limits production, services, goods market, technical development or investments, or 
engages in activities involving abuse of the dominant position on the market by the enterprise shall be 
punished by a fine of up to 300 fine units or by detention. 
The EP eliminated all alleged practices from 01.01.2007 onwards, but stayed unpunished. 
However, the Supreme Court stated explicitly that the EP had violated § 16 No. 3 CA and it could be 
concluded from the reasoning of the Supreme Court that there had also been a violation of § 16 No. 4 
CA. Until now, this case is the leading precedent in Estonian Competition Law for identifying a 
distortion in competition. 
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6.2. Janis Neimanis (Supreme Court, Latvia), Maxima Latvija and others v. Latvian 
Competition Authority 
Introduction 
At the beginning of 2013, the Supreme Court considered three cases, which were consolidated so that 
legal matters affecting the abuse of a dominant position in retail trade were considered. Latvia is one 
of the few states where the prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position in retail trade in regulated 
by law.  
Relevant Law 
Section 13, part two of the Competition law provides that:  
‘(2) A market participant or several market participants are in a dominant position in retail trade if, 
considering their buying power for a sufficient period of time and the suppliers’ dependency in the 
relevant market, they have the capacity of directly or indirectly applying or imposing unfair and 
unjustified provisions, conditions or payments upon suppliers and may hinder, restrict or distort 
competition in any relevant market in the territory of Latvia. Any market participant who is in a 
dominant position in retail trade is prohibited from abusing such a dominant position in the 
territory of Latvia. Abuse of a dominant position in retail trade occurs as: 
 1) application or imposition of unfair and unjustified provisions concerning return of products, 
unless the returned product is of poor quality or is a product, including a new product, unknown to 
the consumer, a delivery, or increase in the amount of delivery of which is initiated by the 
supplier; 
 2) application or imposition of unfair and unjustified payments, discounts for the delivery of 
products, the presence of the delivered product at a retail outlet, including for the placement of 
products on the shelves of shops, and for the promotion measures of the trade. Objectively 
justified payment for the promotion of a new product, unknown to the consumer, in the market 
shall not be considered as unfair and unjustified; 
 3) application or imposition of unfair and unjustified payments for entering into a contract, 
unless such payments are justified by the fact of entering into a contract with a new supplier, who 
therefore needs a special evaluation; 
 4) application or imposition of unfair and unjustified payments for the delivery of products to a 
soon to be opened retail outlet; 
 5) application or imposition of unfair and unjustifiably lengthy settlement periods for the 
delivered products. The settlement period for the delivered food products, the term of validity of 
which is no longer than 20 days, shall be unfair and unjustifiably lengthy, if it exceeds 30 days 
from the day of the delivery of products; and 
 6) application or imposition of unfair and unjustified fines for violating the provisions of a 
transaction’. 
First Case 
Overall, there are two market players in Latvia who occupy the dominant position in the retail trade 
supermarkets - Maxima and Rimi. There is a considerable purchasing power there. 
In the first of three cases the Court considered the decision of the Competition Council, whereby 
SIA Maxima Latvija was held liable for an infringement of the earlier specified rules. In this case, on 
1st October, 2008, SIA Maxima Latvija and the third person, SIA Siguldas Maiznieks, entered into a 
goods delivery contract, whereby the third person delivered pastry – cookie, biscuits, cakes, etc., to 
(Supreme Court, Latvia), Maxima Latvija and others v. Latvian Competition Authority 
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Maxima. Pursuant to the contract provisions, the filer would pay for the foods delivered within a 
period of 60 days from the time of their delivery. For each day exceeding 30 days, Maxima had to pay 
interest on any outstanding payment for the purchase in accordance with the interest rate set per 
annum. In 2009, more than half of the goods produced were delivered directly to the filer by a third 
person.  
By the decision of 13th January, 2011, the Competition Council recognises the contract provisions 
regarding the periods of accounts settlement for Maxima as an abuse of its dominant position in the 
retail trade. In the opinion of the Council, a fair and duly reasoned term, when the buyer should settle 
accounts for the products delivered, is the average time of the turnover of these goods in a particular 
retail trade chain, adding a term of up to 10 days thereto, which may be necessary to verify mutual 
accounts and to take other actions relating to accounts settlement. 
The Court recognises that the shelf life of a cookie is more than 20 days, so the Competition law 
does not directly determine which term of accounts settlement would be unfair and unreasonably long. 
Simultaneously, the Court recognises that, similarly, the principle of specific liability to a market 
player which is in a dominant position in retail trade is applicable; but this principle of liability is 
focused on the dominant position in retail trade in the retailer’s relationship with the dependent 
suppliers; inter alia, this is relative to the periods of accounts settlement. A market player which 
happens to be in the dominant position in a retail trade in its relationship with dependent suppliers is 
therefore obliged to apply this policy of accounts settlement, which is objectively justified.   
Maxima’s tactics of defence turned solely on stating that its action does not fall outside of the cases 
specified in the law. It refused to clarify why it requires 60 days from the date of goods delivery to 
settle accounts with the third person. So, the court recognises in Maxima’s conduct an infringement of 
their dominant position in retail trade. 
In this case, the Supreme Court did not initiate the cassation proceedings, as it was earlier 
confirmed that the exercising of market power without any objective necessity, i.e., in conditions 
which reasonably justify the conduct, price, or transaction provision of a market player, is malicious. 
The Supreme Court specified that, in the legislator‘s opinion, the application of an unreasonably long 
term of accounts settlement for the delivered goods has already been seen as an action that is turned 
against free competition; therefore, a separate statement is not necessary.  
Second Case 
SIA Rimi Latvia, in Latvia, established two retail trade chains with different formats – the chain of 
Rimi supermarkets, and the Supernetto food store chain, where Supernetto is positioned as the low 
cost purchase chain in opposition to Rimi supermarkets. AS Valmieras piens supplied its own dairy 
products to the logistic centre of Rimi Latvia. Products were distributed and delivered further from the 
logistic centre to the shop chains of both formats. Irrespective of which format of trading chain it is 
envisaged to further deliver the goods to, one order is delivered to the supplier on a monthly basis and 
the initial discount (the so-called volume discount) has already been set, based on the total amount of 
the delivery to both chains of shops. Goods delivered by the supplier to Rimi Latvia do not differ (in 
quality and other properties or parameters) whether Rimi Latvia further decides to distribute the goods 
to the Rimi chain of supermarkets or to the Supernetto chain of shops, or to both of them. After a 
regular month, Rimi Latvia issues an invoice to the supplier on the scope of the products sold through 
the Supernetto food store chain. The difference that has arisen between the prices of goods on 
consignment notes and the lower selling price in the Supernetto food stores is compensated to AS 
Valmieras piens by Rimi Latvia. Suppliers, as well as AS Valmieras piens, have never known in 
advance what the amount of compensation for goods delivered in the next month will be, as the 
distribution of goods to these shops (and respectively to the volume of supplies to the Supernetto food 
store chain) is unilaterally arranged by Rimi Latvija without any agreement with the supplier.  
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By the decision of the Competition Council of 30th November, 2010, it was stated that there was 
an infringement of the prohibition in Rimi Latvia’s actions as determined by Section 13, part two, 
paragraph 2 of the Competition law. 
Initially, the Court recognised the decision of the Competition Council to be illegitimate; however, 
the Supreme Court repealed it. The Supreme Court disagrees with the opinion of the Court that, in the 
viewed transaction, it is merely the unfortunate formulated nature of the transaction, as there is 
nothing to change if the supplier were to deliver Rimi Latvia’ goods at two different prices. The 
Supreme Court specified that, by recognising Rimi Latvia’s price for the goods delivered to the 
Supernetto food store chain as a being applicable as a special purchasing price, the Court has not taken 
into account that such a ‘price’ is applied retrospectively by Rimi Latvia, and that Rimi Latvia had 
already been applying the discount to the total amount of goods sold in the Rimi Latvija chain to 
amount to one volume. 
It is essential that the Supreme Court gave an explanation in this case, whose interests protects 
Section 13, part two (inter alia, paragraph 2) of the Competition Law. The Court specified that, in 
order to apply the rules of the law, a consumer’s interests is really an essential and actual condition 
and therefore the Competition Council was obliged to prove harm to the consumers. 
The Supreme Court did not agree to this, as it was specified in the materials prepared in the due 
course of law, which envisage that the law will promote fair competition, more efficiently protecting 
(small and medium) companies (producers) against the unfair provisions of transactions. The Supreme 
Court specified that small and medium companies are distinguished (highlighted) in the annotation, as 
they are the first to suffer economically from the abuse of the retailer’s dominance and, in its essence, 
the protection of the rules of law applies to all suppliers. The public interests are indirectly protected 
by the rules of law, thus providing for a variety of producers and goods and thereby the strength and 
development of the national economy.  
Third Case 
In the third case, the Supreme Court considered the temporary correctness of the protection decision. 
The Court imposed a ban on the execution of the Competition Council’s decision, considering it to be 
obviously illegal. With the Council’s decision, a general obligation on a considerable retailer, AS 
Drogas, was imposed but did not include unfair and unreasonable provisions in contracts concluded 
with suppliers relative to the return of goods, the application of discounts, the contractual provisions 
providing for unfair and unreasonable payments on the delivery of goods to the newly established 
retail trade point, which envisage unfair and unreasonable penal sanctions for the infringement of 
transaction terms and conditions.  
The Court regards such an obligation to be too general and ambiguous for its addressee, as the 
Council should particularly specify all of the dependent suppliers, with whom contracts are to be 
amended.  
The Supreme Court does not agree with the position of the Court, making reference to the practice 
of the European Commission and the Court of Justice. The Supreme Court recognises that the degree 
of particularisation of the obligation depends upon part of the motive for the decision. If the grounds 
of the obligation imposed on the addressee are extended in the grounds of the decision, it cannot plead 
the ambiguity specified in the determinable part of the decision (see comparative Judgment of the 
European Court of First Instance of 12th December, 2000, on Case No.T-128/98 Aéroports de Paris, 
Paragraph 83). 
The Supreme Court stated that, in the comparative aspect that competition cases in the European 
Commission imposed, the general obligation of the decision on the addressees to stop actions causing 
harm to competition (see the European Commission's decision No. COMP/E-1/36 604 of 5th 
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December, 2001, Decision No. COMP/36.571/D-1 of 11th June, 2002), although this already follows 
from the rule of law. Such decisions have been recognised to be true in the case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (see udgment of the European Union Court of Justice of 24th 
September, 2009, in Joined Cases No.C-125/07 P Lombard Club). Similarly, it is recognised that the 
European Commission can formulate the general obligation for addressees to refrain in future by 
stating that there was an infringement of law in the decision in a similar manner (see, for example, the 
Decision of the European Commission on Case No. 88/138/EEC Hilti of 22nd December, 1987,which 
was approved by a Judgment of the European Court of First Instance of 12th December, 1991, in Case 
No.T-30/89).The obligation to stop the activity may be imposed even if the addressee has already 
stopped such activity prior to the decision being pronounced, or if the competition supervisory 
authorities are not clearly aware of the same (see, comparatively, the Judgment in Case No. T-354/94 
the Court of First Instance of the European Union, paragraph 99). 
The Supreme Court recognises that, under the decision’s obligation, the circle of suppliers has not 
been given in detail; so by this all suppliers of the filer in a relevant market are meant. It should be 
taken into account that the market is specified in the decision of the Competition Council and the 
suppliers are known to AS Drogas. In order to formulate the obligation, it is requested that each 
supplier in a relevant market, and its economic dependence upon the retailer, are evaluated if it is 
stated that the retailer is in a dominant position in retail trade in a relevant market and a certain 
structure of the market is exorbitant, and when Section 13, part two of the Competition Law, does not 
claim it.  
In turn, the obligation imposed in the decision is construed in conjunction with the causation of the 
decision, wherein the particular provisions of the contract are extensively evaluated, as well as the 
actions of the filer relative to the return of goods, the application of discounts, the contractual 
provisions that provide for unfair and unreasonable payments on the delivery of goods to the newly 
established retail trade point and which envisage unfair and unreasonable penal sanctions for 
infringement of transaction terms and conditions. In this case, the uncertainty of the obligation is not 
stated. 
Comment 
Latvia is one of the few states where the prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position in retail trade 
in regulated by law. This is due to a significant concentration of market players and the use of the 
power to establish a relationship with suppliers. 
Regulation of a dominant position in the retail trade is derived from the basic regulation on the use 
of a dominant position in the market. They have the basic principles; inter alia, the obligation to an 
objective justification of actions. 
Regulation is directly turned to protect suppliers and, through them, the trade structure and 
consumers. 
The operative part of the decision of the Competition supervisory authorities should always be read 
together with the reasons. The authority enjoys wide discretion in determining the measures or 
restrictions on the market players that are applicable. It is clear, taking into account the addressee's 
knowledge of its suppliers, that this may differ from an ordinary event by the issuing of an 





6.3. Agnieszka Pieńkowska (Myszków District Court), Getin Noble Bank v. Polish 
Competition Authority 
Judgment of the Warsaw Regional Court issued on 26
th
 February, 2013 
Facts 
By the decision of the 12th November, 2010, the Head of the Office for the Protection of Consumers 
and Fair Competition (UOKiK) declared unlawful the practices of the bank in automatically charging 
its customers for falling behind the deadline for the minimum debt payment into their credit card 
accounts, even though the bank was not performing any additional action that might justify extra 
running costs for the account, which is a breach of Article 3 of the Bill of 1993 on Fair Competition. 
The Head of UOKiK declared unlawful the bank’s inclusion of a clause in the terms of the contract 
for their credit cards, where the clause says that the customer is liable to pay a flat charge of 39zl 
(around 10 Euros) for falling behind the deadline for payments into their account. 
Under Article 479 – 45 of the Civil Law Procedure, the clause was an abuse of Polish law and it 
was thus forbidden.  
The Head of UOKiK, referring to Article 106, items 1 – 4, of the Bill of 1993 on Fair Competition, 
imposed on the Getin Noble Bank S.A., Warsaw, a fine to be paid to the state budget, of 1,959,044zł 
(500,000 Euros). 
The Getin Noble Bank filed an appeal against the decision, stating that the clause in the bank’s 
contract terms regarding the payment of a fine of 10 Euros for falling behind the deadline is not an 
abuse of the law, specified in Article 479 – 45 of the Civil Law Procedure. 
According to the claimant – the Getin Noble Bank, the fine imposed was not justified, and 
therefore an appeal against that decision was filed or, alternatively, a request to have the fine lowered. 
The Regional Court in Warsaw established the status quo of the case. According to paragraph 12, 
item 8 of the contract terms that the bank signed with its clients, which says: ‘in the case of falling 
behind with the minimum debt payment into the credit card, the bank will charge the credit card holder 
an amount of money specified in the table of running cost fees, including also other fees’. 
The table of credit card and credit fees created by the Getin Bank S.A. says that the fee for falling 
behind with a payment is 39 zl (10 Euros). 
As of the 1st March, 2009, the fee was automatically changed to 50 zl (12.5 Euros).  
On 22
nd
 July, 2009, a new fee of 60 zl (15 Euros) was introduced by the bank for any case where 
the bank’s employee or a field debt collector visited the credit card’s holder’s house, and another fee 
was introduced for sending a debt reminder letter to the holder – the fee was 30 zl (7.5 Euros), and 
then another fee for a debt reminder phone call, the fee being 25 zl (6 Euros), as well as a text message 
reminder fee of 10 zl (2.5 Euros). 
The information about the new fees was sent to the credit card holders as part of their monthly bank 
account notifications. The customers were informed that they could refuse to agree to the new terms 
by sending the bank a written resignation notice within the following 30 days. However, if a customer 
did send the refusal, that would automatically cancel the credit card contract which, in turn, imposed 
on the holder the need to pay to the bank the whole debt outstanding on the credit card within those 30 
days. 
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The attorney for the Getin Bank, at the hearing of 15th February, 2013, stated that other banks also 
used this practice, yet they had not been fined, but had merely been obliged to terminate the practice. 
The attorney presented the obligations that had been imposed on other banks by the head of 
UOKiK, referring to a similar status quo to the present case, but where no fines had been imposed on 
the perpetrators.  
The defendant applied for the evidence presented by the bank’s attorney to be dismissed, as it was 
filed after the evidence filing deadline, and all the decisions of the head of UOKiK are published on 
the website of the Office.  
The Ruling of the Warsaw Regional Court 
The Court dismissed the evidence presented by the Bank. The Regional Court established that the 
appeal was unsubstantiated, and the decision by the Head of UOKiK remains in place. 
The practices of the Claimant breached Article 3 of the Bill of 1993 on Fair Competition, according 
to which it is a case of unfair competition if the practices are unlawful or against decent conduct, if 
those pose a threat to, or affect, the customer’s financial status. In this particular case, it was decent 
conduct that had been breached. 
It was acceptable to impose fees based on work done by the bank’s employees; work like letters 
sent to the customers, e-mails written and sent, phone calls made and text messages sent, while it was 
not acceptable to impose fees that were unsubstantiated by the bank’s employees’ work, of 50zl. 
It is easy to imagine a situation where the customer makes a payment into his credit card account 
with a slight delay, and yet the fee for falling behind with it will be imposed without any actual work 
that justifies this being done by the bank’s employees. Such a practice is nothing other than pure gain 
for the bank, money for doing nothing, and the customer is already paying extra interest for falling 
behind with the payments, which is already in itself compensation paid to the bank. 
The practice, which is against decent conduct, affected the class interest of the customers, as it 
could be applied to any of the bank’s customers. The Court also established that the clause regarding 
the automatic charging of the customer with an extra fee, in a case where they fell behind with the 
payment, is an abuse of the law, breaching Articles 479 – 45 of Civil Procedure.  
The fact that other banks performing similar practices had not been fined, and had merely been 
obliged to terminate these practices, could not be allowed as evidence to be used against the decision 
by the Head of UOKiK. 
According to the Court, the fine imposed was adequate to the bank’s malpractice. 
With that situation in place, the Court dismissed the appeal and charged the Claimant with the costs 
for court procedures. 
Comment 
In my opinion, the ruling by the Regional Court (Competition and Consumer Protection) is fully 
justified and also clearly stated. In a situation where the bank can impose additional fees and penalties 
on its customers and the customers themselves are in no position to demand the same of the bank, it is 
only just, and substantiated by the law and the system of justice, that the Court should be strict and 
inclined towards the benefit of the customer. 
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6.4. Yulia Todorova (Sofia Regional Court, Bulgaria), I.B. AD v. Bulgarian 
Telecommunications Company EAD 
Judgment No. 285 of 8th April, 2009, Sofia Appellate Court, Civil College, Fifth 
Bench, Civil Case No. 2039 on the docket for 2008.  
Facts 
Company I.B. AD has appealed the First-Instance judgment of the Sofia City Court, Commercial 
Division, VІ-5 panel, delivered on 8th July, 2008, on Civil Case No. 1582/2004, whereby the Court 
has dismissed the claim of the company, claimed partially against the Bulgarian Telecommunications 
Company EAD, for the sum of BGN 20,000. This sum represents compensation claimed for material 
damage /lost profits/ suffered as a result of the violation of the Protection of Competition Act. The 
plaintiff requests a reversal of the appealed judgment and the granting of the partial claim.  
The defendant -- the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company EAD -- challenges the appeal. The 
written notes of the defendant set out detailed arguments stating that there had been no unlawful 
behaviour towards the plaintiff. The defendant argues that the damage has not been proven and there is 
no causality between I.B. AD’s drop in turnover and the actions of the Bulgarian Telecommunications 
Company EAD. 
The Ruling of the Sofia Appellate Court 
In the complaint and the specification of the claim made by written application on 7th March, 2005, 
the plaintiff states that the unlawful behaviour of the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company EAD 
was established by the resolution of the Commission for the Protection of Competition, which has 
taken effect, and the damage suffered by the plaintiff consists of: 
1. Lost profits from terminated agreements with clients for the ‘dial-up Internet access’ service; 
2. Lost profits from the sale of ‘dial-up Internet access’ cards; 
3. Lost profits from the total volume of ‘dial-up Internet access’ services; 
4. Lost profits from traffic purchased by the plaintiff; 
5. Lost profits are claimed between 2000 and 2004, inclusive. The plaintiff states that they total 
BGN 12,000,000, yet it has lodged only a partial claim for BGN 20,000. 
The Preliminary Agreement for access and connection that was signed between I.B. AD and the 
Bulgarian Telecommunications Company EAD on 17th June, 2002, was produced at the First-Instance 
Court, whereby the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company EAD agreed to provide paid and timely 
access to, and connection of ,the operator I.B. AD’s public network for data transmission with the 
public fixed telephone network of the Bulgarian Telecommunication Company EAD, so that the users 
of this network could make calls to the operator using the national number, 0134400.  
The Sofia Appellate Court has accepted the conclusions of expert witness opinion that established 
the following: in 2000, the number of subscribers to the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company 
EAD for the ‘dial-up Internet access’ service was 5,515, followed by a steady decline in the next four 
years, dropping to 1,231 in 2004. The revenue of the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company EAD 
from this service peaked in 2000, at BGN 343,524, dropping to BGN 232,147 in 2004.  
I.B. AD’s figures for the same period are as follows: clients for the ‘dial-up Internet access’ service 
in 2000 were 1,730, growing to 2,955 in 2002, after which the numbers gradually declined to 1,759 in 
(Sofia Regional Court, Bulgaria), I.B. AD v. Bulgarian Telecommunications Company EAD 
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2004. The revenue drop from these clients, however, is long-lasting and significant, starting from 
BGN 865,405 in 2000, and plummeting to BGN 3,252.15 in 2004.  
The first expert witness opinion ordered by the Sofia City Court showed that the ‘dial-up Internet 
access’ service is implemented technically through the physical environment of a fixed telephone 
network, of which there was only one in Bulgaria, owned by the Bulgarian Telecommunications 
Company EAD, and which was operated by special devices /telephone/modems.   
Resolution No. 156 of 21st December, 2000, and Resolution No. 78 of 22nd May, 2003, of the 
Commission for the Protection of Competition were produced to the Sofia City Court, as well as 
Judgment No. 7155 of 16th July, 2002, of the Supreme Administrative Court, Fifth Division, delivered 
on Administrative Case No. 1742/2001 and Judgment No. 11897 of 20th December, 2002, of the 
Supreme Administrative Court – Five-Member Bench, delivered on Administrative Case No. 
8902/2002, show that by virtue of the bringing into force of a Court Instrument, it was found that the 
Bulgarian Telecommunications Company EAD had violated Art.18, item 1, of the Protection of 
Competition Act. The violation is an abuse of dominant position in the market for the ‘access to 
Internet via the fixed telephone network’ service, whereby the Bulgarian Telecommunications 
Company EAD, being the only participant in the market for this service, enjoys more favourable 
conditions /by dial-up access via the single code 0134100, than I.B. AD. In its Resolution of 22nd 
May, 2003, the Commission for the Protection of Competition holds that ‘by offering to a part of its 
clients more favourable conditions for the use of the whole service, ‘access to Internet via the fixed 
telephone network’, due to the possibility of offering more favourable conditions for use of the first 
element of this service /ordinary telephone service/ and by also refusing to offer these conditions /with 
use of the first element/ to the clients of the plaintiff, the telecommunications company imposes 
‘unfair commercial conditions’ within the meaning of Art. 18, item 1, of the Protection of Competition 
Act. The Bulgarian Telecommunication Company EAD is obliged to offer to its competitors the same 
commercial conditions for the whole service described /the given implementation of the first element 
thereof/, which it guarantees for itself. The imposition of unfair commercial conditions is related to the 
fact that the Bulgarian Telecommunication Company EAD binds the potential provision of the single 
code, 013400, to other Internet service providers for the use of Internet traffic purchased from the 
Bulgarian Telecommunications Company EAD, i.e., it forces all Internet service providers to become 
intermediaries between the company and the end users of the service ‘access to Internet via the fixed 
telephone network’.  
The Sofia Appellate Court held that the defendant, the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company 
EAD, behaved unlawfully. The violation of the Protection of Competition Act conditions the right of 
the plaintiff, in its capacity as a party affected by the violation of the Protection of Competition Act, to 
lay a claim for damages on the grounds of Art. 36, para.2 of the Protection of Competition Act 
/repealed/, which was nevertheless in effect by the date of the institution of the proceedings. The 
quoted provision conditions the admissibility of the claim lodged. 
According to the Appellate Court, in order for the claim for payment of damages to be 
substantiated, it is necessary to prove unlawful behaviour on the part of the defendant, the damage 
suffered by the plaintiff, and the causality between these events. In this case, it is argued that the 
damage consists of lost profits caused by the limitation of the opportunities for the plaintiff to earn 
profits from the ‘dial-up Internet access’ service. The aforementioned conclusions of the expert 
witness – accountant state that, in the period 2000–2004, the revenue of I.B. AD that came from the 
provision of ‘dial-up Internet access’ service dropped considerably. However, it was not found that 
this drop in revenue was caused solely and only by the violation of Art. 18, item 1, of the Protection of 
Competition Act /repealed/ on the part of the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company EAD.  
Given the aforementioned considerations, the Appellate Court found that, by dismissing the claim, 
the First-Instance Court delivered a substantiated and lawful judgment, which should remain in effect. 




As the Court stated, it cannot be assumed as being a proven fact that the monopoly behaviour of the 
Bulgarian Telecommunications Company EAD is the sole market factor to negatively affect the 
revenues of Internet service providers. In a period of rapid free market development there can be many 
and various reasons for a diminished interest in a given service. It is a well-known fact, not requiring 
proof, that the introduction of cable Internet as an alternative to dial-up Internet access has changed 
users’ interests. Given this case, the degree to which the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company 
EAD has violated competition regulations, as found by the Commission for the Protection of 
Competition, cannot be proven. 
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6.5. Dimitrov Chavdar (Bourgas Administrative Court, Bulgaria), Ethna Cargo v. Bulgarian 
Competition Authority 
- Decision № 6217 of 08.05.2013 on Administrative Case № 3099/2013, of a 5-
member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) regarding the appeal 
of 
- Decision № 15743 of 11.12.2012 on Adm. Case № 9247/2012, of a three-member 
panel of the SAC, by virtue of which was confirmed 
- Decision № 659/14.06.2012 оn Case 408/2012 of the Commission for Protection of 
Competition (CPC). 
Facts 
The case under consideration aims to establish the lack or presence of the dominant position of one of 
the three mobile operators in the market for mobile phone services, and it is initiated by an ex-client of 
one of those operators - Cosmo Bulgaria Mobile JSC (acting with the brand name Globul), which is 
now a current client of another of them - Bulgarian Telecommunication Company JSC (Vivacom). 
The struggle between all the three mobile operators in Bulgaria, amongst which is also Mobiltel JSC 
(with the brand name Mtel) has continued for years and is always about the infringement of the rules 
of fair competition, and, in particular, of the abuse of a dominant position with respect to particular 
services and markets. 
What is different and specific about this particular case is that the procedure of the Commission for 
the Protection of Competition (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) is initiated by a third party 
which is not a participant in the market for mobile services, but a client named Ethna Cargo Ltd, 
which had sent a request to the Commission with the purpose of establishing infringements under 
Article 21 of the Protection of Competition Act (similar to Art. 102 TFEU) committed by Cosmo 
Bulgaria Mobile JSC/Globul, in connection with preventing their clients from the possibility of 
terminating their contracts and signing up with the other participants in the market by foreseeing 
penalties of great value in the case of contract termination. 
Cosmo Bulgaria Mobile JSC, which is a defendant in the proceedings before the Commission and 
the Court, is a company that provides public electronic communication networks and services;  
There are three companies registered in compliance with the procedure of the Electronic Messages 
Act in Bulgaria, and operating on the market for access to mobile land networks and the provision of 
mobile voice telephone services through them. Officially all the three companies act in competition 
with each other. 
By its earlier decisions the Communications Regulation Commission determined that Mobiltel and 
Globul are dominant operators in the mobile voice services market, taking into consideration their 
market share – more than 25 per cent of the respective market. Cosmo Bulgaria Mobile JSC was also 
determined to be an enterprise with a significant influence on the whole sales market. This had been 
ruled by a number of decisions of the Commission for the Protection of Competition in the period 
2006 – 2008. 
However, at a later time there are plenty of cases where the Commission, such as 1340/2011; 
861/2011; 774/2010; 170/2010; 1264/2009 says that the dominant position of those two operators 
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(Mobiltel and Globul) no longer exists, because of the increasing influence and market share, as well 
as the increasing income of the third operator soon after being empowered, and because of its 
technical capacity to service as many clients as the other operators, so that now Globul is only the 
second most powerful company among the three in a market with an oligopolistic structure in 
Bulgaria. 
Ethna Cargo Ltd. is an international transport company which has been a client of Globul since 
2004. On 21.12.2010 their business relations were rearranged by a term contract for a period of 12 
months, with a clause for automatic renovation of that period in the case of non-termination of the 
contract. At the end of that period, Globul was informed by Ethna Cargo that it would like to terminate 
the contract but to keep its telephone numbers and use them in another mobile contract, which Ethna 
Cargo intended to negotiate with the operator Vivacom.  
Under those circumstances, Globul offered better conditions for the contract (cheaper prices, 
minutes for free etc.), so that Ethna Cargo decided that the term of the contract with Globul be 
automatically prolonged, but after the prolongation Globul refused to contract under the promised 
conditions. 
This was the reason for Ethna Cargo terminating the contract, but the company was charged an 
unreasonably large amount of money which would actually prevent, according to the company, every 
client from terminating the contract, unless he were as frustrated as Ethna Cargo.  
On the grounds of the above events the claimant, Ethna Cargo, asserted that there a dominant 
position exists, by which Cosmo Bulgaria Mobile JSC has committed abuse, according to the meaning 
of Article 21 of the Protection of Competition Act (respectively Art. 102 TFEU) by setting such a 
large amount of penalties that actually prevented their clients from terminating their contracts, no 
matter how dissatisfied with the conditions they were. 
The Decision of the Bulgarian Competition Authority 
The Commission has reached the conclusion that in the specific mobile services market there is no 
company with a dominant position, which would make such a company independent of both other 
competitors who are participating in the competition. 
It is assumed that, in the presence of the oligopolistic structure of the  type of market represented 
no company involved in the relevant market is able to impose its own market conduct. Its lack of a 
dominant position, irrespective of the market share, always makes it dependent from the market 
response of each individual participant, as the other two competitors have sufficient market power to 
respond appropriately to potential competitive pressures.  
According to the Commission, one of the preconditions for abuse of a dominant position under 
Article 21 of the Protection of Competition Act is missing, because Globul does not have a dominant 
position, within the meaning of the Act, with regard to this market. The lack of a market participant 
holding an independent power with a view to its market share, level of technological development, 
financial resources and market access capability, to ignore its competitors, leads to the lack of the 
mentioned infringement.  
The Ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court 
The decision of the Commission on the Protection of Competition was confirmed by the Supreme 
Administrative Court in two instances, disagreeing only with the statement of the Commission that 
such a dominant position in an oligopolistic market is practically and theoretically impossible.  
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The Court assumed that an oligopolistic market is characterised by a small number of players, with 
relatively equal market shares among the participants in the oligopoly. None of them is able to have a 
fully independent market behaviour. When all firms are of equal size, oligopoly is symmetrical. In the 
case of a prominent leader in the oligopolistic market (dominant undertaking) there is an asymmetric 
oligopoly. In the present case, it is assumed that there is an oligopoly of a symmetrical structure of the 
shares of market participants, because there is no prominent market leader which, according to the 
Court and the Commission, excluded the existence of a dominant position of Globul. 
The case mentioned above is important because of its deviation from the practice of the ECJ and 
the First instance court upon the matters of the oligopolistic market, especially in the following cases 
Airtours/Commission, T-342/99, Recueil; C-413/06 etc., where the problem of joint dominance is 
being explored. According to the Court’s opinion in the last mentioned case: 
120. In the case of an alleged creation, or the strengthening of a collective dominant position, the 
Commission is obliged to assess, using a prospective analysis of the reference market, whether the 
concentration which has been referred to will lead to a situation in which effective competition in 
the relevant market is significantly impeded by the undertakings which are parties to the 
concentration and one or more other undertakings which together, in particular because of 
correlative factors which exist between them, are able to adopt a common policy on the market 
(see Kali & Salz, paragraph 221) in order to profit from a situation of collective economic 
strength, without actual or potential competitors, let alone customers or consumers, being able to 
react effectively. 
121 Such correlative factors include, in particular, the relationship of interdependence existing 
between the parties into a tight oligopoly within which, on a market with the appropriate 
characteristics, in particular in terms of market concentration, transparency and product 
homogeneity, those parties are in a position to anticipate one another’s behaviour and are therefore 
strongly encouraged to align their conduct on the market in such a way as to maximise their joint 
profits by increasing prices, reducing output, the choice or quality of goods and services, 
diminishing innovation or otherwise influencing the parameters of competition. In such a context, 
each operator is aware that highly competitive action on its part would provoke a reaction on the 
part of the others, so that it would derive no benefit from its initiative.  
122 A collective dominant position significantly impeding effective competition in the common 
market or a substantial part of it may thus arise as the result of a concentration where, in view of 
the actual characteristics of the relevant market and of the alteration to those characteristics that 
the concentration would entail, the latter would make each member of the oligopoly in question, as 
it becomes aware of common interests, consider it possible, economically rational, and hence 
preferable, to adopt on a lasting basis a common policy on the market with the aim of selling at 
above competitive prices, without having to enter into an agreement or resort to a concerted 
practice within the meaning of Article 81 EC and without any actual or potential competitors, let 
alone customers or consumers, being able to react effectively.  
123 Such tacit coordination is more likely to emerge if competitors can easily arrive at a common 
perception as to how the coordination should work, and, in particular, of the parameters that lend 
themselves to being a focal point of the proposed coordination. Unless they can form a shared tacit 
understanding of the terms of the coordination, competitors might resort to practices that are 
prohibited by Article 81 EC in order to be able to adopt a common policy on the market. 
Moreover, having regard to the temptation which may exist for each participant in a tacit 
coordination to depart from it in order to increase its short-term profit, it is necessary to determine 
whether such coordination is sustainable. In that regard, the coordinating undertakings must be 
able to monitor to a sufficient degree whether the terms of the coordination are being adhered to. 
There must therefore be sufficient market transparency for each undertaking concerned to be 
aware, sufficiently precisely and quickly, of the way in which the market conduct of each of the 
other participants in the coordination is evolving. Furthermore, discipline requires that there be 
some form of credible deterrent mechanism that can come into play if deviation is detected. In 
addition, the reactions of outsiders, such as current or future competitors, and also the reactions of 




In the Bulgarian case presented above, there is plenty of evidence about a similar behaviour among the 
three companies on the market of mobile services in Bulgaria. Instead of checking out the contract 
penalties of the other two companies and comparing all the important elements of the contracts of all 
the three companies, such as terms, prices, extras etc. which would help the Commission and the Court 
to notify the existing correlation of those characteristics in the contracts, The Court and the 
Commission regarded Globul as a separate and independent entity though participating on a market 
absolutely similar to that mentioned in C-413/2006 case where the question about the existence of 
abuse of dominant position is very often equal to that of the existence of collective dominant position 
situation where a small number of companies on an oligopolistic market controlled by the State, offer 
contracts with similar and almost equal terms and conditions to their clients. It is not always said such 
a dominance to exist but at least that should be verified. 
As a conclusion I would say that this case is more interesting on local level than on EU Level but it 
shows the often met misunderstanding of the problems of competition by the Commission for 
Protection of Competition in Bulgaria. 
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6.6. Patrizia Puccini (Venice Court of Appeal, Italy), CETEL S.N.C. and others v. ENEL 
S.p.A. 
Judgment of the Italian Supreme Court N.3638/09, issued on 21
st
 October, 2008. 
Introduction 
The proceeding of the First Instance was held before the Court of Appeal of Bari in as much as it was 
exclusively competent pursuant to Art. 33, Law n. 287/1990.  
The ruling of the Court was challenged before our Supreme Court, which overturned the previous 
decision, sending the parties once again before the Lower Court in order to reach a decision based on a 
different definition of the relevant market. 
Facts 
Some companies operating in the field of contracts that are related to the construction and 
maintenance of electrical systems on behalf of Enel Spa, Naples section, sued Enel before the Court of 
Appeal of Bari, asking to declare as null contractual clauses relating to pricing, due to the abuse of 
monopoly power in the production, transport, distribution and sale of electricity, and they demanded 
their re-determination. 
They also denounced the abuse of economic dependence that had been caused by Enel to the 
above-mentioned companies which, in the Puglia Region, were operating almost exclusively on behalf 
of Enel. 
They therefore cited a violation of Article 82 of the EU Treaty and Art. 3, Law N. 287/1990, 
prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. 
Enel observed the absence of the conditions for the application of Law n. 287/1990, a relevant 
market not having being identified in the field of the installation and maintenance of electrical systems 
at low and medium voltage, and suggested that any abusive conduct on its part was non-existent. 
The Ruling of the Court Of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal rejected the merits of the plaintiffs' claim and ruled that there was no abuse of 
dominant position on the assumption that the proper definition of the relevant market be taken on the 
basis of a technical report (CTU), so with no reference to contracts for the installation or maintenance 
of power lines for medium and low voltage, but with reference to the entire market for building works. 
The Court held that it is not possible to refer to a ‘specific market for the construction of overhead 
and underground lines and execution of civil works and laying underground cables exclusively aimed 
at the transmission of electric power’, and that it could consequently not ‘identify a dominant position 
for Enel as regards the sectors mentioned above’. 
The CTU found that most of the plaintiffs' undertakings fell under categories ANC, different from 
those that stuck specifically to works on electrical systems of medium and low voltage (i.e., 16 H), 
that that part of the turnover of the undertakings concerned works different from those relating to the 
plants in question, and that the necessary equipment for carrying out the work in question was 
employable in the preparation of civil works of various kinds. 
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In addition, some of the firms that were suing had conducted work in a geographical area that was 
not limited to the Puglia Region, and the demand for the execution of works of excavation and 
maintenance for a network in the Puglia Region came not only from Enel, but also from local 
government and from other companies that managed network plants. 
Neither from the point of view of the demand, nor from the point of view of the supply, was a 
specific and/or significant market concerning contracts for the installation and maintenance of 
electrical lines of medium and low voltage found in the Puglia Region. 
The appellants relied on the breach and misapplication of the standards referred to by Art. 3, Law 
N. 287/1990 (National Antitrust Law), in relation to Art. 1, paragraph 4, of the same Act, with 
reference to the principle according to which the relevant market in which to tailor the position of the 
firm responsible for the abuse consisted in the ‘smallest group of products and the smallest 
geographical area for which the creation of a dominant position is possible, because of the given 
situation.’  
The appellants observed also that it is common knowledge that the relevant market should be 
identified by the set of economic transactions in which significant changes in the competitive tender 
can occur. Transactions that are considered suitable for inclusion in a given market are classified 
mainly according to the product being traded and the place where the exchange can be realised. 
This principle is used to delimit the relevant economic context affecting both the product and the 
geographical markets. If a characteristic of these transactions appears likely to separate one set of 
transactions from another, to bring them back to a more restricted context than that identified by 
sectorial and geographical distinction, this feature becomes essential in establishing the correct 
extension of the relevant market. 
The relevant market could not be identified with reference to all the economic transactions 
associated with the execution of civil works of any kind, and at a larger level than the market in the 
Puglia Region, but only with respect to transactions between Enel and the applicants. 
The Ruling of the Supreme Court  
Our Supreme Court has ruled in the sense that the identification of the target market, commonly 
referred to as the ‘relevant market’, is preliminary and is essential for the assessment of any anti-
competitive conduct and assumes central importance for abuse offences, such as for concentrations, 
given that, for the detection of both cases, checking the position that the companies hold on the market 
stands as being preliminary. 
However, it is clear that to perform this investigative action it is necessary to first define the scope 
of the market in which the position should be checked, since the larger the market to which we relate, 
the lower the degree of dominance that the company can play, while, on the contrary, the more 
restricted the relevant market, the greater can be the part played by the undertaking considered. 
For the purpose of defining the relevant market, it is necessary to take into account the 
geographical area in which the transaction is placed, or in which it is assumed to produce a noticeable 
effect (the geographical market) and the scope of the product or service that involves the same 
operation (the product market).  
Each antitrust system operates in a certain market and must therefore identify the territorial scope 
with respect to which the legislation may have specific anti-competitive effects. 
With regard to the antitrust laws, for the definition of relevant market we must refer to the 
Communication from the Commission on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of the 
Community law in the field of competition (in OJC 372 of 9.12.1997) and to the parameters that the 
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national and the Community law consider to be essential to the definition of the relevant market, 
namely the substitutability on both the demand and the supply sides. 
The Communication under examination indicates the relevant product market as being that ‘which 
comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by 
the consumer, by reason of products, characteristics, prices and intended use’ (paragraph 7 of the 
Notice.) 
The relevant geographical market comprises the area in which the undertakings involved provide or 
buy products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and 
which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas because, in the latter, the conditions of 
competition are appreciably different (point 8 of the Communication). 
The Communication states that as a dominant position it intends one that allows one company or 
group of companies to determine their own conduct to an appreciable extent, independently of its 
competitors, its customers and, ultimately, of the final consumers of its products or services. 
Furthermore, it notes that substitutability on the demand side constitutes the most immediate and 
effective disciplinary bond for the suppliers of a given product, especially with regard to their 
decisions on price. An undertaking or group of undertakings (Enel, in this case) cannot significantly 
influence the conditions of sale and, in particular, of prices, if customers (read ‘the applicants’) are 
able to easily switch to available substitute products on the market (see tenders for the execution of 
other jobs). 
With regard to the substitutability on the supply side, it is necessary to determine whether, in the 
face of a small but permanent increase in the price of the referenced product, there are companies 
which, despite being active in the production of non-fungible assets, are nevertheless capable of 
producing the good in question, converting its production capacity over a short period of time and 
without facing huge investments. 
Products that are characterised by a very marked degree of affinity and that are manufactured based 
on the same technology, for which a conversion of production capacity is realistically attainable in the 
short term and without significant additional costs, can be considered as being substitutable. 
The market can thus be defined as the territory in which all traders are found in similar conditions 
of competition, specifically in the relevant products or services considered, identifying them according 
to their characteristics and to the needs that are worth satisfying. 
So, the first task is to check that the products or services must be perceived as being substitutable 
by the consumer, not only for their technical and functional characteristics, but also for the levels of 
their prices. 
On the supply side, however, attention must be given not only to all the firms in a certain industry, 
but also to those that may operate in it in view of the possibility of a conversion that is economically 
and commercially advantageous. 
However, the Court observed, there are many cases in which the Community Courts have limited 
the definition of the relevant market with reference to the specific market segment which was the 
subject of significant transactions that were under investigation.  
On the one hand, it seems that too broad a market, such as that for civil works in general, has been 
considered; on the other, the market for the execution of works of the excavation and maintenance of 
network plants in the Puglia Region must be considered in depth (in fact, in this sector the demand 
comes not only from Enel, but also from local public administrations and other enterprise management 
systems in the network). 
In this case, however, whether Enel was or was not in a dominant position should have been 
investigated with reference to the market share held by each entity in that market. 
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The question is, in fact, not to determine whether Enel is monopolistic in that market, but whether 
it is in a dominant position with respect to the shares held by other operators. 
The ruling of the Bari Court does not take into account the possibility that the relevant market that 
could be referred to in this case was not so specific, that is, limited to transactions between the parties, 
but instead a little larger, that is, the market for the execution of works for the excavation and 
maintenance of a network in the Puglia Region. 
The latter was indicated by the CTU in their market considerations, but it seems the Court did not 
take into account additional considerations regarding the position of Enel. 
The fact highlighted in the judgment challenged, that the appellants have also worked in other areas 
and for other companies, does not exclude that there might still be a dominant Enel position in the 
specific market in which the companies specialised. 
In fact, it was not necessary to demonstrate that Enel was the only company able to offer work to 
specialised companies but, rather, that Enel held a position of prominence, such as to decisively 
influence the choices of the other subjects of the contracts. The matter was therefore to define the 
shares held by Enel compared to other possible offers that were available to the applicants in the 
market in relation to their specialisation. 
With regard to the geographical market, the judgment under appeal did not take the responsibility 
of clarifying whether it intended to refer to the national market or to a part of it: sometimes it mentions 
the Puglia Region, at other times the Centre-north, but in any case there is no clear stance on the 
matter. 
A proper definition of the relevant market cannot be separated from the identification of the target 
market in terms of territory, as well as in terms of the products and/or services considered. 
The Court ruled also on the problem of the exemption, pleaded by Enel’s defence, regarding the 
applicability of the provision referred to in Law. N. 287 1990, Art. 8. 
Pursuant to this article ‘The provisions of the preceding Articles shall not apply to undertakings 
which, in the eyes of the law, exercise the operation of services of general economic interest or operate 
a monopoly on the market, for all that closely relate to the fulfilment of specific tasks entrusted to 
them’. 
The Supreme Court observes that it must be denied that undertakings carrying out services of 
general interest can be, for that reason only, exempt from the antitrust rules. 
It must be stated that a prerequisite for the effectiveness of the provision invoked is that the 
conduct that is the subject of the complaint was raised as being closely linked to the fulfilment of 
specific tasks entrusted to a firm engaged in the operation of services of general economic interest.  
There was no evidence which suggested that the behaviour took place as the only possible 
behaviour in order to pursue Enel’s institutional mission n energy. 
The burden of proof was on Enel. 
Comment 
This judgment is very interesting, since it defines in absolutely clear and precise terms the notion of a 
‘relevant market’ with reference, in particular, to the position of companies operating in a wide 
geographical area in which services of public interest operate.  
The definition of the relevant market, in both its product and geographical dimensions, allows the 
market operators (suppliers, customers, consumers) to be identified. On that basis, the total market size 
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and the market share of each supplier can be calculated with reference to their sales of the relevant 
product in the relevant area. 
Companies' estimates, studies commissioned from industry consultants or trade associations, or the 
companies' turnover figures can help to calculate the total market size and the market share of each 
supplier. If sales are usually the reference whereby market shares are calculated, there are nevertheless 
other indicators that, depending on the specific products or industry in question, can provide useful 
information, such as capacity and the number of players in bidding markets, etc. 
The conclusion is that the interpretation of data and the judicial assertions of both the product and 
relevant geographical markets are complex economic issues that carry too many possibly relevant 
markets for the purposes of administering justice. As stated above, the best that the courts can do is to 
identify many relevant markets for one product and to ascertain whether there is inelasticity in at least 
one of them. 
In our case, the question is whether the proper solution was not to consider as a relevant market 
that for the execution of works of excavation and the maintenance of a network in the Puglia region, 
but that for an electricity and telecommunications network: in fact, the gas and water markets do not 
have the same players if compared with the second market. 
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